192. Airgram A–26 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Human Rights in Guatemala
REF
- (A) State 012320, January 1975
- (B) State 014917, January 1975
- (C) Guatemala A–6, January 1975
- (D) Guatemala 6928, December 1974
- (E) Guatemala 4879, September 1974
- (F) Guatemala A–139, August 1974
- (G) Pryce-Obiols MemCon, July 18, 1974
- (H) Guatemala A–123, July 1974
- (I) Guatemala 2197, April 1974
- (J) Guatemala A–92, June 1973
- (K) Guatemala 691, February 1975
Summary: Violence has for a long time characterized the Guatemalan political process and Guatemalan society. This violence has often involved what we as Americans consider to be violations of internationally recognized human rights—violations by private individuals, by legal political parties, by illegal private organizations, and [Page 542] by the government. Upon taking office July 1, 1974, President Laugerud pledged that his administration would respect Guatemalan constitutional guarantees of liberty, security, and justice. The administration has not fully lived up to that commitment; but the Embassy believes the present government to have a substantially better record in this area than many of its predecessors, and in particular the Arana administration (1970–74). The human rights of a small number of political extremists, most of them with long records of torture and assassination, have been violated. The Embassy does not approve of or excuse such actions, and we have made our views known to the Guatemalan Government. However, we do not believe that the government has engaged in a “consistent pattern of gross violations” which would render it ineligible for assistance under Section 502B(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. End Summary.
A. Political Violence as a Social Phenomenon
Violence is a regular feature of Guatemalan life, and the settlement of disputes in Guatemala is quite often violent. This social propensity to casual violence has naturally spilled over into the political arena.
As pointed out in ref. (I), there is “evidence that every Guatemalan Government which has exercised jurisdiction over the last 50 years has, to one degree or another, used extra-legal violence, including officially sanctioned murder, against some of its enemies. In recent years, this violence has been directed primarily, but not exclusively, against known or suspected left-wing terrorists.”
A case in point. We recently spoke to Col. Victor Manuel Gamboa Gramajo, who headed the National Police at the time of Ambassador John Gordon Mein’s assassination. He told us that after the August 28, 1968 assassination, President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro had personally ordered him to execute summarily any assassins that were captured. Col. Gamboa proudly informed us that he had carried out these instructions to the letter.
B. The Recent Past
Col. Carlos Arana Osorio was elected President in 1970 largely on the basis of his reputation for ruthlessly exterminating guerrillas in the eastern part of the country and on the strength of his “law and order” campaign platform.
The first half of the Arana administration was marked by an unusually high level of violence (see ref. I). Probably the most noteworthy incident was the September 1972 disappearance (and presumed murder) of six members of the PGT (Communist Party) Central Committee.
Violence, especially in the form of sudden disappearances of persons who were never heard from again, reached such a level that the [Page 543] OAS Commission on Human Rights requested information about them from the GOG. This request, repeated in May and November 1971, was not answered until April 1972. At that time the GOG stated that it was totally innocent, that whatever killings had taken place were the responsibility of “extremist factions,” and that whenever extremists were captured they were placed at the disposition of the courts. No response to the Commission’s specific requests were made. The Commission again asked for information, but the GOG answered that its previous response was sufficient. The Commission at its 31st session requested GOG permission to send a subcommittee to Guatemala, but the GOG refused.
In January 1974, Amnesty International indicated that it wished to participate in the search for persons who had disappeared. The Ministry of Government answered on January 9, 1974 that there were adequate national means for any type of investigation, and that any group’s imputation to the contrary was an intrusion into internal affairs.
