330. Telegram 436 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State1

436. CINCSO for POLAD. Subject: Preliminary Analysis of Possible External Orientation of Uruguayan Military. Ref: MVD 2773, 2672, 2621, A–167 of October 7, 1972.

1. Summary: The Uruguayan military group, which has now openly attained dominant power in Uruguay, share many common characteristics with other reformist, Latin American military. There are some similarities with the orientation of the Peruvian Military. Basically, however, the Uruguayan military at this stage are inward rather than outward looking. They are highly nationalistic and suspicious of foreign activities. End summary.

2. Speculation that the Peruvian military government is the model for the Uruguayan military dissidents and that the Uruguayan military want to set Uruguay on a radical populist, not to say Marxist, left has been most active in spreading this line. Developments during the past few days will no doubt reinforce this hypothesis, especially abroad. In my judgment and based on what we know now and previous service in Peru, there are some important similarities between the orientation of the Uruguayan military dissidents and those observed in their Peruvian brothers-in-arms.

3. The Uruguayan military share the conviction of their Peruvian colleagues that they and only they can save the nation and can identify disinterestedly with the well-being of the masses. They have some common group characteristics of idealism, moralism, being thin-skinned, prideful, suspicious and contemptuous of those not agreeing with them. They instinctively distrust politicians and businessmen, [Page 894] believing them to be corrupt almost by definition. They tend to see problems and their solutions in simplistic and idealized terms as perusal of their policy statements shows. (MVD 429 and 432). We note section of Army/Air Force communiqué 7773 which reads: “. . . the Armed Forces neither adhere nor adjust their mental outlooks to any specific politically partisan philosophy, but seek to adjust their beliefs and orient their actions according to the native and original concept of an ideal Uruguay . . . which will offer the greatest well-being and happiness to all its sons. This concept will be achieved with the creation and consolidation in all Uruguayans of the mystique of Uruguayaness, which consists in recovering the great moral values of those who forged our nationality and whose basic facets are: patriotism, austerity, disinterest, generosity, honesty, self-denial and firmness of character . . .” They are thus more eclectic than ideological, but because they desire public support, if not adulation, share a strong tendency towards demagoguary. They also share a suspicion of foreign activities in their country and a great desire for independence from any form of foreign tutelage. As in Peru, the Uruguayan military have made studies of various aspects of Uruguay’s problems at the Military Institute for Superior Studies (IMES) under the direction of civilian instructors, most of whom are believed to have a statist, but not, as in Peru, Marxist orientation.

4. There are also important differences between the Peruvian and Uruguayan situations. There is a great difference between the two countries, their cultures and their traditions. The Uruguayan military must operate in a country having a highly developed institutional framework, a high degree of civic pride and individual freedom, a well-educated and sophisticated population, and a strong tradition of civilian control over the military. The Uruguayan military realize they will have to rely on civilian collaboration. Apparently at this stage, they as individuals are not willing to assume direct responsibility for governing as in Peru.

5. If the Uruguayan military were to look abroad for a model, Argentina, the nation most resembling Uruguay, comes first to mind. However, Uruguayans are all too aware of the failures of “Argentine Revolution”. Brazil is an attractive model because it is a working one. However, Brazil is traditionally feared even more so as its growing power is felt here. The Uruguayan military, conscious of their nationalistic image, will not wish to appear open to charges they are the southern appendage of the northern colossus. Thus, while Brazilian model will have great influence of Uruguayan military thinking, we doubt there will be an open identification.

6. Peru, on the other hand, is far away. It has a good nationalistic image acceptable to many political segments in Uruguay, especially [Page 895] on far left and among dissident youth. It is also widely believed here that “Peruvian Revolution” is a success. These factors may incline some of the Uruguayan military not to reject an identification with the Peruvian model, if they believe it is in their interest to project a radical, revolutionary image. The Marxists will do everything they can to push for this identification. However, we expect the Uruguayan military to remain basically inwardly-oriented and highly nationalistic.

7. We shall report soon what we perceive to be the attitudes of the dissident Uruguayan military towards the U.S. As of now, few of us here doubt that it will take some time before it will be possible for us to establish an easy working relationship with this group. We do not foresee at any time soon that they will drop their disposition to be highly suspicious of us.

8. [less than 1 line not declassified]

9. Department may disseminate as desired.

Ortiz
  1. Summary: The Embassy reported that the Uruguayan military, now the dominant power in Uruguay, shared some elements of a leftist political orientation with the reformist Peruvian military government. Ultimately, however, the Embassy concluded that Uruguay’s military was unwilling to govern directly and too nationalistic to consciously model itself on the military of any other South American nation.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 23–8 UR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated for information to Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Lima and Southcom. In telegram 519 from Montevideo, February 16, the Embassy reported that a meeting had taken place between some leaders of the military and the Convención Nacional de los Trabajadores (CNT), and that on February 13 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) had declared its support for some points in the military’s platform. The Embassy concluded that there was “a coincidence of interests” between the military, the labor movement and the communist party that led to “a tactical ‘alliance’ which is very unstable, given the extreme hostilities which have existed between these groups in the past.” (Ibid.)