19. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting1
The Secretary’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meeting, Tuesday, July 16, 1974, 3:00 p.m.
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Cuba and the OAS.]
Cuba and the OAS . Conciliatory noises from Cuba; Brazil’s capacity to delay admission of Cuba to various bodies. The OAS majority voting issue and the risk of a deliberate lifting of sanctions by structuring a [Page 67] failure of a two-thirds vote to maintain them. The Secretary stated that we would not be pushed into having Castro at the March MFM and if necessary would take credit for his being there ourselves. He agreed to have the matter considered at a year-end meeting and to use that plan meanwhile as a negotiating tool. The Secretary agreed to lunch with the Brazilian Foreign Minister about October 5 on this strategy.
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Cuba and the OAS.]
[Mr. Kubisch:] The whole Cuba thing is beginning to boil up again, and Ambassador Mailliard, having gone into this very carefully in the OAS context, has prepared a memo, which I have just forwarded to you.
Secretary Kissinger: I understand the Cubans have said they are prepared to go to the conference.
Mr. Kubisch: On Saturday, Fidel was asked, “Will you come if invited?” And he said, “Yes, we will definitely come.” The Argentines told me in Buenos Aires about 10 days ago, when I was there—
Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me.
(Secretary Kissinger called out of room. Five-minute recess.)
Secretary Kissinger: O.K.
Mr. Kubisch: Just to finish one item?
Secretary Kissinger: Is it cleared at all the appropriate levels?
Mr. Kubisch: It will be, after I mention it. (Laughter.)
I just wanted you to know what when I was in Buenos Aires at President Perón’s funeral, the Argentines told me privately that they were not going to try to consult about whether or not Cuba should be invited to the March MFM until December at the earliest. And I said that made sense to me.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I’m presuming the Brazilians will block it.
Mr. Kubisch: I don’t know if that’s a safe assumption. Their position is evolving.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, if they don’t block it, we may not have any choice. One way or the other it’s O.K. to us.
Mr. Kubisch: Cuba has been admitted, for instance, to the Latin America bloc at the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas, and Fidel is making all kinds of conciliatory noises.
President Perez said Thursday maybe we can get Fidel to make some kind of a statement that would make it easier for us to invite him to that meeting a year from now. In the meantime, there are some other governments—Facio in Costa Rica and others—that are trying to promote a meeting of Foreign Ministers—or, at least, in the Permanent [Page 68] Council of the OAS—to lift the mandatory sanctions. That is the subject of the memo.
Secretary Kissinger: Have we changed the rules so that they can be lifted by majority vote?
Mr. Kubisch: Not yet.
Secretary Kissinger: Have we proposed it?
Mr. Kubisch: It hasn’t been necessary yet. They adjourned on July 3 for a couple of months and just didn’t get to it.
Mr. Feldman: This is giving us a lot of concern, because one of the outcomes—if they do something to call some kind of a meeting for consultation or of the Permanent Council, in order to hold off a unilateral vote by Venezuela or Colombia, they cannot get a two-thirds vote for changing these sanctions. So they may try to rig up some procedural gimmick where they say they’re accomplishing this by majority vote, which would make the thing look ridiculous.
Secretary Kissinger: Can’t we block a meeting?
Mr. Kubisch: We possibly can block it. It will take your own heavy involvement. But I think also, and I would recommend—
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t mind changing our policy, but I do mind being pushed. But if they’re trying to push us, they better understand it—we’re not going to be forced to having Castro in Buenos Aires. We might have to go to it but not under pressure. So nobody is going to play any points and be the hero that brought Castro to Argentina. And if they’re trying that, we’re not going to be there. I would just tell that to them.
Mr. Kubisch: I said it precisely to him.
Secretary Kissinger: If anybody gets credit for getting him there, it’s going to be us. (Laughter.) I’m serious.
Mr. Kubisch: No—I agree. And they are really sending you some signals, as you’ll see from this memo, to see whether or not you’ll approve a certain approach for the United States and all of us jointly to consider this problem.
Secretary Kissinger: Only the majority vote can end the sanctions. And then we can go along with the majority vote. But with any gimmick we’ll oppose. There’s no sense playing games with our policies; we’ll become a laughing stock.
Mr. Kubisch: I agree. When would you want to have that matter considered? Some think a month or two. I think what would be better would be at the end of the year, for many reasons.
Secretary Kissinger: For many reasons.
Mr. Feldman: On the Rio Treaty.
Secretary Kissinger: We should just block any special meetings.
[Page 69]Mr. Kubisch: And we can do it if we get your authorization to negotiate with them about a possible meeting in December.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s fine.
Mr. Kubisch: We need that to head one off now.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s fine. Nobody is going to make points at home by kicking the United States.
Mr. Kubisch: I’m glad to hear you say that because I felt I exceeded my own authority at one point in Buenos Aires when I was meeting with the Ambassador in the Foreign Ministry, the man in charge of the MFM. And he said at one point, “Well, we may not have to have a consensus to do that. You know, our Foreign Minister Vignes has the authority to consult. And he may send a message around saying ‘I’ve invited Cuba.’” I said, “If you send that to the Secretary of State, you may find that Secretary Kissinger will not come to the meeting.”
Secretary Kissinger: You tell him I am not coming to the meeting.
Mr. Kubisch: Later, after lunch, he said, “You know, you said something jokingly before lunch and I said something jokingly to you.” I let him know I wasn’t joking, and he said Vignes would never do that (invite Cuba without advance agreement).
Secretary Kissinger: We cannot in Latin America, or anywhere else, let the United States become the focal point for building yourself up domestically. If we want to have an opening to Cuba, let’s do it as our own policy and not let the Argentines deal with their Peronists by cheap shots at us. I’m open-minded on Cuba, but we’ll do it at our own speed.
O.K. Well, just as long as the Latins understand it. You better have a talk with the Brazilians so that they—
Mr. Kubisch: You may not have to read the memo now?—because one of the proposals was that we go to the Brazilians on this.
Secretary Kissinger: Is their Foreign Minister coming to the UNGA?
Mr. Kubisch: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: I should have a meeting with him—perhaps lunch.
Mr. Kubisch: I should think that on October 5th you might want to have a meeting with all the Latin American Foreign Ministers there—the anniversary of your remarks. A luncheon or dinner, and also some private conversations.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. O.K., good.
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Cuba and the OAS.]
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Summary: In a discussion with Department officials regarding Latin American interest in lifting sanctions against Cuba, and the possibility of Cuban attendance at a meeting of Foreign Ministers planned for March 1975 in Buenos Aires, Kissinger stated he was willing to consider changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba but would not be pushed into an opening with Havana.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 2. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which began at 3 p.m. and was attended by all principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. All brackets appear in original except those indicating text omitted by the editors and “[Mr. Kubisch]”, added for clarity.
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