51. Letter From the Ambassador to Bahrain (Twinam) to the Director of the Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State (Palmer)1

Dear Steve:

Thank you for sending me the Livingston-Wiley-Placke report on Gulf Policy, and inviting my comments on it.

Having been involved in Gulf matters most of the last decade, and having spent some time with the Inspector’s in the course of their labors, I am especially interested in their findings. They have done a first rate job.

Less from the present vantage point of Bahrain than from past experience I must “vent feelings” informally on two major issues which the report properly addresses although they transcend the Gulf context in its strictest sense—oil policy and the Iranian/Arab connection:

1) The Inspector’s urge departing from traditional wisdom by having the USG play a more active role in oil negotiations. Their recommendations are more or less overtaken by events. Events, however, may have departed not just from traditional wisdom but eventual wisdom in hindsight. In weakening the oil company “buffer” we take great risks, and we should seek a more direct role in negotiations with caution, and certainly not until we are satisfied that:

a) The USG understands the complexities of international oil at least as well as the companies;

b) the USG has a firm and long-term energy policy permitting sensitive control of the price and volume of our imports and exports;

c) the USG has a Middle East policy which protects rather than threatens Western access to Arab oil prices determined by market forces;

d) The long term ongoing USG interest in the Gulf is more directed toward access to oil than toward access to the capital resources the oil has produced.

If any of these conditions has not been met, we need to strengthen, not weaken, the oil company “buffer.”

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2) As we contemplate whether Iranian/Arab cooperation will continue to keep the Gulf stable we should not fall into the delusion of thinking in narrow terms of Iranian/Saudi cooperation. Saudi/Iranian cooperation has been but a facade to keep the lesser Gulf sheikhs easy; in terms of real cooperation it is a hopeless contest between non-equals—and will be for at least a generation. The reason the British could “officially” leave the Gulf with grace (and by leaving, stay in a very meaningful and helpful sense) was that the Nasserist Revolution left before they did. Gulf stability hence depends on an easy relationship between Iran on the one hand and Egypt (bankrolled by Saudi Arabia) on the other. So far our luck is not only holding out but even getting better in this respect; and we should as a matter of basic policy seek to reinforce its onward chances.

Beyond these informal and gratuitous comments, I attach a “formal” comment on the Inspection.

With thanks and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Joe Twinam

Attachment

Report Prepared by the Ambassador to Bahrain (Twinam)

Embassy Manama comments on inspection report “U.S. Government policies and progress in the Persian Gulf States”

I. Basic Thrust

The report urges that the USG approach toward the Gulf States emphasize cooperation in the economic/social area rather than in military/security affairs. Only by rigid and forceful adherence to this recommendation will we truly serve U.S. national interests, particularly in the long term.

II. Technical Assistance

In pursuit of a stronger USG role in the economic/social sphere the Report suggests increased efforts to provide USG sponsored technical assistance, including advisors whose salaries are supported in part by US funds. The legislative and budgetary capability to pursue this recommendation in all the Gulf States (including the richest ones) should be vigorously sought. USG technical advice is the key to increased U.S. access to markets and funds in the area and, leaving aside [Page 223] its significant political desirability, is urgently justifiable on purely economic grounds. In the absence of “Salary topping” American advisors are generally not competitive with roughly comparable European talent.

A Gulf Technical Assistance Office to oversee and administer USG technical assistance efforts should be seriously considered. For reasons discussed immediately below and because a US technical advisory assistance program for Bahrain is already planned, this office should be located in Bahrain, with adequate administrative support.

III. Pursuing Economic Interests—Development Projects and Reverse Investment

Among several meritorious recommendations to foster our economic interests in the Gulf the Inspectors suggest establishing two senior regional jobs dealing with (1) financial affairs and (2) project-oriented commercial activity.

The motive is excellent; the specific suggestions deserve a hard look. The need is broadly to absorb the surplus funds of the Gulf through sound investment in the area and in Western markets, with substantial benefit to the U.S. economy. Possibly a single Department of State activity would better serve this purpose than would the two positions proposed. They in any event are but a splitting of the now-abandoned Gulf Regional Economic/Commercial Officer slot as originally conceived. Earlier Inspectors made withering verbal critiques of that concept.

Assuming we come up with additional positions to serve our economic interests in the area, and these positions are designed to best serve real needs rather than to fall easily into Washington’s bureaucratic pigeonholes the Inspectors concept of where such an operation should be based is questionable. The experience of American business in dealing with the Gulf is instructive and suggests the following formula: (A) If a US activity in the Gulf requires high quality but sporadic contact, it should be based in the United States. (B) If the activity requires almost constant presence in the area: 1) If the target is almost solely Saudi Arabia it should be based there; 2) if the target is the Gulf States generally, Bahrain is the natural base of operations; (c) In any event, a Beirut-based operation is the worst of all possible worlds.

