Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

388. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Georgetown, October 19, 1976, 8:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Pre-departure Talk with Prime Minister Burnham

PARTICIPANTS

• John Blacken, Chargé d’Affaires a.i., American Embassy, Georgetown
• Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of Guyana

After I had made the official U.S. protest to Foreign Minister Wills as directed by the Department and had completed drafting a cable thereon, I called Burnham to tell him that I was leaving the following morning. He asked if I would come over to see him at 8:45 PM.

When I arrived in Burnham’s office, I said that his speech had earned me a ticket to Washington, as Fred Wills had probably told him. Burnham responded that he didn’t understand why. His speech had contained nothing but facts. I replied that he might consider it that way, but regardless of whether the “facts” that he had cited were correct, the suggestions and insinuations that accompanied them made clear his speech contained an attack on the United States. We had given assurances to him that the United States was not involved in any way with the sabotage of the Air Cubana plane, nor were we involved in any campaign to deter Guyana from organizing its economy as it saw fit. The insinuations, therefore, were unfair. I had become angry in listening to his speech and, as I was sure that Fred Wills had already told him, my government had felt offended by the speech. Burnham said he hoped that I had not taken it personally. I replied that no, I had no ill feelings toward him but that my feelings were immaterial, since the problem had been caused.

Burnham said he didn’t think there should be any lasting adverse effect in U.S./Guyana relations over his speech. The United States should assure that the guilty get punished. If Barbados did not prosecute them, then they should be sent to Cuba. He hoped the United States would not prevent that from happening. He then returned to the fact that the United States had encouraged and helped the Cuban exiles previously. It had not moved to clearly separate itself from them at the present. If he could see that the United States law enforcement authorities were moving seriously against Cuban exiles using the United States as a base, he would be satisfied.

Burnham again reviewed the history of Orlando Bosch and asked why we had never sought his extradition before. He called Bosch a murderer and suggested that the United States kill him. When I asserted that the United States Government did not act in that way, Burnham retorted, “You have done it before!” I replied that I didn’t know what he was referring to, but that sort of thing was out of the question.

Burnham mentioned the protest to the Guyanese Chargé in Washington on October 14 and said that the United States could not expect to influence governments by talking to them as if they were unruly children. I replied I was certain that interpretation had not been intended.

Burnham then started talking about Tom Adams, Barbados’s Prime Minister. Adams had made a fool of himself, he said, by stating that “destabilization” did not exist. The Cuban exiles’ actions, such as the bombing of Guyana’s consulate and the sabotage of airplanes, was “destabilization.” He reminded me that two weeks ago he had said publicly that governments were not now practicing “destabilization” against Guyana and that “destabilization” could come from many sources, including Cuban exiles. Returning to Tom Adams, he said, “You are backing the wrong horse; he can’t do your work for you.” He then said that Barbadian Foreign Minister Forde was now in Washington talking of economic assistance for Barbados, and he was sure that he would get support. However, he repeated that Adams was “a passing thing in the Caribbean. He is out of step politically with the area.”

He then said it would be in the United States’s interest to have good relations with Guyana. He said, “We can help you with Cuba.” He explained this by saying that he believed there would be a rapprochement between Cuba and the United States within the next year or two. Burnham added that Castro wants to resume relations with the United States.

Comment: Burnham was personally friendly throughout my visit. He appeared calm but tired. Although he seemed to understand that the United States might be annoyed over the criticism, he had directed at it in his October 17 speech, he did not seem to comprehend why the U.S. should be seriously offended. Looking back on this conversation and our several previous talks since October 6, I believe Burnham’s attitude concerning the whole affair to be as follows:

—A horrendous crime was committed resulting in 73 deaths, including 11 Guyanese;

—A sense of personal guilt, or at least responsibility, for having induced 6 of the 11 Guyanese who died to go to Cuba;

—The USG may or may not still have some ties with the anti-Castro group which they helped organize, equip and train ten years ago, but even if such ties do not exist, because of the USG’s “historical links” with these groups, the USG has a special responsibility to disassociate itself now from the “Frankenstein monster” it created;

—The United States appeared reluctant to acknowledge that sabotage was the cause of the airliner crash;

—The United States might well be behind the reluctance of the Government of Barbados to claim jurisdiction over the case;

—The USG might fear that a thorough investigation and trial might reveal further embarrassing USG ties to the exiles;

—The USG might have engaged and might still engage in “destabilization” of Guyana’s government; and

—Behind all of this is the belief that the USG has a much greater capacity for controlling events around the world—for good or evil—than it actually possesses.

Burnham did not appear to believe that his speech should cause any lasting adverse impact on U.S./Guyana relations. He was lamenting a situation and, without a written text, had become overly emotional. He gave the impression that, once the dust had settled, U.S./Guyana relations would return to the more-or-less friendly state that had existed prior to the airliner crash.

1. Summary: Blacken told Burnham that the Guyanese Prime Minister’s speech implying a U.S. role in the Cubana bombing had resulted in his recall to Washington. Burnham stated that he did not think that the speech should cause any lasting damage to bilateral relations.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830032–0592. Confidential. Drafted by Blacken. The meeting took place in Burnham’s office. In telegram 258529 to Georgetown, October 19, the Department instructed Blacken to protest allegations of U.S. Government complicity in the Cubana bombing. (Ibid., D760392–0453) In telegram 2088 from Georgetown, October 19, Blacken reported that Wills, in “personal comments” to Blacken, stated he wanted to improve U.S.-Guyanese relations. (Ibid., D760392–0827)