66. Telegram 192437 From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, September 5, 1974, 1400Z.1 2
TELEGRAM
Department of State
192437
O 051400Z SEP 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN
IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA
IMMEDIATE
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION OECD PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PHNOM
PENH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
IMMEDIATE
STATE 192437
FOLLOWING SENT ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS FROM SECSTATE WASHDC
31 AUG 74:
QUOTE
STATE 192437
ALGIERS, BAMAKO, BELGRADE, BERLIN,
BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, BUJUMBURA, CONAKRY, COTONOU, DACCA, DAR ES SALAAM,
GEORGETOWN, ISLAMABAD, KABUL, KHARTOUM, LIBREVILLE, LUSAKA, MOGADISCIO,
MOSCOW, PEKING, PRAGUE, SANAA, SOFIA, TANANARIVE, TRIPOLI, VALLETTA AND
WARSAW FOR INFO ONLY. ALL OTHERS ACTION.
DAKAR ALSO PASS INFO BANJUL AND NOUAKCHOTT
KUWAIT ALSO PASS MUSCAT
FOR ACTION
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
E.O. 11652: GDE
TAGS: VORG, XA, XB, XG, XM, XF
SUBJECT: KHMER UNITED NATIONS CREDENTIALS
1. AS PREPARATIONS FOR THE 29TH UNGA GO FORWARD, I AM DISTRESSED TO LEARN THAT IT IS THE ESTIMATE OF THE DEPARTMENT AND OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT SUPPORTERS OF THE KHMER INSURGENT REGIME, NOMINALLY LED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK, STAND AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF OBTAINING ENOUGH VOTES TO UNSEAT THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC.
2. I WISH TO AFFIRM TO YOU MY STRONG AND PERSONAL INTEREST IN THIS MATTER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE EJECTION OF THE GKR FROM THE UN WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA BUT BECAUSE OF ITS IMPLICATIONS AS A PRECEDENT FOR THE UN AS AN INSTITUTION. ALTHOUGH YOUR MISSION HAS BEEN ASKED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS TO INTERVENE ACTIVELY WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO SEEK SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE US POSITION ON THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE, I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS AGAIN THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH I REGARD THIS MATTER.
3. AS I RECENTLY TOLD THE CONGRESS, THERE ARE TWO BASIC THEMES IN OUR POLICY TOWARD INDOCHINA. THE FIRST IS OUR BELIEF THAT A SECURE PEACE THERE IS IMPORTANT TO OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A WORLDWIDE STRUCTURE OF PEACE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT AN EVOLUTION TOWARDS PEACE IN OTHER TROUBLED AREAS HELPS BRING ABOUT STABILITY FOR WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR SO LONG IN INDOCHINA. CONSEQUENTLY, OUR POLICY IN INDOCHINA, IN GENERAL AND CAMBODIA IN PARTICULAR, HAS BEEN GEARED TO BRING ABOUT CONDITIONS WHICH WILL BRING THE CONTENDING PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. THEREFORE, A COROLLARY IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, AND THE SECOND THEME OF OUR POLICY, HAS BEEN THE FRUSTRATION OF A FORCIBLE CONQUEST OF THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA. AGAIN, AS I TOLD THE CONGRESS, FORCIBLE CONQUEST IS NOT ONLY REPUGNANT TO AMERICAN TRADITIONS BUT DESTABILIZING IN THIS INTERDEPENDENT WORLD BECAUSE THE EFFORTS ARE FELT FAR BEYOND THE AREA DIRECTLY THREATENED.
4. WE WANT HOST GOVERNMENTS CLEARLY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE US FAVORS NO PARTICULAR FORM OF GOVERNMENT OR SOCIAL SYSTEM IN THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA. HOWEVER, WE DO INSIST ON A FREE CHOICE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THOSE COUNTRIES, AS THE DECISIONS OF FIVE PRESIDENTS IN THE PAST 25 YEARS INDICATE. FOR THIS, AMERICA HAS SOUGHT NO PLAUDITS AND HAS IN FACT SUFFERED UNJUST CRITICISM. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE, NEVERTHELESS, THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL NATIONS, WITHOUT COMMENTARY ON THE MERITS OF EITHER SIDE’S CLAIMS, TO SUPPORT A CESSATION OF COMBAT IN THE AREA.
5. WE BELIEVE THAT ACQUIESCENCE IN THE CLAIMS OF THE CAMBODIAN INSURGENT REGIME TO THE KHMER SEAT IN THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD NOT, AS SOME WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE, RESOLVE THE ISSUE ONCE AND FOR ALL. RATHER, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD FURTHER EMBITTER THE CONFRONTATION BY ENCOURAGING THE KHMER ROUGE TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO BRING DOWN THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT BY ALL MEANS.
