59. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Ambassador Twinam
PARTICIPANTS
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Robert Ellsworth
- US Ambassador to Kuwait, Joseph Twinam
- Acting Director, NESA, COL Richard Lawrence
- State Country Desk Officer, John Lyle
- Acting DOD Country Director, COL Robert Burch
(S) Ambassador Twinam opened the conversation by saying he wanted to talk with Mr. Ellsworth before having lunch with the VCNO, Admiral Shear, during which the subject of the Middle East Force (MEF) would be discussed. Mr. Ellsworth asked the Ambassador what State wants to do about responding to the termination notice. More importantly, he wondered what would be the wise thing to do. Ambassador Twinam replied that State’s concern involved political symbolism. NEA/ARP favored a joint announcement. The Bahrainis have already told some people of the termination notice. Ambassador Twinam then described briefly the internal pressures which affected the Bahraini decision. There was no public support in Bahrain for retention of MEF and no encouragement from the Saudis either. Mr. Lyle indicated that past overtures had been made to the Saudi Arabian and Iranian rulers to support MEF presence; their responses were negative.
(S) Ambassador Twinam described the situation that the Bahrainis feel themselves in, with leftists seizing upon MEF status as the most convenient issue to dispute with the Government. We can expect nothing in the next 18 months to change this situation and thus lead to withdrawal of the termination notice. Mr. Ellsworth wondered whether we should not leave open the question of a formal response to termination and thus not be on record as committed to leave on a specific date. Ambassador Twinam responded that the Government of Bahrain would like a joint statement. It would not have to be issued immediately. Basically, the Bahrainis do not want to be in the position of [Page 243] appearing to have thrown us out. Mr. Ellsworth than suggested that we might delay the joint statement until next summer. He wondered whether we could not simply wait a year, until such time as the prior year’s notice had to be given. Ambassador Twinam indicated that there was nothing rigid about the June 1977 date.
(S) Mr. Ellsworth asked what the impact of the Berbera revelations had been on Bahrain. Ambassador Twinam answered the Bahrainis were unhappy but that they looked to the US to more or less keep the USSR at bay outside the Gulf. The Bahrainis felt that the Soviets tricked the Somalis; however, they are not alarmed.
(S) The discussion shifted back to MEF when Ambassador Twinam said we delude ourselves if we think the Bahrainis will extend MEF. A joint statement does limit our flexibility somewhat; however, the news of the termination notice is already seeping out. Ambassador Twinam indicated that the foreign minister of Bahrain will be in New York during September and that he was amenable during his stay to work out a joint declaration.
(S) Mr. Ellsworth asked whether there were any Soviet facilities at Um Qasar. Ambassador Twinam went on to say that when Senator Scott visited Bahrain and talked to the Foreign Minister, one of the points raised was the tendency of the major powers to increase their posture in the Gulf. It was once thought that we could bargain MEF departure from Bahrain in exchange for Soviet departure from Um Qasar. This might have been possible had MEF been based in Saudi Arabia or Iran.
(S) Ambassador Twinam stated that this had been a bad year for Bahrainis. They have become rather tricky to deal with since discovering just how much they have become dependent on Saudi Arabia. Shaikh Isa always relished the connection with MEF and thus the US Navy may be his last link with the past. Mr. Ellsworth indicated he thought that the Bahrainis would be unwise to throw us out. In the long run, it would be clearly in their strategic interests to allow MEF to stay. It seemed that Bahraini changes of attitude were related to Saudi and Iranian declarations of opposition to MEF.
(S) Mr. Ellsworth said he thought Ambassador Twinam had done a fine job in Bahrain. Ambassador Twinam expressed his thanks for the confidence and described how challenging the Bahrainis are to deal with. They are “tricky” but very smooth. They harbor a strong attachment to the US, but he foresaw a difficult year ahead. Ambassador Twinam explained that in his view the foreign minister was not yet astute enough to realize how much US interest in Bahrain is on the wane. It will be very hard to try and explain this in Bahrain, especially since the Bahrainis are more pro-US than pro-British.
(U) Mr. Ellsworth asked if there were any US businesses in Bahrain and what the advantages were. Ambassador Twinam responded in the [Page 244] affirmative and identified several firms that were setting up offices there, including Exxon, Gulf, and Bechtel. Some of the advantages were as follows:
—The best communications facilities in the area.
—Excellent air transportation.
—Central location.
—A certain ambience.
—No taxes to speak of.
—Free port.
—Approximately 20 banks, 3 of which are US.
(U) Ambassador Twinam then indicated that when compared to others in the Middle East, the Bahrainis were not as rich as some but not necessarily destitute. Their basic future problem will be the attitude of their neighbors; for example, if the Kuwaitis went heavily into the banking business, which they have the resources to do, this could adversely affect the Bahraini banking community.
(U) Mr. Ellsworth asked if the Ambassador cared to discuss the school. Here Ambassador Twinam asked Mr. Ellsworth for DOD support. In general, he requested DOD help with the situation in Bahrain by being especially careful on little matters in general, and especially with regard to the school. Ambassador Twinam indicated his opinion that not one cent in US taxes should be spent on the school (now supported almost 50 percent by DOD subsidies) if DOD enrollees become negligible. However, in terms of withdrawal, he requested that we be very flexible when phasing out the school. It would be most helpful to have US personnel stay on until they can definitely be replaced adequately and in order to make a rather difficult transition as smooth as possible. It would be very hard to keep the school going, for example, if the entire faculty left at one time. So he asked Mr. Ellsworth for assistance in avoiding an abrupt changeover. He wondered if DOD could be flexible enough on the teachers to secure a year’s absence with career status protected but salaries unpaid by DOD. The teachers could then remain and assist with the transition. This would be particularly helpful because the Bahrainis were most interested in keeping the school. Its presence is an advantage, in attracting business and for other reasons.
(U) The meeting concluded with an exchange of pleasantries.
Summary: Ellsworth and other Department of Defense officials met with Ambassador Twinam to discuss MIDEASTFOR.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–79–0040, Folder BA–1, Bahrain General and Miscellaneous Items. Secret. Drafted by Col. Robert Burch (OASD/ISA/NESA); approved by Ellsworth on August 22. The meeting took place in Ellsworth’s office.
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