499. Telegram 25 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- Somoza’s Views on Political Transition
1. During the weekend of Jan 1 which my wife and I spent as lake house guests of President and Mrs. Somoza, Somoza took me aside on the second day and sat on the terrace overlooking the beach and engaged in approximately three hour discussion of his aims, aspirations and hopes for the future of Nicaragua, detailed accounts of his talks with opposition leader Dr. Fernando Aguero and his own personal plans for the future.
2. Somoza began by tracing the approximately 150 year history of hatred and animosity which he said existed between the conservatives and liberals in Nicaragua, or what he characterized as the Chamorro-Sacasa feud. He described the historical background of the Granada-based conservatives and the Leon-based liberals and said that until his father, General Somoza had taken power in the 1930’s that essentially Nicaragua had been a group of warring factions neither significantly concerned with the welfare of Nicaragua or the progress of the country or its people. He said that until his father had come to power that there were few usable roads in the country, very little development and a constant state of instability. Somoza said that the conservatives based in Granada [Page 2] had made considerable money, built large and imposing homes but had never established any understanding of the needs and requirements of the Nicaraguan people or the country. By inference he indicated that the old-family liberals in Leon had likewise displayed little interest in the country’s development. He said that as a result Nicaragua had had to pass through a “revolutionary period.” This revolutionary period he indicated had begun in the early 1900’s but had never been institutionalized or stabilized until the advent of his father. He described his father as a “builder” who had devoted his efforts to pulling the country together, making it into a cohesive whole and bringing a degree of modernization in the wharfs, roads, ports and other developments. He said that he was proud of the “Somoza contribution to Nicaragua” because it had brought stability and progress and had “for the first time based its primary interest on the welfare of the Nicaraguan people.” FYI: In understanding Somoza it would appear useful to bear in mind that rightly or wrongly he strongly believes that the Somoza family despite any arguments to the contrary are basically responsible for modern Nicaragua end FYI.
3. President Somoza said that the future of Nicaragua and his place in its history would be determined by whether or not he was able to end the historical feuding between the Conservative and Liberal Parties and bring the two parties together to operate on a basis of a modern two-party government. Somoza said that he was primarily concerned about three things:
A. The threat of communism
B. The danger of the National Guard in the absence of strong leadership and,
C. The rise of a Christian, Democratic party with strongly leftist tendencies if the Conservative opposition party were not strengthened.
Based on these three concerns Somoza said he was [Page 3] carrying on discussions with Dr. Aguero, leader of the Conservative Party in an effort to reach a satisfactory agreement. Somoza said that he liked Aguero and respected him and felt that Aguero was the only really effective leader in the Conservative Party. He said that he had been disappointed in his talks with Aguero in that Aguero had not demonstrated that he really knows what he wants. He said that he was planning another talk with Aguero soon and that at that time he intended to propose the following:
A. He (Somoza) would retire from the presidency at the end of his term in 1972 but would retain his position as the head of the National Guard because without his control of the National Guard there was a danger that “ambitious officers” in the Guard might think in terms of a military government. FYI: Aguero has told me that he agrees strongly that it would be useful for Somoza to remain as head of the National Guard since he is the only one who can totally control it. End FYI.
[Page 4]B. National elections would be held in 1972 for a Constituent Assembly and that in order to meet Aguero’s and the Conservatives’ concern about the validity of elections, Somoza would be willing to have “observers drawn from the OAS or elsewhere” at these elections. (Somoza said that he would under no circumstances permit outside supervisors for the election which is what Aguero really wants because this would not be in keeping with national dignity.)
C. The Constituent Assembly would then appoint a provisional President for a period of approximately two years during which time the Constituent Assembly would rewrite the constitution and make changes which were made necessary by the need for “modernizing governmental machinery,” (Somoza, said that many of his advisors had urged him to have a Constituent Assembly appoint him (Somoza) provisional President but that he had completely rejected this as unacceptable. He also said that he would be unwilling to accept any government post such as a Cabinet Ministry since this would vitiate the effectiveness of the provisional government.)
