64. Telegram 171606 From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Vietnam, August 6, 1974, 2300Z.1 2

TELEGRAM
Department of State
171606

P R 062300Z AUG 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

STATE 171606

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS:PINT PFOR, MR, VS

SUBJECT: DRV/PRG DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE
REF: SAIGON 8775

1. WE ESTIMATE DRV/PRG WILL CONCENTRATE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE DURING REST OF CALENDAR YEAR ON FOLLOWING TARGET AREAS LISTED IN ORDER OF PRIORITY:

A. UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

A MAXIMUM GOAL OF DRV/PRG DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE WOULD APPEAR TO BE SECURING PRG FULL MEMBERSHIP IN ANY OF 12 UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES. THIS WOULD ENTITLED PRG TO AUTOMATIC INVITATION TO MAJORITY OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES. HOWEVER, SUCH OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO BE BEYOND REACH OF PRG FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE BECAUSE IT SIMPLY DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT VOTES TO WIN APPROVAL OF TWO-THIRDS OF MEMBERSHIP REQUIRED FOR ADMITTANCE TO SUCH AGENCIES. (SOLE EXCEPTION TO TWO-THIRDS RULE IS WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) WHICH ONLY REQUIRES SIMPLE MAJORITY VOTE. IN WAKE OF DEFEAT AT LAW OF WAR CONFERENCE LAST FEBRUARY PRG FAILED TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP TO WHO MEETING IN APRIL BUT MAY WELL SUBMIT AN APPLICATION NEXT YEAR). NONETHELESS, THERE ARE MEETINGS OF SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AT WHICH PRG ISSUE COULD CONCEIVABLY ARISE INCLUDING: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) BOARD OF GOVERNORS, VIENNA, SEPTEMBER 13; IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE, VIENNA, SEPTEMBER 16-23; INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) TRIENNIAL ASSEMBLY, MONTREAL, SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 18; UNESCO EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING, PARIS, SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 18; UNESCO GENERAL CONFERENCE, PARIS, OCTOBER 15-NOVEMBER 16; INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE (IMCO) ASSEMBLY, LONDON, OCTOBER 16-18; AND FAO 64TH COUNCIL, ROME, NOVEMBER.

B. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

GIVEN DIFFICULTY OF GAINING ADMITTANCE TO SPECIALIZED AGENCIES DRV/PRG, SUPPORTED BY USSR AND PRC, WILL PROBABLY PRESS FOR ADMISSION TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, FOCUSING ON THOSE GATHERINGS DEALING WITH BROAD HUMANITARIAN ISSUES THAT CAN BE EXPLOITED TO GARNER SYMPATHY VOTES AMONG “NON-ALIGNED” NATIONS AND A FEW WESTERN STATES. LIST OF SUCH CONFERENCES INCLUDES UN WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE, BUCHAREST, AUGUST 19-30; UN 3RD PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, FOOD CONFERENCE, ROME, SEPTEMBER 23-OCTOBER 5; ICRC WEAPONS CONFERENCE, LUCERNE, SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 18; UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), 25TH SESSION, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, GENEVA, OCTOBER; UN WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE, ROME, NOVEMBER 5-16; AND UNICEF SPECIAL PLEDGING CONFERENCE, NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 11. ADDITIONALLY DRV/PRG MAY RENEW ATTEMPTS TO GAIN OBSERVER STATUS OR SOME OTHER FORM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED STATUS FOR PRG AT UN 29TH ASSEMBLY MEETING IN SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, OBSERVER STATUS IS TRADITIONALLY GRANTED BY SECRETARY GENERAL ON BASIS OF MEMBERSHIP IN AT LEAST ONE UN SPECIALIZED AGENCY AND OF BEING “GENERALLY RECOGNIZED” BY THE MEMBERS OF THE UN. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN ADDITION TO MEETINGS OF SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND CONFERENCES NOTED ABOVE THERE ARE LITERALLY SCORES OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS SCHEDULED FOR REMAINDER OF YEAR AT WHICH, THEORETICALLY, PRG ISSUE COULD ARISE. IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR US TO MONITOR EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THESE MEETINGS. HOWEVER, ALL U.S. DELEGATIONS TO MAJOR INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS HAVE STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS ON PRG ISSUE INCLUDING REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY IF MATTER COMES UP. ONCE INFORMED WE ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT WE CAN MARSHAL SUPPORT TO THWART EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE PRG--AT LEAST FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

