49. Telegram From the Embassy in Qatar to the Department of State1
112. Dept pass CINCUSNAVEUR London UK and other military addressees as appropriate. Subject: Gov’t of Qatar Decides Against Permitting US Naval Visit. Refs: Doha 55 (Notal): Doha 59.
1. Summary: GOQ has decided against permitting requested Feb 24–26 visit of COMIDEASTFOR flag ship, USS La Salle. According Commander-in-Chief of Qatari armed forces, decision based on unfavorable atmosphere created by recent US statements about possible intervention in area and other related US actions. Believe it would be inadvisable to press issue further at this time. Since GOQ does not rpt not wish to give US formal refusal, for record and cosmetic purposes, we will withdraw our clearance request for La Salle visit. End summary.
2. After repeated requests to Foreign Ministry for reply to our note requesting clearance for visit of USS La Salle Feb 24–26, we were advised to take matter up directly with Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, Commander-in-Chief of Qatari Armed Forces, who is also Amir’s oldest son. On evening Jan 27 I called on Shaykh Hamad and asked about our clearance request for La Salle.
3. Shaykh Hamad reminded me of our previous conversation during which he had raised question about advisability of La Salle visit in present atmosphere (Doha 59). He said, as he had promised, he had discussed situation with the Amir who had confirmed Hamad’s judgment that visit inadvisable at this time. Hamad asserted that against background of Secretary’s statement in Business Week interview about possible intervention in this area, which statement subsequently had been repeated and confirmed a number of times not only by Secretary but by President Ford and Secretary of Defense, US naval ship visit here would put GOQ in awkward position vis-à-vis domestic and Arab public opinion. Hamad indicated that current public furor over US request for facilities on Masirah Island and canard re alleged US formation of three divisions for service in Mid East, plus recent OPEC Minis [Page 214] terial Conference in Algiers and further OPEC Ministerial and Summit meetings planned for late February/early March, were bound to keep pot boiling on alleged US intervention threats in area. It was in this atmosphere that GOQ would have to answer to Qatari people and other Arabs for its permission for US naval visit, and this had brought GOQ to decision that La Salle visit inadvisable.
3. Hamad said that he, the Amir and other GOQ officials appreciated US explanations re recent statements and actions, but first impressions were lasting ones and unfavorable to US, particularly in public forum. Hamad stated that he could not rpt not rule out subversive-inspired hostile demonstrations in Doha if La Salle visited, and he believed this could harm US/GOQ relations. He believed that GOQ’s frank and friendly counsel for La Salle to stay away at this time would be best for all concerned.
4. I expressed disappointment with GOQ attitude which indicated that anti-US propaganda in area instigated by enemies of GOQ as well as US, had done its job well. Hamad replied that US statements had given anti-US forces their opportunity. I answered that La Salle visit would demonstrate, despite hostile propaganda, GOQ’s understanding of real meaning and intention of US presence in area as force for stability. Hamad responded that GOQ could not rpt not ignore external and publicly understood implications of recent US statements, its perception of ex post facto explanations notwithstanding. He said his frankness with me indicative of solid basis of US/GOQ relations since only friends could be so candid. GOQ decision dictated by its own political environment and not intended to mar its excellent relations with US. He said decision should not rpt not become issue between us and since matter not rpt not in public domain it need never surface as problem or embarrassment between two countries. He asked for our understanding of GOQ’s situation.
5. I said that I did understand GOQ’s situation but did not rpt not agree that it leads to decided course of action. I found it ironic that Iraqis, who GOQ feared were actively engaged in subversion here, had had naval visit late last year. Hamad replied that GOQ could not refuse Iraq since it fellow Arab country and its ships had visited all other Gulf states. He said GOQ had made its attitude toward Iraq clear during visit by fact that neither he nor any other senior Qatari official had attended any of functions associated with Iraqi naval visit, and this was public indication of Qatari disfavor toward present GOI. I noted that US ships too called frequently at other Gulf ports and indeed were provided facilities in Bahrain. Hamad countered that he was not rpt not aware of any US naval visits since Secretary’s and subsequent [Page 215] statements from other USG officials on possible intervention in area. I also expressed great skepticism about danger of demonstrations against La Salle in Doha, saying it had been my impression that security situation here completely under control. Hamad said that nuisance potential of a few subversives should not be underestimated. In any case, the major concern of GOQ was to preempt cause of possible demonstrations by advising against La Salle visit.
6. Hamad reiterated that he did not wish this matter to become issue between our governments. I suggested that matter be reviewed again with Amir. He said that he could do this or I could do it myself, but he strongly advised against this course of action. He said Amir’s displeasure with US statements had been clearly conveyed during Senator Percy’s visit (Doha 46), and that other Arab moderates such as Sadat and Saudis had also spoken out strongly on issue. According Hamad, although moderate Arab views principal bench mark for Qataris, they could not ignore ravings of radicals such as Algerians, Libyans and Iraqis, and expose themselves to general Arab criticism by permitting US ship visit in this highly charged atmosphere.
7. I repeated to Hamad my disappointment over GOQ attitude but said that I would reluctantly accept his advice not to press issue further. I told him I would of course be reporting GOQ’s decision and his remarks in detail to my government. He replied that this is exactly what he wished since the USG should have a very clear picture of the impact of its recent statements and actions on its friends in this area.
8. Comment: La Salle’s non-visit is clearly casualty of Secretary’s Business Week interview and subsequent statements and actions interpreted as confirming US intervention intentions in this area. I believe Qataris sincerely wish to believe our explanations but we have not been able to dispel their doubts and suspicions of our true intentions, and progression of events in past few weeks has done nothing to allay these suspicions. GOQ is wondering and apprehensive about what our next surprise will be in this region. I am too.
9. Comment continued: On immediate problem of ship visit, as indicated above, I do not rpt not believe it advisable to press further. GOQ typically wants to keep its head down. Although I have considered going over Hamad’s head to the Amir, I think this would be a vain and counter-productive attempt to convince him to change his mind. It is un-realistic to expect Qataris to stand up for what we say is true; even though they want to believe it, they don’t. Since it is indicated that GOQ does not wish to give US a formal refusal, for cosmetic and record purposes, we will send note to Foreign Ministry withdrawing La Salle clearance request citing “changed operational requirements”. There are a number of officials in Foreign Ministry and armed forces who are aware of our pending request, and our initiative [Page 216] in withdrawing it will provide a thin but plausible cover for GOQ’s turndown.
Summary: The Embassy informed the Department that Qatar decided not to allow the U.S.S. LaSalle, the MIDEASTFOR flagship, to visit Doha in retaliation for Secretary Kissinger’s interview in Business Week.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Doha Embassy Files: Lot 79F187, POL 7, Visits. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated Priority to COMIDEASTFOR; repeated to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Jidda, Manama, Muscat, and Tehran. Telegram 55 from Doha was not found. Telegram 59 from Doha, January 18, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750020–0555. For additional documentation on the Business Week interview, see Documents 125 and 126.
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