Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

50. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 30, 1975, 9–9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the Ambassador of Kuwait (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• Kuwait Side

  • The Ambassador of Kuwait—Shaikh Salim Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah
  • Commercial/Military Officer—Mr. Abdul Razzak

• United States Side

  • Secretary of Defense—James R. Schlesinger
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense—William P. Clements, Jr.
  • Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Robert Ellsworth
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East, Africa & South Asia—James H. Noyes
  • Military Assistant to SecDef—MG John A. Wickham, Jr.
  • Director, Near East & South Asia Region—MG Gordon Sumner, Jr.
  • Deputy Director, DSAA—MG James A. Grimsley, Jr.
  • Country Director, Kuwait—CDR Gary G. Sick

Ambassador al Sabah began by apologizing for missing the Secretary’s lecture at Georgetown the previous afternoon but noted he was speaking at Johns Hopkins at the same time. The Secretary commented that it was not a lecture but a sermon.

The Ambassador stated that he wished to speak candidly as only friends are able to. Specifically, he wished to raise two issues. First, he would appreciate the Secretary’s comments about Masirah Island and, secondly, would like his views concerning possible US interference in the Gulf and, specifically, Kuwait. Secretary Schlesinger responded that with respect to Masirah, there was no news to report. The US contemplated occasional flights into the Indian Ocean area via Diego Garcia, which would occasionally refuel at Masirah, since that is a “transition point”. However, there was no plan to put military power in there and the event has no particular significance in itself. With regard to the second point, the Secretary stated that he assumed the Ambassador was referring to Dr. Kissinger’s interview in Business Week. In that interview he had stated a number of propositions which could be characterized as “political science,” e.g., the proposition that in case of strangulation or the gravest emergency, recourse to military action would have to be considered. This was not intended to refer to any specific actions. However, it has resulted in some complexities. At his recent press conference, SecDef was asked why the US sells arms to the Gulf states, as those arms might be used against the US in the event of an intervention. He had replied at the time that obviously he did not consider such an eventuality to be likely. Rather, our objective is to strengthen the indigenous military capability and security of nations in the Gulf. That factor should be kept in mind in understanding the context of Dr. Kissinger’s remarks.

The Ambassador noted that the press, especially in the Gulf, treats intervention as an imminent occurrence. The Secretary replied that this was “hogwash”. The Ambassador observed that it would be useful in such cases to have some statement of explanation or clarification, and he intended to make this point with the State Department in the near future. He noted that we are in a position where things are moving smoothly between our two countries, and such statements make things difficult. For example, Kuwait has just had a new election which will bring new faces into the National Assembly. He could not predict the attitudes of the new Assembly exactly, but it is possible that they would take up such issues for political purposes. He gave the example of a recent case where a rigidly Moslem member of the Assembly demanded that liquor be banned at embassies, on airlines, and other places under government control. Although the Ambassador was personally aware that three-fourths of the members of the Assembly do drink; nevertheless they could not oppose this proposition since elections were near. As a result, the Ambassador must personally take the blame if he serves drinks at a reception. Obviously, it is to our advantage to avoid creating misunderstandings which make our relations more difficult. SecDef replied that for his part, he wished the subject would go away, and he promised to raise the issue with Dr. Kissinger. He was amused by the Ambassador’s story and recalled a similar situation when he was in Ireland 20 years ago, during the continuing decay of Irish nationalism, when only 20 percent of the Irish still spoke Gaelic. Nevertheless, when it was proposed to conduct all government business in Gaelic, no one could come out four-square against it, even though the debate had to be conducted in English.

The Ambassador noted that Kuwait has no intention of strangling its friends. This had been told to the US Ambassador in Kuwait in the presence of Senator Percy during his call on the Crown Prince. The Government of Kuwait wishes to work together with the US to prevent any situation being forced upon them (repeated for emphasis) as was the case in 1973. He was personally optimistic about the composition of the new Parliament, but recognized that politicians will go their own ways. He was personally acquainted with many of the Deputies and believed they were reasonable and moderate. SecDef reiterated that Dr. Kissinger’s comments were more in the form of an observation rather than a threat. The clear inference of these remarks is that in case of an embargo, the US could not remain passive. This was probably understood even before the statement was made, and whether the advantages of making it explicit outweighed the disadvantages was not certain. The Secretary observed that he was encouraged by the Ambassador’s comments on the new Parliament. He noted that the independence of the Gulf states is a result of the balance of power and is indirectly related to a US presence. If the Soviets became paramount, the degree of freedom available to the Gulf states would diminish. Therefore, the interests of the area can not be disassociated from the utility to them of US power. Our relationship should be one of partnership. Egypt’s experience with the Soviets over 20 years is a good example. The Egyptians appreciate the balance of power and their need to be able to act independently. Without such a balance, a move such as that 1½ years ago to remove the Soviets would not have been possible. In the case of Kuwait, with the proximity of Soviet power to the north, together with the role of Iraq, the importance of these factors should be well recognized.

