44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1 2
SUBJECT:
- Disestablishment of the Southern Command
Secretary Laird has written asking your approval of the disestablishment of the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) effective December 31, 1971. His memo is at Tab B.
On April 21, 1971, you decided to defer action on SOUTHCOM pending a clarification of the political and diplomatic implications of such a move. Since then,
—On May 1, Secretary Irwin gave State’s view that “neither SOUTHCOM’s presence nor its purposes are consonant with current political and defense realities in the Western Hemisphere.” “There is a widely held feeling in Latin America that SOUTHCOM is an anachronism in the 1970’s.”
—On May 20, Secretary Packard met with you to press his view that SOUTHCOM should be reduced in size because of the ability of Washington staffs to do its work. As you know, Packard’s view is not shared by Admiral Moorer or the Services, particularly the Army, who believe that SOUTHCOM should be retained in its present form. Following that meeting you indicated you would wish to meet again with the Chairman and Secretary Laird to discuss the issue further.
While earlier arguments against SOUTHCOM focused on the irritation it has caused some Latin Americans and the expense involved in operating a headquarters in Panama. Secretary Laird stresses that the disestablishment would “improve significantly the opportunities for furthering vital U.S. in Latin America.” His reasons are based on the contention that disestablishment of SOUTHCOM would:
[Page 2]—Involve the most senior Washington officials directly in Latin America and, therefore, policy enhance the strength of our ties with them.
—Facilitate centralized control and coordination of the many security assistance functions related to Latin America.
—“Dissolve a key political sticking point with our Latin American allies,” and, by implication, signal to many Latin Americans a growing U.S. reluctance to intervene militarily in the Region.
It is clear that Secretary Laird fully supports the Packard/Irwin view that SOUTHCOM should be disestablished. The objections of the JCS and Ambassador Lodge to Laird’s view and your earlier decision to defer a final decision on SOUTHCOM were based on the following counter-arguments:
—It is not feasible to maintain our close ties to the Latin American military from Washington. Occasional visits by high-ranking Washington officials are not substitute for day-to-day working level contacts maintained by SOUTHCOM.
—The centralized control and coordination of security assistance can be better exercised from Panama than from Washington given SOUTHCOM’s interest and experience in the area.
—The disestablishment of SOUTHCOM would represent to many Latin Americans a diminished U.S. interest in and commitment there. It might well be interpreted as a further manifestation of U.S. distrust of the Latin American military and contribute further to extreme nationalist solutions on their part. Combined with the events in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, this could add momentum to the decline of U.S. influence in Latin America and provide greater opportunities for Communist inroads.
On the whole, I think that there could be risks involved in disestablishment of SOUTHCOM at this time. For this reason, I recommend that you disapprove the disestablishment of SOUTHCOM. Your choices are:
[Page 3]—Disapprove disestablishment. Recommended by the JCS, particularly General Westmoreland. To soften this decision you might ask for a plan to reorganize SOUTHCOM, making it more effective. [RN initialed]
—Continue to delay a decision, possibly pending a review of the Canal Treaty negotiations.
—Approve disestablishment of SOUTHCOM effective December 31, 1971. This decision is recommended by Secretary Laird and Under Secretary Irwin.
You may wish to meet with Admiral Moorer and Secretary Laird to discuss this issue further before sending a memorandum reflecting your decision. If so, I will arrange a meeting.
Set up meeting
No meeting. Send memo reflecting decision.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 806, Country Files, Latin America, Southcom. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the first page indicates the President saw it. In the fifth paragraph, Nixon circled the words “disestablishment” and “improve” and put a question mark in the margin. Nixon initialed the disapprove option, and lined through the other options. The memorandum at Tab B is published as Document 39. In a July 20 memorandum, Kissinger communicated the President’s decision to Laird, while indicating that Nixon would welcome recommendations “to make the Command more effective in carrying out essential Department of Defense programs in the Latin American area.” (Ibid.)↩
- Kissinger reviewed the pros and cons of disestablishing Southcom and recommended that the President disapprove such action.↩