Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

127. Telegram 66020 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany¹

Washington, March 24, 1975, 2016Z.

66020. Subject: West German Nuclear Exports to Brazil. Ref: State 48844 (Notal).

1. FRG Ambassador Von Staden called on ACDA Director Fred Iklé March 21 to convey his government’s reaction to U.S. expressions of concern about pending FRG–GOB nuclear agreement, especially about exports of reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities. (U.S. had proposed that all pending agreements which included these facilities be delayed until suppliers could confer on common policies.) Von Staden presented informal note which contended that FRG had obtained best results possible in its negotiations with Brazil, that FRG was pessimistic about chances of harmonizing views of supplier countries, “after efforts of several months and in light of the reaction of other states,” and that in any event, if all suppliers obtained conditions and principles equivalent to these, this would be a step forward. Note said FRG saw little prospect of achieving more comprehensive agreement among relevant supplier countries and said FRG therefore “believed that in view of the legitimate interests of our nuclear industry the conclusion of the agreement with Brazil should not be delayed any longer.”

2. FRG note also answered specific questions we had posed concerning projected FRG-Brazil agreement (para 5 reftel). FRG responses indicated that no controls on plutonium were envisioned over and above IAEA safeguards except for prior FRG consent to re-export. Note cited both Brazilian and German opinion that all technology developed in connection with FRG-Brazil cooperation would be subject to IAEA safeguards. However it said implementation of this principle would be determined in the safeguards agreement and that this would be negotiated between Brazil and IAEA (without FRG participation). Agreement would preclude use of covered material for any explosive device.

3. FRG note confirmed that cooperation agreement envisaged provision of both uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. It said that “concerning uranium enrichment, we have excluded the particularly sensitive centrifuge technology” but there was consideration of use of the nozzle separation process. Note concluded that at industrial level, “there will be joint ventures which will offer additional safeguards.”

4. Iklé said USG would study FRG reply carefully. His initial personal reaction was that one effect of such an agreement would be to create problems for U.S. negotiations with Iran. As we had informed FRG, we had not acceded to the Iranian request for an agreement permitting storage of U.S.-derived plutonium in Iran. Lack of supplier oversight over plutonium storage in Brazilian-FRG agreement would be especially awkward in light of fact that Iran is a full NPT party while Brazil refused to support the treaty.

5. Von Staden said FRG was pleased with agreement it was able to reach and thought safeguards were good. Iklé recalled some of weaknesses in safeguards system itself including inadequate staff of inspectors, and mentioned even greater uncertainties likely to surround inspection of complex facilities such as reprocessing plants. He noted lack of economic rationale for these facilities in countries like Brazil, which should give rise to question about their motives for seeking them. U.S. had over fifty reactors but no reprocessing plants now in operation.

Kissinger

1. Summary: The Department transmitted a summary of ACDA Director Iklé’s March 21 meeting with West German Ambassador Von Staden concerning the pending West German-Brazilian nuclear agreement. Von Staden gave Iklé an informal note that indicated that the “best results possible” had been reached with the Government of Brazil and answered several questions posed by the Ford administration regarding the agreement.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750102–1013. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Frank Crump (ACDA); cleared by Iklé and Davies; approved by Klein. Repeated Priority for information to Paris, and also to London, Moscow, Tokyo, Ottawa, the Mission to the IAEA at Vienna, Brasilia, and the Mission in Geneva. Telegram 48844 to Bonn, March 5, is ibid., D750078–0226.