Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

387. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Georgetown, October 18, 1976, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Foreign Minister Wills

PARTICIPANTS

• John Blacken, Chargé d’Affaires a.i., American Embassy, Georgetown
• Fred Wills, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Foreign Minister Wills called me at about 7:00 AM the morning of October 18 and, in referring to Prime Minister Burnham’s speech the previous day, said that it was worse with respect to the United States than he had expected, even though at the meeting on Saturday it had been decided to mention the “facts” that the police investigation in Trinidad had revealed. He said he would like to see me that afternoon in his office as soon as he returned from addressing a training group at a Guyana Defense Force camp outside of town. Our meeting was subsequently postponed until 3:30 PM.

When I arrived in his office, Wills appeared harassed and tired. He had delayed our meeting for an hour in order to go to the airport to see off a Barbadian sports team which was leaving prematurely. He had tried to patch things up with representatives of that group who were angry with Prime Minister Burnham’s statement of the previous day.

The speech had caused a lot of damage in the Caribbean as well as in U.S./Guyana relations. There was no question, Wills said, that

Burnham had criticized the United States. Now it was his task to try to pick up the pieces.

I told Wills that the speech was one which would anger Americans; I became angry listening to it. Wills replied that he understood that but said that our reaction last week had caused the speech to be worse than it would have been otherwise. Wills then again reminded me of his efforts to keep the thing within certain parameters during the previous week and a half. I reiterated the feeling on the United States’s side that Guyana had been in almost total opposition to the U.S. at the UN Wills then denied that, saying he had personally tried to be fair to America. He had endorsed in his speech on September 30 Kissinger’s plan for Namibia. He claimed to have been instrumental in the Prime Minister’s decision not to go to North Korea and, at the Non-Aligned Conference at Colombo, that Guyana not take a position on the North Korean and Puerto Rican resolutions. I challenged him on the latter, saying we had had indications that the Guyanese delegation had helped the Cubans with their resolution on one of the committees. Wills said he knew nothing of this and, moreover, to his knowledge no one on the Guyanese delegation had spoken favorably of either the North Korean resolution or the Cuba-supported Puerto Rican resolution.

I told him that it seemed to some people that he had told me and my predecessors that the GOG would do one thing and then it would do something else in the U.N. He again said he didn’t see how anyone could draw that conclusion and started to review the issues we had talked about prior to his visit to the UNGA. I stopped him, saying that he was correct except for two things—his statement concerning Secretary Kissinger’s initiative on Rhodesia, and the destabilization statement. He responded that, on destabilization, he had done exactly what he had told me he would do—he had not criticized the United States. When he referred to destabilization, it was to the activities of the Cuban exiles in the attempt from abroad to force Guyana to change its policies by threats or violent actions or false press articles. Guyana’s goal at the UN was simply to take a position against destabilization and to define it so that, should it happen in the future, it would be condemned. I replied that Americans had become very sensitive to that term and, when he brought it up, he had to assume that Americans would consider themselves his target.

Concerning the Rhodesia problem, Wills reminded me that he had already said that his statement had been coordinated by Burnham with the “front line” Presidents. It had been agreed that Guyana would say things they wanted said but could not say themselves because they were directly involved in the Rhodesia problem. His personnal position still remained that he had expressed to me before his departure for New York, i.e., that he encouraged the United States’s efforts to find a negotiated solution.

Wills said that Guyana’s foreign policy was closely linked to its domestic political problems. There were the wild men in the PNC and a few in the Cabinet who would urge Burnham to take the worst possible attitude toward the United States. Wills mentioned again that he was considered and had been accused of being a dove vis-à-vis the United States. He tried to manage Guyana’s foreign policy, to maintain cordial relations with the United States. He said that I and my predecessors had always had access to him at any time, that he had been open and frank with us. Individual Americans got along well in Guyana. However, Guyana was trying to be a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The United States is big and powerful and attracts strong resentment from many countries. When governments have internal political problems, unfortunately they sometimes “throw darts at the United States.” His role, Wills said, had been to minimize this, but he takes his instructions after a majority of the Cabinet have decided. He had always tried to inform us when signals were suddenly changed.

Last week, Wills had sought to keep Burnham’s speech within the parameters of his own October 11 press release. In that form, it would not have mentioned the fact that Joe Leo’s name had been in Freddy Lugo’s diary, nor would it have contained other points which would seem to link the United States to the Cuban exiles who sabotaged the Air Cubana airliner.

