Thank you for sending me the Livingston-Wiley-Placke report on Gulf
Policy, and inviting my comments on it.
Having been involved in Gulf matters most of the last decade, and having
spent some time with the Inspector’s in the course of their labors, I am
especially interested in their findings. They have done a first rate
job.
Less from the present vantage point of Bahrain than from past experience
I must “vent feelings” informally on two major issues which the report
properly addresses although they transcend the Gulf context in its
strictest sense—oil policy and the Iranian/Arab connection:
1) The Inspector’s urge departing from traditional wisdom by having the
USG play a more active role in oil
negotiations. Their recommendations are more or less overtaken by
events. Events, however, may have departed not just from traditional
wisdom but eventual wisdom in hindsight. In weakening the oil company
“buffer” we take great risks, and we should seek a more direct role in
negotiations with caution, and certainly not until we are satisfied
that:
If any of these conditions has not been met, we need to strengthen, not
weaken, the oil company “buffer.”
2) As we contemplate whether Iranian/Arab cooperation will continue to
keep the Gulf stable we should not fall into the delusion of thinking in
narrow terms of Iranian/Saudi cooperation. Saudi/Iranian cooperation has
been but a facade to keep the lesser Gulf sheikhs easy; in terms of real
cooperation it is a hopeless contest between non-equals—and will be for
at least a generation. The reason the British could “officially” leave
the Gulf with grace (and by leaving, stay in a very meaningful and
helpful sense) was that the Nasserist Revolution left before they did.
Gulf stability hence depends on an easy relationship between Iran on the
one hand and Egypt (bankrolled by Saudi Arabia) on the other. So far our
luck is not only holding out but even getting better in this respect;
and we should as a matter of basic policy seek to reinforce its onward
chances.
Beyond these informal and gratuitous comments, I attach a “formal”
comment on the Inspection.
With thanks and best wishes.
Attachment
Report Prepared by the Ambassador to Bahrain
(Twinam)
Embassy Manama comments on inspection report “U.S. Government policies and progress in the Persian
Gulf States”
I. Basic Thrust
The report urges that the USG
approach toward the Gulf States emphasize cooperation in the
economic/social area rather than in military/security affairs. Only
by rigid and forceful adherence to this recommendation will we truly
serve U.S. national interests,
particularly in the long term.
II. Technical
Assistance
In pursuit of a stronger USG role in
the economic/social sphere the Report suggests increased efforts to
provide USG sponsored technical
assistance, including advisors whose salaries are supported in part
by US funds. The legislative and budgetary capability to pursue this
recommendation in all the Gulf States
(including the richest ones) should be vigorously sought. USG technical advice is the key to
increased U.S. access to markets and
funds in the area and, leaving aside
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its significant political desirability, is
urgently justifiable on purely economic grounds. In the absence of
“Salary topping” American advisors are generally not competitive
with roughly comparable European talent.
A Gulf Technical Assistance Office to oversee and administer USG technical assistance efforts
should be seriously considered. For reasons discussed immediately
below and because a US technical advisory assistance program for
Bahrain is already planned, this office should be located in
Bahrain, with adequate administrative support.
III. Pursuing Economic
Interests—Development Projects and Reverse Investment
Among several meritorious recommendations to foster our economic
interests in the Gulf the Inspectors suggest establishing two senior
regional jobs dealing with (1) financial affairs and (2)
project-oriented commercial activity.
The motive is excellent; the specific suggestions deserve a hard
look. The need is broadly to absorb the surplus funds of the Gulf
through sound investment in the area and in Western markets, with
substantial benefit to the U.S.
economy. Possibly a single Department of State activity would better
serve this purpose than would the two positions proposed. They in
any event are but a splitting of the now-abandoned Gulf Regional
Economic/Commercial Officer slot as originally conceived. Earlier
Inspectors made withering verbal critiques of that concept.
Assuming we come up with additional positions to serve our economic
interests in the area, and these positions are designed to best
serve real needs rather than to fall easily into Washington’s
bureaucratic pigeonholes the Inspectors concept of where such an
operation should be based is questionable. The experience of
American business in dealing with the Gulf is instructive and
suggests the following formula: (A) If a US activity in the Gulf
requires high quality but sporadic contact, it should be based in
the United States. (B) If the activity requires almost constant
presence in the area: 1) If the target is almost solely Saudi Arabia
it should be based there; 2) if the target is the Gulf States
generally, Bahrain is the natural base of operations; (c) In any
event, a Beirut-based operation is the worst of all possible
worlds.
