Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

18. Action Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Mailliard) to Secretary of State Kissinger ¹

Washington, July 16, 1974.

CUBA

The Problem

Venezuela and Colombia are reportedly planning to resume relations with Cuba, perhaps even as early as August. Costa Rica’s Facio, believing this will effectively destroy the Rio Treaty, is trying to forestall unilateral actions by obtaining agreement to convoke a Rio Treaty Meeting of Foreign Ministers in early fall to deal with the Cuban issue. We have very little time to respond to these developments.

Analysis/Background

The useful respite gained at the Washington MFM seems to be coming to an end. In essence, we are faced with the choice of trying to head off an OAS meeting on Cuba and thereby tacitly accepting highly visible defections from the sanctions, or of agreeing to (or acquiescing in) some form of OAS action.

Facio confirms reports from Mexico and Caracas that Venezuela and Colombia are prepared to move soon and, perhaps, even unilaterally to renew relations with Cuba. Several others, reportedly including Ecuador and Honduras, could follow now or later. But those on the fence generally want the OAS sanctions off the books rather than resumption of relations.

In order to preserve the Rio Treaty, Facio seeks an MFM to dispose of the sanctions and believes Venezuela and Colombia have agreed to delay unilateral action at least until early August while he tries to round up support. He also believes he now has Rabasa’s tacit support for a Rio Treaty MFM. In a message probably intended for you, he pleads for U.S. agreement to an OAS meeting (Tab A). Venezuela’s President Perez has now indicated his preference for an OAS solution no later than September (Tab B).

In my judgment, there is not much prospect of preventing an OAS meeting, much less a majority against us when it comes to a vote. At Atlanta, the Latins held off in deference to you but at least a majority of 12 OAS nations still favor relaxing or lifting sanctions. The Argentine licensing decision—sensible and necessary as it was—in Latin eyes also knocked a prop from under mandatory sanctions. The Pat Holt visit has added fuel to the fire, particularly since the Latins are unschooled in the niceties of executive-legislative relationships. Castro has stated publicly that Cuba will attend the Buenos Aires MFM in March if invited, making their attendance more difficult to forestall (Tab C).

If Facio succeeds in convoking an MFM, the sanctions will likely be repealed through a procedural maneuver designed to produce a vote for or against sanctions, postulating that because the situation obtaining in 1964 no longer exists a new vote in their favor is required to maintain them. This would effectively nullify the two-thirds requirement for lifting them, even though we would argue against this interpretation of the Treaty.

We probably could prevent this by negotiating an agreement to bring the issue into the Permanent Council of the OAS (acting as Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty) for a vote on making sanctions, in effect, optional. This would follow the recommendations of the S/P study on this issue (Tab D).

A shift in our position would probably result in a two-thirds majority for optional sanctions, making this course the only one open to us that offers the prospect of maintaining both the integrity of the Rio Treaty and the international legal basis for our Cuba policy. It also renders moot the issue of your attendance or non-attendance at an MFM.

Alternatively, we could mount an all out effort, with considerable emphasis on procedural arguments, to prevent any OAS or MFM consideration of the issue. If this is to have any prospect of success, it would have to include your personal intervention. This might preserve the policy for a time but would probably lead at an early date to highly publicized unilateral defections of Colombia and Venezuela, with others almost certain to follow. But Latin concern—particularly by the small nations—for the Rio Treaty could lead to an MFM regardless of our views.

Whatever the decision, we are committed to consult with Brazil. Any substantive reply to Facio should await these consultations.

The Options

1. Agree to a meeting, as late in the year as possible, of the Permanent Council acting provisionally as the Rio Treaty’s Organ of Consultation, and there vote for a satisfactory formula that makes sanctions optional.

Pro:

—Maintains clear OAS authorization for our trade and asset controls against Cuba.

—Rids us of a major stumbling block in our relations with the rest of Latin America.

—Deprives Castro of a major propaganda victory and makes Cuban behavior, rather than “imperialist” pressures from the U.S., the determinant of whether countries wish to renew relations with Cuba.

—The Rio Treaty is intact for future contingencies.

Con:

—Significantly weakens our ability to defend continuation of U.S. Cuba policy, both domestically and with respect to third countries.

—Encourages fence-straddlers to renew relations with Castro.

2. Maintain our opposition to any kind of change, but support holding a Permanent Council meeting to deal with the issue. Work discreetly to have the resolution take the middle-road of an optional formula rather than lifting sanctions outright, perhaps in trade off for our abstention.

Pro:

—Our opposition makes a two-thirds vote very unlikely, permitting us to claim mandatory sanctions are still legally in effect.

—If an optional formula is adopted, we can point to it as political justification for our own economic denial program.

Con:

—Some Latins will renew relations with Cuba, and cite whatever resolution emerges as justification.

—We suffer a propaganda buffeting over “losing” to Cuba, although we get credit for agreeing to a meeting.

—Promotes contradictory and damaging interpretations of the Rio Treaty.

3. Strongly oppose any kind of OAS meeting.

Pro:

—If successful, prevents OAS action on the sanctions.

—Permits us to assert the continuing validity of sanctions and, consequently, the international basis for our economic denial program.

Con:

—Major unilateral defections will damage, perhaps irreparably, the Rio Treaty. Will be seen as a cynical act on our part.

—Assists Castro’s maximum political objective, isolation of the U.S., as more major Latin countries simply ignore inter-American obligations, which he wishes replaced by an exclusively Latin grouping.

—Even with the expenditure of political capital gained through our recent initiatives, we may fail to prevent an OAS meeting.

Recommendation:

That you approve an effort to work out and support a satisfactory formula for making sanctions optional in the context of an OAS Permanent Council meeting late this year under the Rio Treaty. (Option 1) L gives this option qualified support. (See Tab E)

Alternatively, that you approve acquiescence in a Council meeting, but hold fast to support of mandatory sanctions. (Option 2)

Alternatively, that you approve opposing the convocation of any kind of OAS meeting, even though the effort may be unsuccessful and will lead to major unilateral defections from the sanctions. (Option 3)

1. Summary: Mailliard outlined possible U.S. responses to growing Latin American interest lifting regional sanctions against Cuba.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850149–0967. Confidential; Exdis. Sent through Kubisch. Drafted by Mailliard and McNeil. Copies sent to Feldman and Lord. Tabs not attached and not found. Kissinger did not initial any of the memorandum’s recommendations, and he wrote, “See me—This is very complicated as the President has strong views on it.”