Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

60. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Sisco) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 12, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Future of Middle East Force at Bahrain

The Problem

We recently completed negotiations with the Government of Bahrain on our Navy’s Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), which effectively superseded the one-year termination notice the GOB gave us in October 1973 and provide a basis for MIDEASTFOR’s remaining on at Bahrain. At the same time, however, the Bahrainis told us they intended to set a two-year limit on the Navy’s continued presence, or until June 30, 1977, and on August 12 they delivered a letter notifying us of this decision. We need to consider how to deal with Bahrain’s June 1977 deadline: to fight it, or to accede to it; and, if the latter, how to make the best of the situation.

Background/Analysis

The US Navy has had a small contingent in Bahrain since 1949 consisting of one command ship homeported at Bahrain and two destroyers assigned to MIDEASTFOR on a six-month rotational basis. With the departure of the British, we negotiated a stationing agreement with Bahrain in December 1971. The one-year termination clause in that agreement was invoked by the Bahrainis in October 1973, in reaction to the Administration’s request for $2.2 billion in military aid for Israel.

After immediate sensitivities associated with the 1973 war subsided, the GOB informed us it would reconsider its notification that the Navy leave by October 1974, subject to satisfactory negotiation of several conditions for continued Navy presence. Early this year, we agreed to: (a) raise the rent from a concessional $600,000 to $4 million per annum; (b) accept Bahraini jurisdiction over criminal cases considered politically sensitive; and (c) undertake to withdraw MIDEASTFOR in six months instead of a year should the GOB decide in the future to invoke the termination clause. In an indirectly related understanding, we also undertook to seek Congressional approval of a small AID-administered technical assistance program for topping off salaries. For this purpose, AID’s FY–76 budget requests $400,000.

In June, the GOB told us it was ready to formalize these understandings through an exchange of notes, but it also informed us that it had decided to set a two-year limit on our continued naval presence. By then, Bahraini leadership had become increasingly sensitive to domestic and external developments it saw as impinging on MIDEASTFOR. It had barely averted the Navy’s presence becoming an issue for debate before the country’s National Assembly recessed for the summer. It felt uncomfortable over the misinformed allegations of US invasion plans in the Gulf. The lack of explicit support for MIDEASTFOR from the two largest countries in the Gulf region (Iran and Saudi Arabia), the Shah’s recent statements on the eventual removal of “third parties” from the Gulf, and recent discussions of a possible Gulf security arrangement added to Bahrain discomfort.

At the end of July, we formalized the different understandings on the retention of MIDEASTFOR. Despite our several attempts to try and convince the Bahrainis not to set a deadline for MIDEASTFOR’s departure, the GOB officially notified us of its decision on August 12 (see Attachment 1). In presenting the letter, the GOB Foreign Minister noted that it was considered confidential and he wanted to work out some mutually agreed formula to make the decision known after he returns from the UNGA in September. He hoped that the US would understand that the decision in no way reduced the high value Bahrain placed on a continued friendly relationship.

The MIDEASTFOR mission has in recent years been heavily political in addition to its military functions. Its role has been one of showing the flag and reflecting our interest in the stability of the Persian Gulf region. It has also participated in CENTO exercises and provided intelligence-gathering on Soviet fleet movements in the Indian Ocean. Its present functions could be performed, albeit less efficiently, by other support arrangements.

There remains a slight possibility that Bahrain might be willing to reconsider its position in the next two years if the situation in the Middle East improves. On the other hand, there is no indication that the recent dissolution of the Bahrain National Assembly has changed the GOB position, and it appears that Bahraini leadership did not want to have MIDEASTFOR an issue at the time it cracked down on leftists in the country and called for revising the constitution. Firm planning to phase out MIDEASTFOR now could be seen as bringing added pressure against the Soviet use of facilities at Aden and at Umm Qasr in Iraq. In any event, the littoral states in the Gulf have increasingly taken on responsibility for regional security, and any efforts to maintain our own naval presence are likely to be viewed increasingly as anachronistic.