The Ambassador noted with respect to the Iraqi situation that he found it sad. He noted, however, that there are those who say that when the US gives arms to Iran this prompts the Soviets to increase their military support of Iraq. The Secretary interjected that we do not give arms to Iran—we sell them. The Ambassador agreed that the US has the right to sell to whomever they please. But the continued military build-up in Iran gives the impression that they are “too big for the area”, and Iranian military involvement has extended as far away as Vietnam, where they sent aircraft. Kuwait was particularly concerned with increased Soviet presence in Iraq and Aden. SecDef asked his views on Soviet activities in Aden. The Ambassador replied that they “hear of this.” The Kuwaitis had invited representatives from South Yemen to visit and see Kuwaiti democracy for themselves. They were shocked to find that it did not resemble their propaganda picture of Kuwait as a “pawn of the West”. Kuwait had also tried to give them economic help and thus relieve some of the pressures which push them toward the Soviets. He noted that in Yemeni schools they ask a child to say “God give me food” and nothing happens. They then ask him to say “Mao give me food” and they give him food. This is very impressive to a 7-year old. Therefore, Kuwait has concentrated on food, schools, and hospitals. At least one result of this policy is that they no longer talk about “liberating” the Gulf. That doesn’t include Oman, of course. The Secretary noted that the Sultan during his recent visit had not been pleased to be singled out that way.

The Ambassador stated that it was Kuwait’s objective to try to moderate extremists, but to do so they need help from their friends, and not threatening words. “The danger is much greater than we are”. The Soviets have asked once or twice to stop in Kuwait, but were always politely refused. “Many mistakes have been made in Palestine. We should try to avoid mistakes in the Gulf.” He referred to an occasion at Johns Hopkins the day before when he had followed an Arab speaker who repeatedly referred to the Persian Gulf. He had pointed out the controversy over the name, and had suggested calling it just “the Gulf” as a compromise. The other speaker referred to a map behind him, only to discover the map said “Arabian Gulf”. The Secretary joked that there is also a tendency to confuse the “Gulf of Florida” with the “Gulf of Mexico”.

The Ambassador said that he was not concerned with names, but with security. Kuwait respects the Shah and has no reason to doubt his intentions. But if these arms should get into the wrong hands and operate from territory such as the islands off Ras al Khaima, “the Gulf would become a lake and it is the Arabs who would be strangled.” SecDef stated that we view the Soviet forces north of Iran and Turkey in terms of possible expansionism into the gulf area where there was little power to oppose them. Strengthening Iran creates something more formidable for the Soviets to see when they look south. From the viewpoint of others, this gives the impression of regional imbalance. This has been a source of concern, a source of thought for us. If the Iranians do not obtain arms from us, they can easily turn to European suppliers or even to the Soviets. In view of the money allocated for arms purchases in Iran, nothing will stop the Iranian build-up—irrespective of US policy. We would hope that Iran would focus its military attention toward the north and that US supply would serve as a moderating influence should the need arise. As the Ambassador had noted, the concern is not with Iran, but with power falling into the wrong hands. In such a case, US influence would be highly desirable. The Ambassador asked whether such US influence in the event of a change of regime in Iran would not require a substantial presence on Masirah. SecDef replied we have no present intention of having a substantial presence in Masirah, though certainly a major political change in Iran would bear consideration. He noted again that we have no desire to build up forces in the area, and if the Soviets keep their hands off we see no threat to the region. However, if the Soviets do look south again, we want to be able to match them.

The Ambassador reiterated that it is essential to avoid misunderstandings so the Gulf states can continue to resist Soviet requests. Statements, not only by government leaders but also by Congressmen, get a great deal of attention in Kuwait. SecDef noted that he believed we have made a number of statements concerning stability and the need for a peaceful settlement in the Arab-Israel dispute which we hope would have a settling effect in the region as a whole. We must remember that the Soviets have 4 million men and 160 divisions under arms, representing massive military power. Although we appreciate the desirability of resisting Soviet requests in the Gulf, that does not address Soviet power adequately.

At this point, Mr. Clements joined the group. The Ambassador noted that many nations have only the Soviets to rely on. President Sadat stuck his neck out in resisting such reliance. He hoped the US would help. SecDef stated that is our intention. The Ambassador then apologized to Mr. Clements that he must leave just as he arrived, noting “when angels come, devils must leave”. The Secretary wondered whether the Ambassador was not being diplomatic and reversing the order. Mr. Clements noted that he and the Ambassador were old friends and that they understand each other very well.

1. Summary: Secretary of Defense Schlesinger met with Kuwaiti Ambassador Salim al-Sabah to discuss the possibility of U.S. intervention in the Gulf, arms supply, Soviet influence, the situation in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and other topics.

   Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–78–0038, Kuwait 000.1–333, 1975. Secret. Drafted by Sick; approved by Ellsworth on February 8. The meeting took place in Schlesinger’s office. On Kissinger’s Business Week interview, see Documents 125 and 126.