365. Telegram 4652 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State1
4652. Subj: Threat Against Congressman Koch. Ref: State 292202.
1. Prior to receiving reftel, I had never heard anything whatsoever about a threat against Congressman Koch [2 lines not declassified] it turns out that a remark as described in reftel was made some months ago by Uruguayan Army Col. Jose A. Fons, [1 line not declassified] The matter is further complicated by [less than 1 line not declassified] The name of Army Major Jose Nino Gavazzo Pereira, also of the army intelligence unit, SID (Defense Intelligence Service) to aid in judgment of this matter there follows my chronological summary [less than 1 line not declassified]
2. The story begins with [1½ lines not declassified] dated July 23. He mentioned that [less than 1 line not declassified] Col. Fons, had once said “after a couple of drinks” when they were discussing the Uruguayan military’s “extreme irritation” with Congressman Koch, that “maybe Uruguay would have to send someone to the United States to ‘get him’.” [less than 1 line not declassified] he felt at the time that Fons “was just talking out loud”; but he added that should the Koch amendment be approved, “the inclusion of Koch on the Condor target list might seriously be considered by Condor members.”
3. On 2 October [1½ lines not declassified] noted that he believed Fons’ earlier remark “should be taken less seriously than when originally reported.” His reasons were that aggressive action would require concurrence of higher-ups who, although feeling Koch and the Congress had acted unjustly toward Uruguay, “had no intention of modifying traditional ties and dependency on the United States.” He also felt that [Page 979] in the aftermath of the Letelier assassination Uruguayans would take no such risk with their image. [1½ lines not declassified] His view that in the event Uruguay were to decide to go ahead with such a thing, they would entrush the operation “to only one person, Major Gavazzo”; and their modus operandi, he said, would be to send him into the United States for a few months to develop the “operational plan.” He offered to report immediately should his evaluation change.
4. [less than 1 line not declassified] dated 4 November, [less than 1 line not declassified] both Fons and Maj. Gavazzo had been assigned to the US, the former to the inter-American Defense Board to arrive in early January of 1977, and the latter as assistant military attaché; to arrive in March of 1977. He offered the view that the assignments appear “to uncoincidental and neither will have a Condor Mission.”
5. On 19 November [less than 1 line not declassified] “long discussions” with Fons about his assignment and the latter’s avowal that his superiors, Generals Prantl and Vadora, have never seriously contemplated any operations in the United States as it “was too risky and highly counterproductive.” He said Fons’ assignment was to give a plum to a Senior Colonel not likely to make General and Gavazzo’s was to “get him out of the day-to-day fight with terrorists because he had been burned and is known to terrorists.” [less than 1 line not declassified] Both were aware that their respective assignments could be misunderstood [less than 1 line not declassified] Fons has taken great pains to explain [less than 1 line not declassified] their two assignments were a coincidence. He said that neither Fons or Gavazzo “is being assigned to Washington with a Condor Mission.” [less than 1 line not declassified] that in the US climate, following the Presidential election, the GOU “has no intention whatsoever of making any comments or taking any action that would irritate US authorities.
6. [less than 1 line not declassified], dated December 1, [2 lines not declassified] expresses the opinion that after his “exhaustive discussions with Fons, [less than 1 line not declassified] that “Fons earlier statement re Koch should not be taken seriously today.” He notes that this was made after a few drinks and was never repeated. [3½ lines not declassified] both recognize that since subject has been raised [less than 1 line not declassified] and exhaustively discussed. They would be suspect should anything happen. Can only repeat that [less than 1 line not declassified] neither has Condor Mission”.
7. I have also learned from the AIRA of his recent discussions with Fons of the latter’s prospective assignment to the US, and of Fons’ expressed concern that his and Gavazzo’s assignments, which he took pains to say were “conicidental”, might be misunderstood. Fons also told AIRA that he was concerned for his own safety in the US and had asked superiors whether he could request FBI protection. He was told, he said, [Page 980] that he could not request it but could accept it “if offered.” AIRA and others who know Fons characterized him as a loose talker. Many here recall that he was nearly court martialed a couple of years ago for creating an incident at a diplomatic reception by making wild, communist charges against persons in the GOU.
