66. Telegram 900 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State1
900. Department pass DOD. Subj: Allocation of FY 74 MAP. Ref: State 023517.
1. Reftel gives the FY 74 allocation of MAP for Bolivia at $2.730 million (matériel $2.300, training $.400). Since this represents a substantial cut in anticipated level and will dismay GOB and cause problems for us with GOB military at a crucial time in Bolivian political situation, I would appreciate urgent reconsideration and upward adjustment in the Bolivia program for FY 74 to a level not less than the Continuing Resolution authority which has become common knowledge. I offer the following reasons in support of my request:
A. The FY 74 allocation of $2.73 million is a reduction from the Continuing Resolution level of $3.5 million consisting of $2.9 million MAP–M and $.6 million MAP–T. To go below $3.5 million will mean heavy cuts of much needed equipment and training to operate equipment already delivered under the FY 72 and FY 73 programs for all services.
B. Bolivian authorities have been pressing us hard in recent weeks for expeditious delivery of equipment in ongoing programs. They appear to be wondering whether we are holding back for some unstated reasons. Were I to inform the Bolivian Government at this time that the MAP grant program is now down to $2.73 million when they have knowledge that CR level is $3.5 million, their concerns would be increased and our rapport cum credibility reduced.
C. A reduction in the Military Aid Program will be viewed as companion piece to “bad news” on PL–480. We have had to tell the GOB that there will be no further PL–480 Title One program for FY 74 and that the chances are slim that there will be any for FY 75. The impact on President Banzer, personally, will be quite negative.
[Page 190]D. Recently the Bolivian military authorities came to us with an urgent appeal for ammunition, and while we did approve the sale, we initially conditioned it on their coming to Panama to pick it up and our making a collection of payment in advance of its delivery. While this was ultimately worked out to our and the Bolivians satisfaction, nevertheless our conditions were not well received.
E. I would observe that this 2.73 figure is drastically below the MAP figures in our approved CASP (4.7 million), in the congressional presentation document (4.450 million) and in the congressional presentation document as published (5.2 million). I have no basis on which to explain to the GOB why these higher figures are inoperative or what has caused this cut in the Bolivian MAP. While we may be misinformed, we have heard informally that the Congress has authorized funds sufficient to cover the approved Bolivian program.
F. Bolivia is passing through a critical and fluid political/military period. President Banzer, although an Army General, is now quite dependent on the Bolivian Armed Forces for his survival. Recent decisions on the economic front have brought the popularity of the Banzer regime to its lowest point since the October ’72 devaluation, with a consequent increase in divisive tendencies within the military. In a setting such as this, we can further our interests at little cost; or we can lose effective rapport by making the downward cut in our FY 74 MAP. The military program has been one of my principal influence and leverage mechanisms with the GOB. I have been able through the military program to apply pressure or to enlist support where political and economic means were not appropriate. To reduce the effectiveness of the tool will harm my ability to operate effectively.
2. In view of foregoing, I strongly recommend that ways be found to hold the FY 74 MAP program at the FY 73 level. Meantime, I shall not inform GOB nor will I have MILGP do so either.
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Summary: Because military assistance gave him an important source of leverage in his management of bilateral relations, Ambassador Stedman urged that the Department refrain from cutting aid to the Bolivian armed forces.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to USCINCSO. In telegram 23517 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 5, the Department listed the levels of military assistance allocated for Latin American countries in FY 1974. (Ibid., [no film number]) The Department, citing “world-wide reductions and high priority requirements in Cambodia and the Middle East,” denied Stedman’s request to maintain the level of military assistance at $3.5 million. (Telegram 39843 to La Paz, February 28; ibid., P750001–0806)
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