Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

389. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, December 11, 1976.

Relations With Guyana

The Problem

Whether, after some mixed but generally conciliatory signals from the GOG, to respond by returning our Chargé to Georgetown.

Background/Analysis

Since we withdrew our Chargé on October 20 we have had several indications that Burnham wants to “normalize” his relations with us. He is obviously nervous and unsure as to what to do next about the U.S. Although most of the signals from Georgetown are conciliatory, there are also continued public references to “destabilization.”

We have the following conciliatory gestures from the GOG:

—November 23 Wills sent us an oral message through the Guyanese Chargé here, asserting that the GOG now realizes that the USG had nothing to do with the Cubana crash;

—The GOG-controlled press published a front page article stating that the arrested suspects were not members of the CIA;

—The GOG squashed a strong anti-U.S. resolution introduced by opposition leader Jagan in Parliament November 23 concerning the airliner crash and substituted a mild resolution which in no way implicated the USG and contained no mention of “destabilization;”

—During the Parliamentary debate on November 24, Wills commented favorably—deliberately—on the U.S. Federal Grand Jury investigation of Cuban exiles in Miami;

—Guyana’s delegation at the UNESCO Conference, in contrast to most other non-aligned nations, abstained in votes on occupied territories, Jerusalem and mass media issues. They requested that we look upon this as evidence of their cooperation.

Not all Guyanese actions have been so positive.

—Burnham has referred, albeit unspecifically, to destabilization in two recent public speeches;

—Guyana is co-sponsoring a UN resolution (on non-interference in internal affairs of states) which refers repeatedly to “destabilization”—again without specific mention of the U.S.;

—At the UNGA on December 6 the Guyanese, along with Trinidad and Tobago, voted against us on the Guam issue.

Burnham is apparently convinced that the U.S. is opposed to Guyana’s Socialist orientation. He also seems to have concluded that he can get little assistance from the Soviets or Cuba. Facing a very serious BOP problem, he feels cornered and his paranoia is growing. The absence of Blacken deprives him of anyone from our side with whom he can discuss the problem of restoring relations.

The Options

1. Take no action at this time, and leave it to the new Administration to decide how best to handle the problem.

Pro:

—Keeps Burnham under maximum pressure to unsay his allegations.

—Makes it crystal clear that we will not tolerate such irresponsible actions.

Con:

—Deprives us of any effective influence on Burnham, in the absence of an American official who can talk to him on a regular basis.

—Risks increasing Burnham’s paranoia to the point where he may go on to further excesses.

—Undermines the efforts of Wills and other Guyanese moderates to influence Burnham constructively.

2. Send Chargé Blacken back to Georgetown after Christmas with instructions to express again our displeasure over Burnham’s speech and to keep a cool distance making clear that the burden for improving relations still lies with the GOG.

Pro:

—Allows the new Administration to begin with the Guyanese on more or less a normal basis.

—Gives Burnham a chance to thrash out his problem with us if he wants to.

—Keeps the burden on the Guyanese for further improvement in relations.

—Strengthens the hand of the Guyanese moderates who advocate reconciliation with U.S.

Con:

—May be interpreted as a backing down by the USG.

—Leaves Burnham’s charges still on the public record, essentially unmodified.

—Could encourage Burnham to think he can make such accusations with little cost.

3. Inform the Guyanese Chargé here that we will consider returning Chargé Blacken to post provided that the GOG (a) puts an end to the use of the destabilization theme; and (b) by some public utterance repudiates the charge of U.S. responsibility for the Cubana crash.

Pro:

—If the Guyanese meet our conditions, it sets the public record straight.

—Such a change in Guyanese attitudes would not pass unnoticed in the rest of the Caribbean.

Con:

—Burnham has already almost certainly gone as far as he is prepared to go publicly in repudiating his accusations against us.

—Given Burnham’s paranoia, frustration, and immense ego, he might misinterpret this signal, and lash out at us anew.

—Or, more probably, he will just wait for the new Administration.

Bureau Views

I favor returning Blacken to Georgetown. Our point is now firmly made and Burnham has the message. But there seems to me a better chance that the lesson will take if we leave normalization for the new Administration. I would like to avoid the situation in which Burnham sees Blacken’s return under the new Administration as a signal of fundamental change in which all is forgiven.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Blacken to return to Georgetown, with the message of our continuing coolness in the absence of adequate GOG gestures (Option 2).

Alternatively, that you authorize us to inform the Guyanese Chargé here that “normalization” will require a halt in destabilization propaganda and a clarification of Burnham’s October 17 speech, indicating that the GOG does not hold us responsible for the Cubana crash (Option 3).

Or, that we take no further action at this time and leave the resolution of this problem to the new Administration (Option 1).

1. Summary: Shlaudeman asked Kissinger to decide whether to respond to conciliatory gestures from Guyana by sending Blacken back to Georgetown.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760191–2293. Confidential. Sent through Habib. Drafted by Heavner and Shlaudeman. The disapproval line next to the recommendation that Blacken be authorized to return to Georgetown was initialed for Kissinger on December 14 by Covey. A notation next to the recommendation reads, “Oral instructions to Habib.” The alternative options were not initialed. In a November 11 memorandum to Luers, Heavner noted that Blacken had suggested an approach to the Guyanese Chargé to explore the possibility of a retraction of Burnham’s accusations. (Ibid., P830032–0603) In a November 17 memorandum to Luers, Blacken reported that Guyanese Chargé Peter Holder had transmitted to him a message from Wills, who said that Guyana would like to resume a dialogue with the United States. (Ibid., P830032–0604) On November 17, Heavner drafted an options memorandum for Shlaudeman to send to Kissinger. (Ibid., P830032–0606) In telegram 16801 to Georgetown, January 25, 1977, the Department noted that in light of Guyanese Government gestures indicating a desire for better relations, Blacken would return to Georgetown. (Ibid., D770027–0590)