C. “NON-ALIGNED” NATIONS

MAJOR THRUST OF DRV/PRG EFFORT WILL BE DIRECTED AT AFRICAN STATES, MANY OF WHOM AS RESULT OF PREVIOUS COLONIAL EXPERIENCE TEND TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO DRV/PRG PORTRAYAL OF COMMUNIST CAUSE IN VIET-NAM AS ANTI-COLONIAL STRUGGLE. DRV/PRG THUS FAR HAVE SECURED RECOGNITION FROM 19 AFRICAN STATES WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR NEARLY HALF OF 41 NATIONS RECOGNIZING PRG. PRG FOREIGN MINISTER BINH’S ATTENDANCE AT 11TH OAU SUMMIT MEETING IN MID-JUNE AND HER POST CONFERENCE TRAVELS ARE CLEARLY DESIGNED TO EXPAND PRG’S AFRICAN SUPPORT FURTHER. INITIAL REPORTS FROM 11TH OAU SUMMIT MEETING INDICATE THAT OAU DID NOT ADOPT A RESOLUTION ENDORSING PRG NOR IS IT CONSIDERING ANY SUCH MOVE IN NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT AT LEAST ONE OF PARTICIPANTS AT SUMMIT, RWANDA, IS COMING UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM “NON-ALIGNED” GROUP TO EXTEND RECOGNITION TO PRG. WE ARE SENDING CIRTEL TO ALL AFRICAN POSTS, WITH INFO TO SAIGON, ASKING FOR FIRST-HAND ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE FUTURE PRG GAINS AMONG AFRICAN NATIONS.

D. SOUTHEAST ASIA

ONE OF PERSISTENT DRAWBACKS TO PRG’S QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY HAS BEEN NOTABLE LACK OF SUPPORT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS. TO DATE NO NON-COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA STATE HAS RECOGNIZED PRG. (BANGLADESH EXTENDED RECOGNITION TO PRG MARCH, 1973 BUT TECHNICALLY IT IS REGARDED AS SOUTH ASIAN STATE.) DRV/PRG WILL TRY TO IMPROVE THIS SITUATION, FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON LAOS, AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA. WHILE IT DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY THAT ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES WILL RECOGNIZE PRG IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT ONE OR ALL COULD BE PERSUADED TO ADOPT A FRIENDLIER ATTITUDE TOWARDS PRG IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON VIET-NAM AND IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES. MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR EARLY DRV/PRG GAIN IN REGION IS CAMBODIA WHERE COMMUNIST INSURGENT REGIME PRESENTLY APPEARS TO HAVE EXCELLENT CHANCE OF REPLACING LON NOL GOVERNMENT AT UN 29TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY BEGINNING IN SEPTEMBER. IN ADDITION TO IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS DRV/PRG WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS JAPAN TO LEND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO PRG BUT GOJ SHOWS NO SIGNS OF YIELDING TO SUCH PRESSURE. IN CONTRAST PRG REPRESENTATIONS TO INDIA SEEM TO BE BEARING FRUIT AS GOI HAS RECENTLY INFORMED US THAT IT MAY PERMIT PRG TO ESTABLISH INFORMATION OFFICE NEW DELHI BEFORE END OF YEAR.

E. WESTERN EUROPE

DRV/PRG WILL USE ITS INFORMATION OFFICES IN NORDIC COUNTRIES (SWEDEN, DENMARK, FINLAND AND NORWAY) AND NEW “PERMANENT MISSION” IN FRANCE TO ENCOURAGE MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD PRG. PROSPECT OF SECURING OUTRIGHT RECOGNITION FOR PRG FROM ANY WESTERN EUROPEAN NATION IN NEAR FUTURE APPEARS TO BE UNLIKELY. HOWEVER, DRV/PRG MAY POSSIBLY SUCCEED IN OBTAINING WHAT THEY VIEW AS ENHANCED STATUS FOR PRG REPRESENTATION IN ONE OR TWO CAPITALS SUCH AS RECENT “NAME CHANGE” OF PRG INFORMATION OFFICE IN PARIS TO PERMANENT MISSION. IN THIS CONNECTION SENIOR SWEDISH MFA REPRESENTATIVE RECENTLY TOLD US THAT GOS IS CURRENTLY STUDYING QUESTION OF POSSIBLE MOVES TO UPGRADE STATUS OF PRG INFORMATION OFFICE IN STOCKHOLM BUT THAT NO DEFINITE DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE. TWO COUNTRIES WHICH MAY RECEIVE INCREASED DRV/PRG ATTENTION ARE BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS.