The question now before us is, do we try to get the GOB to withdraw its letter because of the importance of our interests in the Gulf and Indian Ocean and the need to avoid potentially adverse repercussions in other countries, or do we accede to Bahrain’s decision. If we accede, do we accept the Foreign Minister’s suggestion to devise a joint statement indicating our mutual understanding regarding the withdrawal of MIDEASTFOR.

The Options

(1) We go back to the Bahrainis by making a high-level appeal from the President to the Ruler which would reassure them that we have never intended MIDEASTFOR’s presence to be a permanent one but ask that the August 12 letter be withdrawn. This approach would be coordinated with similar appeals to the Shah and King Khalid seeking their support for a continued, open-ended MIDEASTFOR presence.

Advantages

—A high-level appeal would indicate to the Bahrainis that we felt strongly about the importance of maintaining MIDEASTFOR and, by implication, that damage could take place to our bilateral relations if Bahrain is seen to have forced us out.

—It would require the Shah and the Saudis to weigh this request in light of our strong bilateral relations.

Disadvantages

—Even if high-level pressure succeeded, it could substantially weaken Bahrain’s present moderate leadership in the face of domestic left/nationalist opposition which would be contrary to US interests in Gulf stability.

—We would be drawing heavily on our credit with Iran and Saudi Arabia to save a facility of limited strategic utility or importance. Our earlier, lower-level attempts have not been successful, and neither the Shah nor—with less certainty—the Saudis are likely to back away from previous statements favoring eventual removal of foreign forces from the Gulf region.

(2) Accepting the Bahraini letter but not acknowledging its receipt

Advantage

—It would give us the greatest latent freedom of action to reopen the question of MIDEASTFOR’s future at a later date, should favorable Middle East developments give us new opportunities to do so.

Disadvantages

—If we try not to respond, we can expect that the GOB will eventually let its unilateral decision become publicly known. When it does, it could be seen as a political setback to the United States by one of the smallest nations in the world in a region where we have substantial interests.

—Congress could balk at the $4 million rent knowing full well the Force is due to leave.

(3) Acknowledging receipt of the Bahraini’s notice with a written reply which, in effect, accepts the June 1977 deadline

Advantages

—To reply to the Bahraini letter would permit us to try to portray our departure from Bahrain in any light we wished.

—A demonstration of sympathetic understanding of the conditions leading the GOB to take this decision would strengthen the prospects for future bilateral political relations (apart from MIDEASTFOR).

Disadvantages

—We would limit our freedom of action, should we wish later to try to have the deadline withdrawn.

—Possible Congressional opposition to a higher rent as in Option 2.

(4) To devise, as the GOB Foreign Minister has suggested, a joint statement indicating our mutual understanding regarding the withdrawal of MIDEASTFOR

Advantages

—It would portray the eventual departure of MIDEASTFOR in the best possible light for us politically in the region.

—The GOB could be expected to keep its unilateral decision and notification to terminate MIDEASTFOR confidential and possibly might agree to withdraw its formal notification.

—This approach would also enable increased pressure by other Arabs on Aden and Iraq to restrict the use of their facilities to Soviet naval vessels.

—Various elements in the Congress would welcome the flexibility shown by the Administration in this case.

Disadvantage

—It would contrast with statements which Defense has made to Congress up to now in connection with the strategic importance of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area. (However, the eventual availability of Diego Garcia and the buying of two more years’ time would tend to lessen this disadvantage.)

DOD Views

The Joint Staff and the US Navy recommend the adoption of Option 2. In their view, it would be misleading and untimely to go on record with a joint USG/GOB statement implying that a mutual agreement for the USN to withdraw from Bahrain on June 30, 1977 had been reached for the following reasons:

(a) The Bahraini note to withdraw notwithstanding, the USG has not reached a decision that it is in its best interest to accede to such a withdrawal.

(b) Until the current Bahraini political situation is resolved, the US should maintain maximum flexible options.

