331. Telegram 453 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State1
453. Subj: Preliminary Recommendations Re U.S. Posture in New Uruguayan Situation.
1. Although it will be some time before the full implications are known, the “total agreement” reached between the President and the armed forces has ended Uruguay’s institutional crisis at least temporarily. To all appearances the agreement essentially preserves the constitutional and institutional framework. Aside from a few changes in top [Page 896] officials the structure of the GOU has scarcely been altered. Essentially what has been overturned is not so much the government or the institutions but the locus of power with the military now dominant over the civil authority.
2. While obviously it is too early to recommend the most advisable posture in this new situation our current thinking is that we institute a low-key, business-as-usual position insofar as routine operations are concerned. Since there has been so little change in the GOU structure, any other position on our part would seem abnormal. Contrary to our expectations we have received several friendly feelers from elements of the military dissidents. We therefore recommend continuation of normal official and personal relations with GOU officials and agencies.
3. However, immediately ahead we will be faced with other than routine decisions. As examples, there are pending, requests for naval vessels; ammunition; offers of equipment under Mimex-Simex; the loan for the Fiat plant; agricultural commodities, etc. Also we will have to decide the manner in which we go about dunning the GOU for a ten percent payment on grant military assistance and the past-due postal debt. As of now we believe we should handle each such case on an ad-hoc basis. However, we should be very slow in undertaking any new commitments until the situation is more clear. It may well develop that at least in the short term our policy objectives in Uruguay will be easier to accomplish under the system now established if military pressures on the Uruguayan bureaucracy make it function more effectively.
4. It is worth emphasizing that throughout this crisis the military dissidents no less than the constituted authorities took great pains to emphasize their commitment to Uruguay’s legal framework and constitutional structures. The military have thus far held to this legalistic line despite great temptations to do otherwise and despite some elements who favor extra-constitutional actions. This commitment to legality and constitutional form is to a great extent explained by Uruguay’s strong democratic traditions. However in my judgment the military are also influenced by what they believed might be the domestic and foreign, perhaps especially U.S., reaction to a Golpe in the usual Latin American sense. Another satisfying result is that; although there were moments of great tension, restraint avoiding the shedding of blood was exercised.
5. We appreciate Department’s efforts in avoiding public comment that might complicate our position in the transition period. What has emerged, we consider, is an Uruguayan solution to an Uruguayan problem.
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Summary: The Embassy noted that an agreement between President Bordaberry and the armed forces had ended the political crisis with minimal changes to Uruguay’s government institutions or personnel, although the “locus of power” now rested in the military. The Embassy recommended that the U.S. adopt “a low-key, business as usual position” on routine interactions between the two governments but watch new developments carefully.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 15 UR. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated Immediate to Southcom and to DIA. In a memorandum to Kissinger, February 13, Eliot reported many of the same points about the agreement but made no policy recommendations. (Nixon Library, NSC-Latin America, Box 796, Folder 3, Uruguay Vol. I [1 of 2])
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