165. Telegram 2046 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
2046. Subject: General Rosson’s Visit and Arms from US.
1. Summary: Ambassador was present at meeting late April 16 between General Pinochet, head of GOC junta, and General William B. Rosson, USCINCSO. Pinochet pressed hard for decision on US arms for Chile, and initiated discussion which gave General and Ambassador opportunity to explain problem raised by human rights issue. End summary
2. After amenities, General Pinochet turned immediately to arms question. Said that Chile had performed great service in displacing Allende’s Marxist government. It was unique in the world in that Chile had accomplished this action with no outside assistance. Chile has ousted the communists and would continue to oppose them. But as regards armaments “US had not taken Chile’s outstretched hand.” In particular the US had not responded with regard to M–60 tanks which Pinochet himself had requested of General Underwood in 1972 and which are needed now to counter a possible attack from Peru—a country which was being aided in its preparations by the Soviet Union in order to reimpose Marxism in South America.
3. General Rosson explained that Chilean request for arms purchases was still under study in Washington and unfortunately he did not have any further information not already in the hands of GOC. General Rosson then went on to explain that the US Embassy, US military group and USSouthCom had supported Chilean requests for assistance.
4. At this point General Rosson pointed out that one of the problems affecting a decision from Washington on the Chilean arms request is the issue of human rights. General Pinochet replied that opposition to arms shipment in Washington based on human rights considerations is unjust. Pinochet said that Chile was and would continue to be a democratic [Page 449] country but it resented being criticized unjustly. For example, it was frequently said that individuals had “disappeared” when the fact was that these people frequently had aliases and were detained by the government under names different from those known to inquirers, thus making identification extremely difficult. He further commented that Chile could hardly be said to have had a revolution since it had cast out Marxism with the death of 1500 persons; an act which could be more accurately described as a “movement” rather than a revolution. Subsequently, the Chilean government had had to take steps to preserve internal security. The communists who were protesting about this all over the world had no regard whatever for human rights or for human beings as individuals.
5. Ambassador agreed that, in a sense, a double standard does exist, with Chile being held to a much higher level of performance than communist states. This was in part because the world had come to think of Chile as an outstanding democratic nation. Whatever the inequities, the Ambassador and General Rosson explained, the fact was that there was concern by many in the US with regard to the human rights issue.
6. Comment: Discussion was probably most direct high-level Chilean complaint so far re USG delay in responding to Chilean arms requests (State 75132). We expect we will have more of same, and will be communicating our views as to implications to Department in septels.
7. Pinochet comments also give insight into one of our major difficulties in dealing with human rights issue here. GOC military leaders are imbued with self-righteousness at their success in having freed Chile of Marxist regime. They attach overriding importance to fact that their subsequent efforts to prevent subversion are proceeding in strict accordance with Chilean law. And they are indignant at international Marxist campaign against them, involving patent untruths and distortions. As result, they are largely insensitive to grounds for non-ideologically-motivated foreign concern at state of observance of human rights in Chile.
8. They are also plainly unable to realize that an important part of negative international reaction to Chilean events derives from foreign perception of Chile quite different from their own. As an example, when Pinochet deprecates the loss of 1500 lives, he is thinking of those saved by timely military action in contrast to Allende’s repeated predictions of a civil war costing a million lives. It is very doubtful that he realizes his remarks would not go down well if disseminated publicly, because foreign public is so largely ignorant of civil war atmosphere which is still pervasive in Chile.
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Summary: During a meeting with Pinochet, General William B. Rosson of the U.S. Southern Command noted that concerns about the junta’s human rights record affected the ability of the U.S. Government to provide it with military assistance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740090–1029. Secret; Exdis. On April 25, the Department informed the Embassy that it had approved the sale to Chile of 18 F–5E aircraft, 15 M–60 tanks, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, and the light anti-tank weapon (LAW) system; and that it would continue to examine their other arms requests on a case-by-case basis. (Telegram 84285 to Santiago, April 25; ibid., D740098–0052) In telegram 86774 to Santiago, April 27, the Department reported that Kubisch had told Ambassador Heitmann that the arms sales had been authorized in order to deter aggression in the region. (Ibid., D740101–0067)
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