(c) The fluid situation in the Middle East will continue to affect Bahraini thinking on the status of MIDEASTFOR. Events which may occur within the next eighteen months could alter present GOB views.

(d) No approach to the GOB has yet been made to obtain their views on the possibility of retaining the MIDEASTFOR staff at Bahrain while discontinuing the homeporting agreement for the MIDEASTFOR flagship at Bahrain.

The Joint Staff and Navy therefore recommend not acknowledging the proposed Bahraini letter. Such a course of action would best convey existing USG attitudes, provide maximum flexibility in future negotiations, follow the same procedures that were successfully employed in response to the previous GOB notification of termination in October 1973, provide the GOB with a cooling-off period during which future events in the Middle East may reshape Bahraini attitudes, and allow for exploratory conversations on the feasibility of discontinuation of homeporting the flagship at Bahrain but retaining MIDEASTFOR staff functions ashore.

OSD/ISA believes that the decision by the GOB to terminate the MIDEASTFOR presence on Bahrain is unlikely to change and that it is in the interests of the United States to accept this decision as gracefully as possible while maintaining maximum flexibility for subsequent negotiations with the GOB and for the formulation of US policy options. This objective could be achieved by the choice of either Option 3 or 4, each of which provides the opportunity of spelling out the US position. If Option 4 is chosen, the present draft should indicate that the initiative for a reassessment of the MIDEASTFOR presence originated with the Government of Bahrain. This is a fact which will necessarily emerge in any event, and it will be essential in answering Congressional questions about our motives in accepting increased rent and other concessions to the GOB just prior to determining that MIDEASTFOR’s presence would be terminated. It is also likely that the GOB will want the record to be straight on this issue for its own policy reasons. It is also recommended that the USG take action to have the joint declaration accompanied, if possible, by separate declarations from Iran and Saudi Arabia noting the US–GOB decision and expressing their desire that other external powers observe a similar policy with respect to the establishment of a military presence in the Gulf area.

Department of State Views

The Department of State believes we have pretty well exhausted our options for trying to keep MIDEASTFOR and that the GOB will insist on the June 1977 termination date. It believes the best way to cut our losses is to accept the Bahraini decision gracefully and to work out a statement reached jointly by the GOB and the USG. This could avoid at least a public indication that the US had had to accede to a unilateral decision by Bahrain to force the Navy off the island. We would also get some credit for adopting a flexible and accommodating position on this issue. This approach would still give us a small option to reopen the matter during the next eighteen months, should future circumstances allow.

Recommendations

1. That the NSC approve Option 4 to devise a joint statement (along the lines of Attachment 2) reflecting mutual understanding between the United States and Bahrain to withdraw MIDEASTFOR within two years. (State recommends this option; DOD/ISA recommends either this option or Option 3.)

2. Alternatively, that the NSC approve Option 3 that we simply acknowledge the GOB unilateral notice thereby indicating our acceptance of the June 1977 deadline.

3. Alternatively, that the NSC approve Option 2 not to acknowledge the proposed Bahraini letter. (Navy and the Joint Staff recommend this option.)

4. Alternatively, that the NSC approve Option 1 to make a high-level approach to Bahraini leadership to withdraw the termination notice and appeal to the Shah and King Khalid to support MIDEASTFOR.

Joseph J. Sisco

1. Summary: Reacting to U.S-Bahraini negotiations on MIDEASTFOR’s retention in Bahrain, Sisco provided Kissinger several policy options, along with recommendations from the Departments of State and Defense.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–77, Box 32, Trucial States (2). Secret. Kissinger did not express a preference from among the four alternatives. Sisco signed above his typed signature. Attachment 1, not found, is a copy of the Bahraini letter of August 12. See Document 58. Attachment 2, not published, is a draft joint U.S.-Bahraini statement acknowledging the termination of the MIDEASTFOR basing agreement. Also attached, but not published, is guidance for press questions on the termination. See Document 75. For further developments, see Documents 61 and 71.