D. Somoza would suggest that during the two year period of the provisional government a major campaign be undertaken to register citizens of Nicaragua and provide them with an id card in order that proper [Page 5] voting registration lists could be prepared in order to facilitate future elections. (This is strongly desired by Aguero and is one of the principal points of the Conservative Party.) Somoza further said that reforms and compromises should be instituted which would give the Conservative Party a greater voice in government. He specifically referred to a more balanced representation of the opposition party on the Supreme Court in the electoral or fourth branch of government and the second and third level positions in the government bureaucracy. Somoza stated that he strongly felt that a move away from the “spoils system” which now existed in government employment should be made and an effort instituted to establish a “non-political” civil service with tenure. Somoza said that he would be prepared to accede to the Conservative Party desires to have the mayors and town councils of all cities elected by popular vote and he would be willing to give the post of comptroller to a Conservative in order to give them a strong voice in the control of government expenditures. (Somoza said this was particularly important since the Conservatives according to him own and control more than 60 percent of the wealth of Nicaragua.) Somoza further said that ad-referendum to his Liberal Party he would be willing to see the Conservatives given two or three Cabinet portfolios. He said that he must make this ad-referendum despite the fact that he controlled the Liberal Party because it must be recognized that this would involve a “serious struggle” with his own party in order to get agreement. Somoza emphasized that the reason for his willingness to bring the Conservatives into the government was to modernize their thinking, give them a sense of responsibility and avoid the blood-letting that would be inevitable if another serious clash occurred between the Liberals and Conservatives.
E. At the end of the two-year provisional government the Constituent Assembly would appoint a new President for a five-year term. FYI: It can only be assumed that the Constituent Assembly would appoint [Page 6] Somoza and Somoza appeared so confident of this that he didn’t even seem to feel it was necessary to say so end FYI. (Somoza emphasized that while the National Guard was completely loyal to him personally he had tried very hard to keep the National Guard out of politics and neither he nor the Conservatives wanted the National Guard to become involved in politics since being the sole source of power in the country they could “take over if they wanted to overthrow a civilian government.”)
[Page 7]Comment: There appears to be little doubt about the sincerity of Somoza’s desire to reach some type of accommodation with Aguero and the Conservative Party. He frankly stated on two occasions during his conversation with me that if he attempted to change the constitution and continue as President in 1972 that he felt he ran serious risk of being assassinated. He emphasized repeatedly that the stability of Nicaragua was vitally important to him personally as he said “I pay 8 percent of the taxes paid into the national treasury.” It is also clear that Somoza believes and on this point Aguero agrees, that he is the only person who can completely control the National Guard. As will be seen by the above outline Somoza is prepared to meet a number of the demands of the Conservative Party and to in effect constitute what might be described as in part a “coalition government.” It is also clear that Somoza feels strongly a degree of contempt for the weakness of the Conservative Party and their ineffectiveness. On several occasions he described the leaders of the Conservative Party as being unwilling to “mix with the people” and as being inclined to “look down their noses” at the day-to-day chores of running the government. It is clear that Somoza feels that the Conservative Party has very little to offer. It is also clear that he feels that without a strong Conservative Party there is serious danger of a drastic shift to the left among the opposition [Page 8] and the possible rise of the leftist oriented Christian Democratic Party. The proposals as outlined by Somoza are in many respects adequate and indeed generous toward the Conservative Party given the balance of power structure in Nicaragua. There is however one extremely serious weakness in his proposal, and it is a weakness which in my opinion might well make the plan unworkable and that is the appointment of a President by the Constituent Assembly after two years rather than new elections for the presidency. It is possible that this is a negotiating position that Somoza plans to work out with Aguero.
If an arrangement can be worked out between Somoza and Aguero to provide by acceptable means at the end of the two year provisional government a President there appears considerable reason to believe that the proposals as outlined by Somoza might well be acceptable to Aguero and his party. The stakes are high and the alternative to a compromise arrangement would undoubtedly be undesirable.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 NIC. Secret; Limdis.↩
- Ambassador Shelton reported on conversations with President Somoza during a weekend at the President’s lakeside house. Much of the discussion surrounded Somoza’s planned retirement from politics, continuation as head of the National Guard, and plans for a provisional government and general elections.↩