He had lost that battle, and his fallback position had been that these things be mentioned in the following context by Burnham: (1) that there was strong evidence that Cuban exiles had sabotaged the airliner, and (2) that the notes in the diary and other things linking the United States to the matter were very weak evidence. This would have prevented the opposition from accusing the government of attempting to cover up information linking the United States to the matter and, at the same time, would draw no inferences of United States complicity. This was disrupted on Friday night by Burnham’s reaction to the protest over Wills’s statement. Others joined in. Wills said that he had been put down during that meeting.

Wills tried to explain what Burnham was doing by asking me to examine the domestic political context in which Burnham is operating. He has a Marxist political opposition. If the government seems close to the United States, Jagan would build up force and would attract the support of the radical youth. Burnham’s political strategy is to try to obtain a majority. To do this, he has got to neutralize some groups; he has got to undermine Jagan and attempt to split part of his support from him. He has succeeded already in isolating Walter Rodney and his Black Power group.

Wills asserted that Guyana was no closer to the Soviet Union than it was to the United States. “We have not been praising the Soviet Union. You don’t see Guyanese officials talking about ‘dictatorship of the proletariat,’ nor do we quote Lenin.”

He then said that half of the men in the Cabinet couldn’t even be classified as Socialists. Hubert Jack and Desmond Hoyte were ideological Socialists, but they weren’t Communists. Wills then said he was a Socialist but not a Communist.

I asked Wills what Burnham wanted for Guyana. He replied that Guyana wanted to be free to develop an internal economic and political system with some Socialist principles. It wanted no strategic attachments to Cuba, the Soviet Union, or the United States. (I believe the omission of China was inadvertent.) Thirdly, Guyana wants help in developing its country and people.

During this conversation, we also discussed the UNESCO meeting in Nairobi. Most of that part of our conversation has been reported by cable.

I told Wills during this meeting that I was being recalled and that I would have a message for him before I left. We agreed that, if it were to come during the night, I would call him at home so that I could leave on the plane the following morning. Wills said he thought it would be better if he did not mention to Burnham before the message arrived that I was being recalled.

Wills said he would be happy to come to Washington if I thought that that would be helpful in repairing the damage that had been done by Burnham’s speech. I told him I didn’t know, but if it appeared that such a visit would be useful, I would send him a message, if such a meeting would be helpful.

Comment: Wills appeared distressed over Burnham’s speech and seemed to understand the damage it had done. He appeared to want to restore cordial relations between our two governments.

Wills is an extremely complex man. He admittedly moves in indirect ways to accomplish his objectives. He has told me that in Cabinet meetings he frequently gives the impression that his main objective is “x” in order to accomplish “y.” He manipulates his Cabinet colleagues, sometimes with Burnham’s connivance, and presumably attempts the same thing with us. Wills claims that his objectives are to maintain cordial relations with the United States within the overall context of Guyana’s basic non-aligned position in foreign relations and Socialist orientation of Guyana’s economy. How much one can trust Wills on a given issue depends directly upon how closely his objectives parallel ours on that issue.

1. Summary: Blacken informed Wills that he was being recalled to the United States after Burnham delivered a speech suggesting U.S. involvement in the October 6 bombing of a Cubana de Aviación airliner. Blacken and Wills reviewed recent Guyanese foreign policy positions.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830032–0587. Confidential. Drafted by Blacken. The meeting took place in Wills’s office. In telegram 4470 from USUN, October 15, the Mission transmitted the text of a Guyanese press release containing an October 11 statement in which Wills suggested that the Cubana bombing, which killed 11 Guyanese citizens, represented evidence of a sustained destabilization campaign against Guyana. (Ibid., D760387–1020) In telegram 256677 to Georgetown, October 16, the Department instructed the Embassy to tell Wills that statements by Guyanese officials implying that the United States was involved in the Cubana bombing were unacceptable and to reiterate U.S. Government opposition to all forms of terrorism. The Department noted that it had delivered a démarche along those lines to the Guyanese Chargé. (Ibid., D760388–0754) In telegram 2072 from Georgetown, October 16, Blacken reported that Wills informed him that Luers’s démarche had hardened the anti-U.S. attitudes of Guyanese officials. (Ibid., D760389–0654) In telegram 2073 from Georgetown, October 17, Blacken reported on Burnham’s speech that day, which he characterized as a “bitter, scathing attack on the United States.” (Ibid., D760390–0046)