During much of the second half of Arana’s administration, the level of violence was lower. His last few months in office, however, were marked by another increase in violence and of incidents which can be classified as human rights violations. We are totally convinced that the March 3, 1974 election results were suppressed and replaced by fictitious returns (a violation of Universal Declaration on Human Rights Article 21(3)). Two outspoken administration critics were assassinated in March 1974 (in violation of Article 3)—the Embassy concluded that these assassinations “were ordered, or at least sanctioned by the GOG, probably at the very highest level” (ref. I). These politically motivated violations were accompanied by summary executions of common criminals, carried out by a group with high-level government supervision calling itself the Escuadrón de la Muerte (in violation of Articles 10, 11). Escuadrón de la Muerte operations claimed 27 known victims between February and the end of June 1974 (ref. H). There were also a variety of government actions against labor groups (in violation of Article 23 (4)).
C. The Laugerud Administration
President Laugerud pledged in his inaugural address that constitutional guarantees of “liberty, security, and justice” would be respected by his government. Gen. Vassaux, upon taking over as Laugerud’s Minister of Government, stated that physical and mental torture of prisoners would not be tolerated and that persons guilty of such practices would be dismissed or turned over to the courts. When an Embassy officer spoke to the Deputy Foreign Minister in relation to Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act, these commitments were cited [Page 544] to him as indicators of the GOG’s good faith (and sensitivity) about the human rights issue (ref. G).
Between July and November 1974, the Laugerud administration made a considerable effort to live up to the strict standard of sensitivity for human rights issues it had set for itself. The new government broke with tradition in July 1974 when police actually announced the arrest of a one-time PGT member who had been charged with violation of the law for Defense of Democratic Institutions (ref. F). The accused was subsequently released unharmed. We believe that the government carried out provisions of a law passed by the outgoing Congress that granted amnesty to persons convicted of “political” crimes, primarily violations of the law for Defense of Democratic Institutions (ref. E). The President also declined to allow the Electoral Registry to engage in fraud in connection with the October 1974 and the February 1975 municipal elections. Although following the law may not be a reason for high praise, the Laugerud government’s efforts to comply with existing legal standards were certainly in sharp contrast to the actions of its immediate predecessor.
Since November 1974, however, a number of incidents have led us to conclude that the Laugerud government will not hesitate to act summarily in certain cases involving illegal and politically provocative activities by extremists of either the Left or the Right.
The most noteworthy of these incidents were the December 20 or 21 murders of PGT secretary general Huberto Alvarado Arellano and PGT member Miguel Antonio Alvarado Lima. The two were captured during or soon after a shootout between government forces and the alleged kidnappers of industrialist Roberto Gabriel Abularach. They were found December 21 tortured, with their hands tied behind their backs, and riddled with bullets (refs. C and D). The GOG’s official explanation was that other guerrillas had killed their two wounded comrades to prevent them from falling into the hands of security elements who had all the hospitals under surveillance. The tortured condition of the bodies made the government story incredible.
There have been other incidents since November, all involving summary execution. Government involvement in each of these cases is a virtual certainty, as pointed out in ref. K. Government actions since November have been directed at persons engaged in some form of illegal and politically provocative activity. In such cases, failure to show “firmness” and “finality” in dealing with its antagonists would be regarded by the government as politically dangerous. Failure to act would be perceived as weakness, and this could render the government vulnerable to additional harassment from both the Left and the Right. This is a case in which past violence conditions the response to present “provocation.”
[Page 545]D. Freedom of Movement, Religion, Opinion, Expression, Assembly, and Association
In areas other than the treatment of prisoners whom the government believes to be implicated in extremist political activity, the record of the Laugerud administration during its first seven months is quite good.
Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Guatemalan Constitution guarantee the right to free, universal, and secret suffrage and to hold office. Article 27 “guarantees the free formation and functioning of political parties that have democratic standards and principles.” Article 43 prohibits “discrimination because of race, color, sex, religion, birth, economic or social position or political opinions.” Article 59 guarantees freedom of movement. Article 63 says that “the right of assembly and of public demonstration may not be restricted, limited, or restrained.” Article 64 guarantees “the right to associate freely . . . for the purpose of promoting, exercising and protecting their rights and interests, especially those established by the Constitution.” However, “the organization or operation of groups . . . advocating the Communist ideology or any other totalitarian system is prohibited.” Article 65 guarantees free expression and provides that newspapers, radio and TV stations “may not be confiscated or seized, attached or closed, or their work interrupted, because of any crime or misdemeanor in the expression of thought.” Article 66 provides that “every person has the right to practice his religion or belief in public or in private, through instruction, worship and observance, limited only by peace, good morals, public order and the respect due to the country’s symbols.”