F. OTHER

DRV/PRG WILL CONTINUE TO RELY ON KEY ARAB BACKERS SUCH AS EGYPT, ALGERIA, LIBYA AND SYRIA TO BOLSTER ITS SUPPORT AMONG ARAB NATIONS. HOWEVER, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR NEW DRV/PRG GAINS IN THIS AREA. IN LATIN AMERICA, ASIDE FROM CUBA, ONLY PERU HAS SUPPORTED DRV/PRG DEMARCHES AT RECENT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DRV/PRG WILL BE DEVOTING MUCH TIME TO THIS AREA GIVEN STRONG U.S. PRESENCE AND FACT THAT DRV/PRG MAIN CONNECTION, CUBA, APPEARS TO HAVE VERY LIMITED POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON THIS ISSUE AMONG LATIN NATIONS.

2. WITH REFERENCE TO USG PRE-EMPTIVE INFORMATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY, USIA WIRELESS FILE APPEARS TO OFFER BEST MEANS FOR RAPID DISSEMINATION OF PERTINENT DATA AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL TO POSTS WORLDWIDE. IN ADDITION TO USING WIRELESS FILE WE PLAN TO SEND CIRTELS TO REPORT IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS PRG ATTEMPT TO GAIN ADMISSION TO ICRC DIPLOMATIC AND WEAPONS CONFERENCES. MOREOVER, WHEN OCCASION WARRANTS WE WILL BE SENDING SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO INDIVIDUAL POSTS ALERTING THEM TO SIGNIFICANT DRV/PRG ACTIVITY IN THEIR AREA AND RECOMMENDING COUNTERMOVES. EMBASSY COULD PROVIDE USEFUL ASSISTANCE BY FURNISHING DEPARTMENT WITH OCCASIONAL AIRGRAMS ANALYZING DEVELOPMENTS THAT HIGHLIGHT PRG’S BOGUS CLAIMS TO LEGITIMACY, SUCH AS ITS SHARPLY LIMITED POLITICAL APPEAL IN SOUTH, WHICH CAN BE USED IN PREPARING CIRTELS AND INSTRUCTIONS.

3. AT RISK OF STATING OBVIOUS WE WOULD NOTE IN CONCLUSION THAT MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF THWARTING HANOI’S DRIVE TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE FOR PRG IS A WELL COORDINATED, AGGRESSIVE COUNTER CAMPAIGN BY RVN. WHILE U.S. CAN AND WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AT UPCOMING CONFERENCES AND IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING COMING MONTHS, OVER LONG RUN RVN SHOULD, WITHIN LIMITS OF ITS RESOURCES, ASSUME LARGER BURDEN OF PRESENTING ITS OWN CASE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN DEALING WITH THIRD WORLD BLOC WHERE RVN IS WIDELY VIEWED AS BEING OVERLY DEPENDENT ON US. WE COMMEND EMBASSY SAIGON FOR ITS CONSIDERABLE AND SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO GET RVN TO ASSUME A MORE AGGRESSIVE DIPLOMATIC POSTURE AND WE URGE THAT YOU CONTINUE TO PUSH HARD IN THIS AREA. AT THIS END WE HAVE ESTABLISHED CLOSE LIAISON WITH RVN EMBASSY AND INFORMATION OFFICE AND ARE PRESENTLY WORKING WITH THEM TO SHARPEN FOCUS OF THEIR ANTI-PRG ACTIVITIES IN WASHINGTON. KISSINGER

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Finney; cleared in draft by Bettauer, Goott, Schaller, Rives, Wenzel, and Schiff, and in EUR/NE, NEA/INS, ARA/LA/USOAS, USIA, AF/RA, EA/ANP, and EA/IMS; and approved by Hummel. Repeated to all diplomatic posts and USUN.
  2. The Department identified the most likely avenues the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would use to enhance their international status at the expense of the Republic of Vietnam.