Our alternative suggestion would be setting up a two to three officer operation in Washington to promote both reverse investment from the Gulf and US participation in projects there, with the officers involved traveling extensively both in the area and the United States. If and only if this experiment flourished should we consider extending the office into the region, with perhaps a representative for Saudi Arabia based in Jidda and one for the Gulf based in Bahrain.

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IV. The Middle East Force Presence

We seem to have preserved for the moment the Middle East Force presence in the Gulf and its Bahraini base of operations. The effort cost us some political IOU’s in Riyadh and Tehran and some increase in what our taxpayers give Bahrain.

In the wake of this effort it would be bad policy indeed to tamper significantly with the Middle East Force presence for at least a year or so.

But now is the time, as the Inspectors suggest, to begin reassessing whether the Middle East Force presence will continue to serve our real national interest.

The 1970 decision to keep the Force in the Gulf as the British withdrew was quite justifiable in manifesting a continuing US interest in the absence of other significant official presence in the lower Gulf. But this is 1975; there is now relatively substantial US diplomatic representation; there are good prospects for increased official US presence in the economic/technical development sphere. The time may be coming, in 1977 or beyond, for the Middle East Force “honor guard” to retire.

Specifically, continued Middle East Force presence, as it currently exists, presents the following problems:

1) As a militarily meaningful U.S. Navy presence becomes a semi-permanent fixture in the Indian Ocean, Middle East Force becomes, to those who trust its mission, increasingly quaint. It is pomp without circumstance;

2) Its innocent “flag showing” mission is sufficiently incredible to make it something of a political liability. Since no other Gulf State will publicly support its presence, Bahrain is asking $4 million a year for the political burden of tolerating the Force;

3) Linking the meaningful U.S. Navy presence in the Indian Ocean with the Middle East Force Command would be instantly intolerable to the Gulf States, notably Iran. Hence the Force is locked in its present and increasingly “comic opera” role;

4) In seeking a fulfilling mission, the Force tends to emphasize an “intelligence gathering” function which seems at best exaggerated and at worst politically vulnerable;

5) Caught in this situation, the Force increasingly becomes a political liability in the area. Its ill-wishers can lie about its mission with a certain persuasiveness. Its well-wishers have difficulty describing what it really does convincingly.

6) Quite apart from the question, which has received all the attention over the last five years, “What harm does the Middle East Force do?”, there is the question the Inspectors have finally raised, “What good does it do?” And here is where the burden of proof should lie.

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In considering the future of Middle East Force the nature and function of its elements should be carefully differentiated.

A) The small shore support facility in Bahrain (NCSO), headed by a Commander, is not subject to major controversy; it could be maintained so long as the U.S. Navy has need of a logistic support base in the area regardless of the fate of Middle East Force.

(B) The role of Commander Middle East Force is subject to controversy, largely because the rank of the Commander (Rear Admiral) and the name of the command imply a scope and intent of activity for exceeding the modest mission of this small contingent of two transient destroyers and the large flagship La Salle. The Commander has a quasi-diplomatic visiting role in a wide area; customarily he fulfills it by traveling in his aircraft rather than riding the flagship. As we enter the latter half of the 1970’s the utility of both the Commander’s command and diplomatic roles is subject to honest question.

(C) The flagship La Salle spends about half its time in Bahrain; the rest on visits, exercises, or out of the area for maintenance. The Commander uses it as an office and site for representational entertaining both in Bahrain and other ports in the area. Seldom does the Commander ride the flagship underway. Since the flagship is seldom used as such in an operational sense yet its complement constitutes 3/4 of the U.S. Navy presence in Bahrain, its role is subject to serious review. If a “flagship”, other than the transient destroyers, is essential, perhaps a hospital ship or some other vessel contributing to U.S. efforts to provide technology to the area would be more appropriate.

(D) The visiting destroyers are the primary manifestation of U.S. Navy presence in the area outside Bahrain. They call but briefly in Bahrain for replenishment during their tours with Middle East Force. The British and French mount comparable visits in the Gulf without relying on a permanent command structure or flagship in the area. It is not clear from the Bahrain vantage point why the destroyer visits could not continue without a Middle East Force Command. If the Command is needed for this purpose, could not the destroyers serve as flagship?

V. Military Attachés for Gulf

Insofar as Bahrain is concerned the low potential for developing our bilateral defense relationships, the political problems created by the present Middle East Force presence and the proximity of USMTM Saudi Arabia for ad hoc advice on military matters all argue against posting a U.S. Military Attaché.

Joseph W. Twinam
  1. Summary: Twinam provided an analysis of current and proposed U.S. policy initiatives toward the Gulf states.

    Source: National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, POL 15, Bahrain Government. Secret; Official-Informal; Nodis Attachment. A copy was sent to Dickman. The Livingston-Wiley-Placke report is not further identified.