Office of the Historian

366. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, December 10, 1976.

SUBJECT

  • ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting, 10 December 1976

PARTICIPANTS

  • ARA—Assistant Secretary Harry W. Shlaudeman,
  • Mr. Joseph Grunwald; CIA—Mr. [name not declassified],
  • Mr. [name not declassified]; INR/DDC—Francis De Tarr

Uruguay: Threat Against Congressman Koch

Most of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the threat made by a Uruguayan security official last July [less than 1 line not declassified] in Montevideo against the life of Congressman Koch (reported in State [Page 982] 292202 dated December 1 and described in detail in Montevideo 4652 dated December 2; [less than 1 line not declassified] concerning the threat on July 23, Congressman Koch wrote to Attorney General Levi on October 19 after having been contacted by an FBI agent, and Attorney General Levi wrote to the Secretary on November 5; with Mr. Luers concurrence, we sent Mr. [name not declassified] copies of these letters as well as State 292202 and Montevideo 4652 earlier in the week.)

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said that we are now faced with an operational problem. The Attorney General had referred Congressman Koch’s letter of October 19 to the Department.

Mr. [name not declassified] said that the FBI had briefed Congressman Koch. [3½ lines not declassified] In the meeting with Koch, they had tried to put the matter into perspective. [2½ lines not declassified].

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said that the question remains as to whether we say anything to the Uruguayan Government. If we do, we run a risk as far as the source is concerned. [1½ lines not declassified].

[3 lines not declassified] Congressman Koch seemed to accept this line of reasoning.

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said that they could not be certain on this point. It was ambiguous, and this is the major question.

Mr. [name not declassified] said he saw no reason to believe that Congressman Koch has changed his position since the meeting on October 26. They have heard nothing further from him. He seems to be satisfied. The matter seems to have been laid to rest.

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman suggested that the same people talk to Congressman Koch again and ask him whether he is satisfied or whether he wants to have a démarche made.

[3 lines not declassified] They had gone into the matter. The threat is not a serious one. So why make a démarche?

Mr. [name not declassified] said that he felt that a personal meeting was indicated, not a letter. Reference should be made to the meeting on October 26, and Congressman Koch could be told that no new information has been developed since that time. He would then expect to get something in writing. One of the Department’s legislative liaison people should be involved. [1½ lines not declassified]

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman asked what Mr. [name not declassified] would recommend if Congressman Koch still wanted to have a démarche made. Mr. [name not declassified] said that in his view there is no reason to think he would. He is a rational man.

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman asked Mr. [name not declassified] how much he thought Congressman Koch should be told. Mr. [name not declassified] said that he thought Congressman Koch should be told everything we know, except for information about the source. The [Page 983] objective is to put the matter in its proper perspective, to try to lay it to rest. [1½ lines not declassified] Ambassador Siracusa’s telegram contains the information needed to put it into perspective, that is, to show it is not sufficiently serious to make a démarche. We have no reason to make a démarche.

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said we would see, adding that he would go see Congressman Koch or call him.

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman then asked what Mr. [name not declassified] thought should be done about the two Uruguayans who want to come to the United States. Mr. [name not declassified] said: it is up to you all to decide if you do not want to take even a minimum chance. As managers we may come out this way. Basically, it is a decision for the Department. [2½ lines not declassified]

[3 lines not declassified]

In conclusion, Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said that we would let Mr. [name not declassified] know how we come out on the matter.

[Omitted here is discussion of Embassy personnel and Cuba.]

  1. Summary: Participants in the ARA/CIA weekly meeting discussed the threat against Congressman Koch and whether or not to make a dé;marche to the GOU.

    Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committees, ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings 1976–77. Secret; Sensitive.

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