39. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon1 2
SUBJECT:
- United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
We share a common concern that our military ties with Latin American countries must be improved and strengthened. The proposal to centralize in Washington the supervision of key US/Latin American military functions is consistent with that thesis. By so doing, the most senior Defense officials, civilian and military, would be able to provide the regular and systematic direction to such functions that their current importance dictates. Likewise, the correlation of the complex military, economic, and political relationships which impinge decisively on each area could be more readily effected. The proposal to disestablish USSOUTHCOM would, by involving the more senior US officials directly and consistently, improve significantly the opportunities for furthering vital US interests in Latin America.
General Principles
In your 1971 Foreign Policy Report you outlined the need for imaginative ideas on the Western Hemisphere. In your Report you said:
We, in the Department of Defense, are striving to find ways in which we can reshape our role, make our views and actions consistent with reality, and harness the forces of change to support US and Free World interests. Elevating the visibility of our interests by centralizing selected key functions in Washington, adjusting our Latin American presence and organizational structure to the sensitivities of our neighbors, and reinforcing the best elements of our more routine contacts are the key elements in our proposal to fulfill your mandate.
[Page 2]The Current Situation
A number of productive military functions and relationships currently exist between the US and Latin American countries. These include, in general terms:
- The Security Assistance Program
- Inter-American Defense Board (which is based in Washington)
- Activities of Military Missions and Attache staffs
- Joint Defense Commissions between the US and selected Latin American countries
- The Inter-American Geodetic Survey
- Conference of Intelligence Chiefs of American Armies
- Annual and biennial seminars in selected functional areas (flight surgeons, other medical, chaplains, training officers, and civic action corps)
- Combined exercises, some of which last 3–4 months each year
- Exchange visits of senior civilian and military Defense officials
It is my view that the activities both explicit and implicit in the listing above have a salutary effect on US/Latin American relationships. I believe, however, we can gain more from the people, resources, and time who are committed to these activities. The way to obtain the extra benefits is through improved integration and programming. That can be done through added attention and more centralized control here in Washington.
Perhaps the most important single military tie between the US and Latin America is through Security Assistance. A Defense effort is underway to revitalize our Security Assistance program in Latin America in support of the Nixon Doctrine. We would plan, in conjunction with the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM, to administer Security Assistance from Washington. The objectives of this new arrangement would be (a) to bring our Security Assistance administration into closer interface with the overall foreign policy objectives, and (b) to improve procedures and responsiveness to Latin American requirements for Security Assistance. This arrangement, I believe, would enhance the prestige accorded Latin American military affairs [Page 3] and bring the efforts of the most competent US military staffs to bear on the truly crucial security problems in Latin America. Rather than diminish the importance of Latin America, I believe that this reorganization would help convince the countries of Latin America that we now have an increased interest and concern.
Many of the other military activities are conducted unilaterally without sufficient central direction or outside the context of a master plan. Dissolving USSOUTHCOM and integrating the programming of the many and diverse programs in Washington would (a) improve the chances to derive maximum benefit from these activities, (b) provide testimony to the conviction that we hold US/Latin American relationships to be crucial, and (c) remove from the Latin American scene a structure which some of our friends hold in suspicion as evidence we are insincere.
On the last point, the Acting Secretary of State articulated the point well in his May 1 memorandum to you. Mr. Irwin wrote, as you may recall:
“There is a widely held feeling in Latin America that SOUTHCOM is an anachronism in the 1970’s. Important sectors of Latin American opinion see SOUTHCOM not as a security shield against external aggression—they assume that this kind of protection would be readily provided with or without a command authority based in Panama—but rather as an instrument of US hegemony and a potential vehicle for unilateral US intervention. It is felt that neither SOUTHCOM’s presence nor its purposes are consonant with current political and defense realities in the Western Hemisphere. In sum, to many SOUTHCOM belies what they believe to be the more positive thrust of the Nixon Doctrine.”
Misconceptions and New Problems
Expressions of concern about our ability to handle crisis management in the absence of USSOUTHCOM are misplaced. We have found, as I indicated previously, that a subordinate headquarters separated from Washington by an intermediate headquarters has not been an impediment to responsiveness. Our efforts in Southeast Asia, through the intermediate headquarters in PACOM, are a case in point. Furthermore, in the event of any special crisis measures, there would be nothing in the command arrangements which would preclude direct Washington-Canal Zone communication.
It would be naive to assume that the proposed new centralized arrangements for dealing with US/Latin American military affairs would not create some new problems. Change inevitably has. The new problems, in my judgment, would center primarily around harnessing into productive directions the vigor with which our top Defense officials would approach the Latin American issues. The new problems could reasonably be expected to be too much attention for Latin America and impatience to see results, rather than the aspects of lethargy and indifference we have seen under existing arrangements. Such problems would, I believe, be manageable.
Conclusions and Recommendations
I see an opportunity to create a new environment of cooperation and mutual respect between the US and Latin America. The key should be to augment the best parts of our current relationships with direct contacts between Latin America and the highest levels of the United States Government. Replacement of USSOUTHCOM with the more centralized management approach would allow us (a) to integrate our various mutual national security activities more meaningfully; (b) to allow a more productive interface among military, economic, and political aspects; (c) to dissolve a key political sticking point with our Latin American friends; and (d) to allow for continuing effective crisis management.
I recommend you approve the proposal to disestablish USSOUTHCOM effective 31 December 1971.