125. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
138. Subject: Ambassador’s Comments on Views of King and Royal Council of Princes. Ref: A) Jidda 0032; B) Jidda 0067; C) State 1955; D) State 1969; E) Jidda 0137.
1. You may have read some of my messages on the growing Saudi nervousness arising from repeated reports from Israel and the United States on the necessity of occupying the Arab oil producing countries, notably Saudi Arabia. You may also have noted the limited reassurances I’ve given the Saudis (ref A&B) which anticipated the Department’s instructions (ref C&D).
2. I don’t know whether the U.S. and Israeli newspaper articles are inspired; I can see why they might be. If there is any considered purpose behind them, it probably is to warn the Saudis of the consequences of another oil embargo in the event of another Arab-Israeli war.
3. There is no doubt that King Faisal is worried and his worry is shared by Fahd, Sultan, Yamani and others. They fear that the United States, in a misguided zeal to support Israeli conquests, will bring down disaster on itself, on the Middle East and on the entire world. And they interpret the U.S. threats as proof that Zionist influence in the U.S. is undiminished. There is however no disposition to foreswear the oil boycott as a weapon.
4. If the war does start and if we come to Israel’s aid as we did in 1973, I am convinced the boycott is inevitable. If the war starts and Israel does very well using the massive arms deliveries we have made in the last year, then the boycott is almost equally certain—although in this case we could conceivably preserve something. If the war is a stand-off, then I think the chances of avoiding the boycott would be at least twenty-five percent.
[Page 447]5. The result of the threatening press articles has been a series of meetings between Yamani and other Saudi leaders with the Western European Ambassadors (I’m not sure about Japan) where the Saudis are apparently doing everything they can to ensure there will be no consumer solidarity. The point they seem to be making is they do not intend destruction of Israel, they are willing to reach peace but if Israel is not, there will be war. And the Saudis will expect European support. If they get it there will be no cutoff of oil deliveries to them—only to the United States, and if United States invades them, then all oil supplies will be lost.
6. I also strongly suspect the Saudis are already taking measures to ensure destruction of the oil installations in Dhahran. I asked Yamani point-blank about this; he laughed and said “you don’t really think I would tell you, the American Ambassador, what we intend to do, do you?” I told him there would be some utility in our knowing Saudi intentions; they would be carefully considered in the United States. He made no comment other than to repeat that he knew the United States well; he was convinced that its support of Israel would stop short of provoking its own destruction and that of its allies. But if we lost our minds we could rest assured that there would not be enough oil left in the Persian Gulf to run the smallest European state; and production would be out for a decade.
7. Sultan made the same statements to me somewhat less boldly earlier (ref E).
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Summary: After Secretary Kissinger gave an interview in Business Week and referred to the possible use of military force in the event of another oil embargo, Ambassador Akins informed the Department of the importance with which the Saudi Government viewed the matter.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 29, Saudi Arabia—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (3). Secret; Niact Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. Reference telegrams C and D were not found. Telegrams 32 from Jidda, January 4; 67 from Jidda, January 5; and 137 from Jidda, January 7, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750004–0636, D750004–0773, and [no film number], respectively. Kissinger’s interview with Business Week appeared in the January 13, 1975, issue. A transcript is in the Department of State Bulletin, January 27, 1975, pp. 97–106.
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