6. THE KHMER PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES, DESPITE DIREST PREDICTIONS BY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS AND AWESOME INTERNAL PROBLEMS, HAVE SURVIVED THE ONSLAUGHT OF COMBAT-TRAINED NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS, PLUS THE ATTACKS OF KHMER COMMUNIST TROOPS LED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE-TRAINED CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST CADRE. THE VERDICT IS QUITE CLEAR AFTER FOUR YEARS OF WAR AND SUFFERING IN A SMALL AND PEACEFUL NATION--AND MAJOR OFFENSIVE EFFORTS--THE KHMER COMMUNISTS HAVE FAILED IN THEIR OBJECTIVES.
7. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE COMMUNISTS CANNOT TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT BY FORCE, THEY DO HAVE THE CAPACITY TO CONTINUE THE CONFLICT, IN SIHANOUK’S WORDS, FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE OF INCONCLUSIVE KILLING AND DESTRUCTION.
8. THE LEGITIMATE KHMER GOVERNMENT HAS PROPOSED UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ITS OPPONENTS. WE SUPPORT AND COMMEND THIS MOVE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE UN AS A BODY WOULD ALSO SUPPORT NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN PREJUDGING THE ISSUE BY TAKING THE UNPRECEDENTED STEP OF EJECTING A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GOOD STANDING AND REPLACING IT WITH AN INSURGENT REGIME. MOREOVER, THIS IS A REGIME THAT HAS NONE OF THE TRADITIONAL CLAIMS TO AUTHORITY, SUCH AS EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE APPARATUS OF GOVERNMENT, THE CAPITAL OR THE POPULATION AND WHOSE LEADERS NOT ONLY PROMISE MASSACRE BUT WHO HAVE BEEN TRUE TO THEIR WORD.
9. IF THE MEMBERS OF THE UN VOTE TO ADMIT THE CAMBODIAN INSURGENT REGIME, IT WILL, WE BELIEVE, DAMAGE THE CENTURIES-OLD EFFORT TO DEVELOP A CODE OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY AMONG NATIONS BY MOVING AWAY FROM ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF LEGITIMACY AND SUBSTITUTING IN ITS PLACE AN INSURGENT AND ILLEGAL REGIME. OTHER NATIONS MAY BECOME SUBJECT TO SUCH AN ATTACK ONCE THE UN SHOWS ITS WILLINGNESS TO ADMIT SUCH A REGIME.
10. I WANT CHIEFS OF MISSION TO BE AWARE OF THESE COMMENTS AND THE TALKING POINTS WHICH WILL BE SENT BY SEPTEL, AND TO TAKE THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPRESS UPON THE HOST GOVERNMENT AT HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL OUR STRONG FEELINGS THAT NO ONE SHOULD VOTE TO EXCLUDE A DELEGATION IN GOOD STANDING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT RATHER THEY SHOULD SUPPORT A CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION, BROUGHT FORWARD BY SUPPORTERS OF THE GKR, WHICH COULD LEAD TO PEACE, OR AT LEAST DEFERRAL OF THE ISSUE.
11. US REPRESENTATIVES WILL CONSULT INTENSIVELY WITH OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN NEW YORK IN AN EFFORT TO AGREE ON A SUITABLE SOLUTION. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THESE EFFORTS AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.
12. FOR LISBON, OSLO AND VIENNA. GIVEN EARLIER ASSESSMENTS OF HOST GOVERNMENT POSITIONS ON THE KHMER REPRESENTATION ISSUE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ATTITUDES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE SPECIAL ACTIONS OR APPROACH THAT MIGHT BE MADE AT HIGH LEVEL TO INSURE SUPPORT FOR GKR.
13. FOR ADDIS ABABA, ABIDJAN, ACCRA, AMMAN, BANGUI, BUENOS AIRES, BRAZILIA, KINSHASA, LAGOS, MONROVIA, NAIROBI, NEW DELHI, MEXICO CITY, NDJAMENA, OUAGADOUGOU, PORT LOUIS, PARIS, REYKJAVIK, RABAT, TUNIS, YAOUNDE. DO NOT TAKE ANY ACTION UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ARE RECEIVED. INGERSOLL
UNQUOTE
KISSINGER
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Antippas and approved by Rives. For the intelligence community’s assessment, see Document 65.↩
- Kissinger directed posts to intervene with host governments to defeat any attempts to unseat the Government of the Khmer Republic during the 29th United Nations General Assembly.↩