131. Telegram 69772 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany1
69772. Subject: Proposed FRG Nuclear Sale to Brazil. Ref: State 66712.
1. As a follow-up to Ingersoll/Von Staden meeting (reported in reftel), Department and ACDA discussed with FRG Embassy officials Patermann and Stelzenmuller U.S. concerns re proposed FRG nuclear sale to Brazil. The following points were made.
2. U.S. is concerned about supply of full fuel cycle capabilities (enrichment and reprocessing) inherent in proposed FRG sale to Brazil. FRG sale would set precedent for transfers to both NPT and non-NPT parties and set standards for specific provisions of such sales, thus preempting the multilateral understanding on nuclear exports that we are currently seeking.
3. The FRG has stated that the Brazil agreement represents a step forward in nonproliferation efforts and there is little prospect of getting more comprehensive agreement. U.S. acknowledges that the conditions for sale include many of the elements U.S. has proposed: application of agency safeguards both to the supplied equipment, supplied and produced materials and technology, provision prohibiting use of these for nuclear explosives and provisions for adequate physical security. U.S. also notes that FRG has attempted to get further conditions such as IAEA safeguards on all Brazilian nuclear activities and a general commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear explosives, but has not been successful in this regard. Therefore, while the U.S. acknowledges that the FRG proposed conditions are extensive, they also fall short of U.S. suggested policies. U.S. feels FRG may be prejudging the outcome of possible multilateral agreement and therefore urges that FRG reconsider decision to proceed at this time.
4. If the FRG nevertheless intends to proceed with sale to Brazil, U.S. suggests the following additional elements be included in the covering agreement:
[Page 440]A) Provision for continuing involvement by the supplier in reprocessing and enrichment programs, to include joint ownership, voice in policy decisions and technical/operational presence.
B) Clear definition in bilateral agreement of guidelines for implementation of IAEA safeguards covering technology to minimize possibility of legal questions concerning whose technology is involved in developing new facilities.
C) Special provisions to assure effectiveness of IAEA safeguards on enrichment and reprocessing plants, including supplier concurrence on IAEA facility attachments, and limitation to low-enriched cascades.
D) Specific provision for application of bilateral safeguards by supplier country if IAEA safeguards are removed.
E) Inclusion of provision for additional supplier control over timetable for developing fuel cycle facilities, such as joint FRG/Brazil determination of appropriate developmental schedule.
5. U.S. planned on discussing the conditions and terms highlighted above in context of a suppliers conference. Due to imminence of proposed FRG sale, and in light of joint interest in non-proliferation and previous productive U.S.–FRG nonproliferation discussions, U.S. believes that we should discuss above conditions re this specific export case bilaterally as soon as possible either in Washington or Bonn.
6. Text of substance of points in para 2 to 5 provided to FRG Embassy officials who will pursue question of follow-on meeting with Bonn. No action required by Embassy at this time.
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Summary: The Department transmitted a summary of the meeting among Department of State, ACDA, and FRG Embassy officials concerning the proposed FRG nuclear sale to Brazil.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750108–0018. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Nosenzo; cleared by Kelly, Boright, Kalicki, Kratzer, David Anderson (EUR/CE), Elliott, and Jay Moffat (S/S); approved by Vest. Telegram 66712 to Brasilia, March 26, is ibid., D750106–0309. For an additional report on the Ingersoll-Von Staden meeting, see Document 127.
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