The freedoms of movement, religion, assembly, and association have generally been respected in recent years, with the exception already noted of members of the illegal Communist Party and allied groups. While some other political groups, Left, Right, and center in orientation, have been unsuccessful in winning official recognition as political parties (usually by being unable to prove that they have the necessary minimum number of members), they have nevertheless functioned freely and openly. The 1974 elections, although replete with instances of official pressure and fraud, were nevertheless basically free in expression, campaigning, and voting. Unfortunately, as already noted, we are totally convinced that the results were grossly altered by the Arana government.
Since President Laugerud took office, one congressional and several municipal elections have been held to fill offices left vacant as a result of various irregularities in the March 1974 voting. The last of these was the election of the mayor and city council in Mazatenango, Guatemala’s fourth largest city, which took place February 2, 1975. The election was necessary due to massive local protests over an attempt to de[Page 546]clare the fourth-place candidate the victor in March 1974. The February race was vigorously and freely disputed by four candidates. The results have been challenged only by the candidate of the pro-government right-wing MLN party and his objections have been overruled. The Embassy has no evidence to indicate that any of the local elections held during the Laugerud administration have been fraudulent. The leader of the principal opposition party, Christian Democrat René de León Schlotter, told Embassy officers February 12 that Christian Democratic victories in these local elections had all come in the altiplano, whereas the party had consistently lost in the lowlands. Asked to what he attributed this, he responded with an analysis of the differences in population and local party leadership between the two areas. He made no mention of fraud.
Freedom of opinion and expression has also been unrestricted in this administration, again with the exception of statements by the illegal Communist Party, which appear only in clandestine newsletters and flyers whose circulation the government tries to prevent. Cultural factors which exist throughout Latin America restrain the press from direct, personal criticism of the President, but criticism of the government and of individual ministries and agencies abounds. There is no censorship, there have been no seizures or closures of newspapers or broadcasting stations, and the views and statements of opposition Congressmen (24 out of the 61 members of Congress) are fully and prominently reported on a daily basis.
E. Applying the Statutory Guidelines
Ref. A requested an analysis of the “current status and prospects” regarding the host government’s discharge of its duty to respect human rights. Reftel B provided the statutory framework for that analysis. The inapplicability of Section 32 of the FAA (1973) to Guatemala was discussed in refs. E and I. We will not repeat that discussion here.
Section 502B(A) of the FAA (1974) is not at this time applicable to Guatemala in our view. The key phrase is, “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . .” The summary executions which have occurred since November (see part C above) must all be considered gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. We tend to doubt, however, that the three-month time frame in which these activities have occurred and the very small number of victims could be construed as a “consistent pattern”—however reprehensible even a single death may be. There has been sufficient deviation from the pattern established during the Arana administration for us to conclude that the present government is not simply continuing a past consistent pattern.
[Page 547]We believe there is a meaningful difference between the two administrations in the intensity and style of their handling of extremist groups. Repressive action by the current government is not on a regular, automatic, and organized basis as under Arana. The government does not arbitrarily select its targets, but deals with those it catches red-handed. Indications are that extralegal actions by the security forces are now tightly controlled and used highly selectively and so far more sparingly. Occasional references in the press to continued activity by the “Escuadrón de la Muerte” are, we believe, incorrect. The EM, which unquestionably functioned with official sanction under the Arana government, has probably been officially and deliberately disbanded. Indeed, the Laugerud government has acted against members of right-wing groups whose illegal activities had flourished under Arana.
