Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

132. Memorandum From David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, April 3, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Contact with the Soviets on CW in the CCD

As a follow-up to the 1974 Summit commitment to explore with the Soviets possible international restraints on CW, we have been attempting to define U.S. options in this area. The crucial issue has been the question of whether or not U.S. chooses to undertake a binary nerve agent program or is willing to forgo such a program. Most of the arms control measures in CW turn on this question.

Recent fragmentary information developed during Army tests of some stockpiled CW munitions indicates that one of our two nerve agents (VX) may be deteriorating. If this proves to be the case, the longevity of our stockpile would be questionable and we might need binaries to maintain an acceptable stockpile.

We will not be able to evaluate and answer this question of deterioration for several months, as additional testing is needed. It, therefore, seems unlikely that we will be in a position to put the fundamental question on binaries to the President before the summer.

Following last summer’s Summit, Vorontsov delivered to you a Soviet draft of a CW treaty. This draft treaty gives us trouble because it calls for destruction of stockpiles, a ban on further production, and a prohibition on R&D. Since most of these measures are unverifiable, we clearly will not be able to go nearly as far as the Soviets suggest in this draft.

The Soviets have periodically asked if we are prepared to discuss their draft treaty or to undertake bilateral discussions of a joint CW initiative as provided for by the Summit Communiqué of July 3, 1974 and reaffirmed at Vladivostok. The Soviets are anxious that we have some bilateral contact soon, and this would be helpful for the purpose of deflecting CCD pressures.

All agencies agree that we should accede to this request and have Ambassador Martin meet with Ambassador Roshchin during the next few days. Since we are not in position to hold substantive talks on possible CW restrictions, the interagency proposal is for Martin to address certain questions to Roshchin concerning the Soviet draft treaty. We would also make a brief joint statement at the CCD noting that U.S.-Soviet contacts on CW are continuing. The instructions for Ambassador Martin are at Tab A.

Denis Clift concurs.

Recommendation:

That you approve the contact with the Soviets regarding their CW draft treaty under the instructions at Tab A.

We also recommend tabling in the CCD the U.S. convention on restricting environmental warfare. This convention has been cleared by you before, and has recently been coordinated in NATO.

1. Summary: In light of the 1974 summit commitments on possible international restraints on chemical weapons, Elliott and Sonnenfeldt recommended that Kissinger approve continued contact with Soviet officials concerning the draft treaty and table the U.S. convention on restricting environmental warfare at the CCD meeting.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents, NSC “NS” Originals File, Box 54, 7502059, Proposed Contact With Soviets on Chemical Warfare. Secret. Sent for action. Clift initialed his concurrence. Kissinger initialed approval of both recommendations. Instructions for Martin, Tab A, are attached but not published.