500. Memorandum of Conversation1 2
SUBJECT:
- President Somoza Comments on the Political Situation, Common Market Problems, and Points at Issue with U.S.
PARTICIPANTS:
- Anastasio SOMOZA Debayle, President of Nicaragua
- Ambassador Turner B. Shelton
- Richard Hines, Nicaraguan Desk Officer, Department of State
During Hines courtesy call, President Somoza expressed the following views on topics of current interest to him:
The Future of Nicaraguan Politics
Somoza said that he was trying to reach a political agreement with opposition leader Fernando Aguero because he wanted to hold an honest election that would, once and for all, re-establish the faith of the Nicaraguan people in the processes of democratic government, and convince the world community that the Nicaraguan government truly represented the will of the Nicaraguan people expressed freely in an open, competitive election. If he failed to achieve this goal, mounting political cynicism and frustration would create a serious threat of revolutionary subversion and polarization of the society between radicalism and right-wing oppression.
Somoza explained that the weakness of the Conservative Party (PCT) and the PCT’s attacks on past elections had led to disenchantment with democracy as a political system, especially on the part of politically active youth. His father had made a pact with the Conservatives in 1950 in order to permit them to participate in the governmental process, guaranteeing them representation in Congress, in the courts, on executive boards, etc. This effort failed because the Conservatives, for the next fifteen years, refused to participate in elections, shouting “fraud” from the sidelines. As a result, when they finally did participate in the [Page 2] 1967 elections, their support was very poor (rejecting charges of electoral fraud, Somoza pointed out that the Conservative members of all but three of the 1500 electoral boards confirmed the vote count). “If we held elections next year under the current electoral laws,” the President concluded,“the Conservatives would get 10% of the vote.” The impact of such a vote on the stability of the political system would be disastrous.
More specifically, Somoza said, “I saw the Conservative kids joining the Social Christian Party, the Movimiento Revolucionario, and the communist groups because they did not have any more faith. So I decided that the next election had to convince everyone that it was honest.” That was why he had “accepted 90% of Aguero’s demands” including a national identity card system, electoral boards in which the Liberals and Conservatives were equally represented, revision of the electoral laws, technical advice from foreign sources, and “as many observers as Aguero wants.” “We’re still discussing the details of the transitional government, and a lot of people are interested in that,” he concluded,“but what concerns me is the election.”
Somoza referred to the Associated Press story which said that the agreement with Aguero was simply a device for him to return to the Presidency more quickly. Somoza countered that how quickly he ran again for the Presidency was not the issue. “I waited twelve years to get this job. When my father was killed, officers of the Guardia came to me and said only I could run the country. I told them, ‘let’s follow the constitution.’ I served seven years under Louie (President Somoza’s brother Luis) and I served three years under Schick. There were many times I could have taken this job, I assure you, but I wanted to do what was right for everyone, not just for a couple of hundred Guard officers. When the time came, I ran in an election to be President.”
Somoza expressed his confidence that the Liberal Party truly had the political support of the majority of the Nicaraguan people. Thus he seemed confident that he would win a free election. He referred to Mexico, where a party enjoying the support of the majority of the population could continue in power and enjoy a favorable place in world opinion. He hoped that an election which was above suspicion would do the same for Nicaragua.
[Page 3]Problems of the Central American Common Market
The President referred first to the situation of Honduras. He pointed out that the treaty creating the Common Market required ten years notice for withdrawal. The state of war between Honduras and El Salvador removed any treaty obligations between them, but it did not remove Honduras’ treaty obligation towards the other three members of CACM. He had not raised this with the Government of Honduras because of the internal political situation there, but he would call them to an accounting after the new Honduran government was installed.
While the immediate problem was with Honduras, the party responsible for the difficulties of the CACM was El Salvador. El Salvador had attacked Honduras unjustly and unnecessarily, it continued to squabble over an insignificant amount of territory, and it had failed to sign the modus operandi. The nugget of the problem in El Salvador, Somoza argued, is Fidel Sanchez, who is incapable of governing with authority.
If new trade relationships are to be established on a more permanent basis between the four without Honduras, Somoza said he will insist on bilateral agreements with Guatemala and El Salvador imposing quantitative limits on their exports to Nicaragua based on the pre-war level plus a growth factor. Otherwise the two countries would dump in the Nicaraguan market the goods they had intended to sell in Honduras.
Current Issues Between Nicaragua and the United States
President Somoza made a point of raising the following subjects:
— MAP Grants: Somoza said that the U.S. Government was making a mistake in terminating its MAP materiel grants. By giving limited quantities of military equipment, he argued, the United States placed itself in the position of legitimately advising Latin American governments on their total equipment programs and was effective in keeping their arms purchases down. By ending the grant program the U.S. would throw away this influence and the result would be spiraling arms purchases. He urged the Department once again to try to win Congressional support for the program.
[Page 4]—Communism in the Hemisphere: Somoza said he could not understand why, just when Castro was most clearly proving himself a failure, his support in Latin America was reaching a new high. He was particularly concerned about the effect on subversive activity throughout the hemisphere of the establishment of the Chilean airline service to Havana from the south. He urged the U.S. Government to exert strong efforts to counter this growing danger.
—Financial Assistance: The President asked that AID adopt a more positive, active policy towards development assistance to Nicaragua. He said that the U.S. should recall that Nicaragua had lost investment opportunities because it had followed U.S. advice in reducing taxes within the Common Market framework. Now this situation had been corrected.
—Private Investment: Somoza said that Nicaragua had in effect been blackballed as a site of overseas U.S. investment. He asked that the U.S. Government adopt a policy of actively urging and encouraging private investment in the country.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 NIC. Confidential. The meeting took place at the Presidential Palace. Transmitted to the Department of State as Enclosure 1 to Airgram A–10 from Managua, January 31. Drafted by Hines (ARA/LA/CEN). Attached but not published at Enclosure 2 is a January 19 memorandum of conversation with Fernando Agüero.↩
- Ambassador Shelton met with President Somoza to discuss Nicaragua’s political situation and United States-Nicaraguan relations.↩