In making this analysis, the Embassy in no way condones or excuses GOG internal security policy or tactics. Our views on the practical and moral advantages of respecting the law as well as enforcing order have been repeatedly expressed to the GOG (e.g., ref. G). We recognize the importance of continuing to make our views known and of closely monitoring the GOG’s performance in this area. As the Department is aware, the Embassy submits a monthly report on developments in the internal security field, in which every identifiable incident of political violence is noted (see, for example, refs. C, F, and H).
The Embassy will periodically assess the level of violence and the pattern of conduct by the host government. Should a clear and consistent pattern of gross violations appear to be developing, we will so report.
With regard to Section 502B(C), although it probably could have conditioned a determination regarding the Arana administration (see discussion in part B above), it has not yet become applicable during the Laugerud administration.
F. Policy Implications
Setting aside for a moment the issue of statutory mandates, we would like to consider the range of alternative U.S. policies and what we see as their consequences. United States policy on political violence in Guatemala could take several approaches. The first would be to cut off all aid or condition access to preferential economic treatment whenever there are violations, or whenever some arbitrary total of violations is reached. If such a decision were made, it should be made in the knowledge that it would probably not alter the GOG’s conduct. What the GOG does to leftist and rightist extremists it regards as essential to the survival not only of its administration but also of Guatemalan society. The loss of our very small military assistance and larger but still [Page 548] marginal economic aid could not possibly weigh as heavily in the host government’s considerations. But the cutoff would, of course, severely damage our relations with Guatemala—and not just with the government. As we have seen with the Trade Act, attempts to single out and discriminate against other countries can generate adverse public as well as governmental reaction.
A second approach would be to make vehement public protest whenever a violation of human rights occurs. Such a policy, if carried out systematically [less than 1 line not declassified]. It would also steadily erode our relations with Guatemala and its general support for U.S. policies.
A third approach would be to continue to work quietly and unsensationally to convince the Guatemalan Government and key political leaders that the long-range best interests of the country require a decrease in the polarization that violence causes. This policy has the least likelihood of worsening relations between the United States and Guatemala. Its chances of success in influencing the GOG are not great in the short run, but certainly better than those of an aid cutoff.
Real success must, in the end, depend on factors over which we have little control: a growth in self-confidence by the governing elite, a relaxation of tension over the extremist threat, greater honesty and efficiency in the courts, and sufficient improvement in the lot of the mass of the population so that human life begins to have some value to its possessors.
-
Summary: In a report on the human rights situation in Guatemala, the Embassy concluded that despite the country’s long history of political violence, it did not believe the government had engaged in a pattern of gross human rights violations that would render it ineligible for U.S. foreign assistance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P750038–1250. Confidential. Pouched to San José, Managua, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. The airgram responded to telegram 12320 to all diplomatic and certain consular posts, January 17 (ref. A), in which the Department requested human rights reports. (Ibid., D750020–0520) In telegram 14917 to all diplomatic and certain consular posts, January 22 (ref. B), the Department outlined which provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 were applicable for human rights reporting. (Ibid., D750025–0090) Airgram A–6 from Guatemala City, January 14 (ref. C), is ibid., P750013–0865. Telegram 6928 from Guatemala City, December 23 (ref. D), is ibid., D740373–0401. Telegram 4879 from Guatemala City, September 6 (ref. E), is ibid., D740248–0714. Airgram A–139 from Guatemala City, August 14 (ref. F), is ibid., P740089–0187. The Pryce-Obiols memorandum of conversation, July 18 (ref. G), was not found. Airgram A–123 from Guatemala City, July 12 (ref. H), is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P740079–0469. Telegram 2197 from Guatemala City, April 19 (ref. I), is Document 182. Airgram A–92 from Guatemala City, June 1973 (ref. J), was not found. In telegram 691 from Guatemala City (ref. K), February 5, the Embassy noted there was “no widespread Guatemalan concern public or private, over GOG’s method of handling internal security; in fact public concern could swing in opposite direction if terrorist activity should spread and government seem to be insufficiently energetic in suppressing it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750042–1048)
↩