8. Evaluation: After careful reflection I accept [less than 1 line not declassified] that Col. Fons’ remark, as such, should be considered, in the context in which it was made, not to consittute, in itself, a real threat to Cong. Koch. I also agree that even had there been any semblance of seriousness at the time, the probability of any aggressive action has been rendered virtually zero by subsequent discussion [less than 1 line not declassified] which would surely lead directly to blame of Fons, Gavazzo and GOU should anything whatsoever happen to Cong. Koch. It is also probable [less than 1 line not declassified], that the assignments of both Fons and Gavazzo to the US are conicidental, having nothing to do with any threat to Cong. Koch or anyone else; reflecting, rather, service needs and motives [less than 1 line not declassified]. On the other hand, since coincidentally or not, the assignments precisely carry out [less than 1 line not declassified] what would happen and who would be involved if an attempt were contemplated, I do not, repeat do not, see how we can in conscience allow the assignments to be realized, minimal or even non-existent as the threat may be. There is a further consideration that the AIRA, while believing Fons to be unoffensive, considers Gavazzo to be a dangerous type.
9. Conclusion and Recommendation: My conclusion (re para. 3 of reftel) is that we have no basis to notify the GOU that it would be held responsible for anything that might happen to Cong. Koch. A remark made after drinks some months ago by a known loose talker is just not adequate basis for serious overture which would be offensive to the extreme to the GOU; and, to base such an overture solely on the fact that Koch was a sponsor of an amendment against Uruguay would appear gratuitously to impugn the integrity of the GOU itself. As for the manner of blocking the assignments of Fons and Gavazzo, I propose that this be done by the Department’s advising Ambassador Perez Caldez that neither assignment would be welcome. I further suggest that this be done with minimum explanation. One possibility, drawing on Fons’ own expressed fears, could be that the notorious relations of both officers to SID and to the Uruguayan anti-terrorist campaign could make them targets for incidents which we would prefer not to have happen in the US. It might also be noted that the USG, having heard of Fons concerns, and as it would not be able to provide protection, would prefer to avoid any potential risk. Such a course of action, I believe, would be effective and would have minimum potential for damaging overall relations. There might well be [less than 1 line not declassified] and even the possibility of [Page 981] some degree of retaliation. I believe we must accept this, however, unless we are prepared to ignore the whole thing which I do not repeat not recommend.
10. I wish to end this message by stating that I am appalled that there could have been an exchange of communications reporting and judging a subject so potentially explosive and even tragic, concerning a threat against an American Congressman, the integrity of this mission, and the relations between the US and Uruguay, without the Ambassador even being aware of it until receipt of the referenced message. I intend to take this up in further and separate communication. Since I note that Cong. Koch was briefed on this matter by an FBI on October 1, some days before I saw him, [less than 1 line not declassified] I sincerely request that the Department make known to him that I was totally unaware that such an even off-hand remark had been made when I met with him. This is particularly important since when he asked if it would be safe for him to come to Uruguay, I rather lightly remarked that he would be as safe as I always am. A [illegible] would probably travel around together.
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Summary: Ambassador Siracusa summarized the Embassy’s information regarding the threat against Congressman Koch, noting that this was the first time he had been informed of it. He recommended against a dé;marche to the GOU on the subject, but proposed that the USG should oppose the appointments to positions in Washington of two Uruguayan military officials linked to the threat.
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Montevideo 1962–79. Secret; Roger Channel; Stadis; Eyes Only. An attached note indicated that this cable was distributed to DDC, S/S, P, ARA, and INR on December 4. The telegram was forwarded to Habib under a covering memorandum from Shlaudeman on December 13, discussing the threat and the potential appointments of Fons and Gavazzo. (Department of State, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P84121–2164) In a December 29 memorandum to Saunders, DeTarr summarized the case and gave the date of the threat against Koch as June [text not declassified]. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committees, Uruguay 1973–80) Telegram 292202 to the Embassy in Uruguay is Document 364.
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