Our alternative suggestion would be setting up a two to three officer
operation in Washington to promote both reverse investment from the
Gulf and US participation in projects there, with the officers
involved traveling extensively both in the area and the United
States. If and only if this experiment flourished should we consider
extending the office into the region, with perhaps a representative
for Saudi Arabia based in Jidda and one for the Gulf based in
Bahrain.
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IV. The Middle East
Force Presence
We seem to have preserved for the moment the Middle East Force
presence in the Gulf and its Bahraini base of operations. The effort
cost us some political IOU’s in Riyadh and Tehran and some increase
in what our taxpayers give Bahrain.
In the wake of this effort it would be bad policy indeed to tamper
significantly with the Middle East Force presence for at least a
year or so.
But now is the time, as the Inspectors suggest, to begin reassessing
whether the Middle East Force presence will continue to serve our
real national interest.
The 1970 decision to keep the Force in the Gulf as the British
withdrew was quite justifiable in manifesting a continuing US
interest in the absence of other significant official presence in
the lower Gulf. But this is 1975; there is now relatively
substantial US diplomatic representation; there are good prospects
for increased official US presence in the economic/technical
development sphere. The time may be coming, in 1977 or beyond, for
the Middle East Force “honor guard” to retire.
Specifically, continued Middle East Force presence, as it currently
exists, presents the following problems:
1) As a militarily meaningful U.S.
Navy presence becomes a semi-permanent fixture in the Indian Ocean,
Middle East Force becomes, to those who trust its mission,
increasingly quaint. It is pomp without circumstance;
2) Its innocent “flag showing” mission is sufficiently incredible to
make it something of a political liability. Since no other Gulf
State will publicly support its presence, Bahrain is asking $4
million a year for the political burden of tolerating the Force;
3) Linking the meaningful U.S. Navy
presence in the Indian Ocean with the Middle East Force Command
would be instantly intolerable to the Gulf States, notably Iran.
Hence the Force is locked in its present and increasingly “comic
opera” role;
4) In seeking a fulfilling mission, the Force tends to emphasize an
“intelligence gathering” function which seems at best exaggerated
and at worst politically vulnerable;
5) Caught in this situation, the Force increasingly becomes a
political liability in the area. Its ill-wishers can lie about its
mission with a certain persuasiveness. Its well-wishers have
difficulty describing what it really does convincingly.
6) Quite apart from the question, which has received all the
attention over the last five years, “What harm does the Middle East
Force do?”, there is the question the Inspectors have finally
raised, “What good does it do?” And here is where the burden of
proof should lie.
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In considering the future of Middle East Force the nature and
function of its elements should be carefully differentiated.
A) The small shore support facility in Bahrain (NCSO), headed by a
Commander, is not subject to major controversy; it could be
maintained so long as the U.S. Navy
has need of a logistic support base in the area regardless of the
fate of Middle East Force.
(B) The role of Commander Middle East Force is subject to
controversy, largely because the rank of the Commander (Rear
Admiral) and the name of the command imply a scope and intent of
activity for exceeding the modest mission of this small contingent
of two transient destroyers and the large flagship La Salle. The Commander has a quasi-diplomatic visiting
role in a wide area; customarily he fulfills it by traveling in his
aircraft rather than riding the flagship. As we enter the latter
half of the 1970’s the utility of both the Commander’s command and
diplomatic roles is subject to honest question.
(C) The flagship La Salle spends about half
its time in Bahrain; the rest on visits, exercises, or out of the
area for maintenance. The Commander uses it as an office and site
for representational entertaining both in Bahrain and other ports in
the area. Seldom does the Commander ride the flagship underway.
Since the flagship is seldom used as such in an operational sense
yet its complement constitutes 3/4 of the U.S. Navy presence in Bahrain, its role is subject to
serious review. If a “flagship”, other than the transient
destroyers, is essential, perhaps a hospital ship or some other
vessel contributing to U.S. efforts
to provide technology to the area would be more appropriate.
(D) The visiting destroyers are the primary manifestation of U.S. Navy presence in the area outside
Bahrain. They call but briefly in Bahrain for replenishment during
their tours with Middle East Force. The British and French mount
comparable visits in the Gulf without relying on a permanent command
structure or flagship in the area. It is not clear from the Bahrain
vantage point why the destroyer visits could not continue without a
Middle East Force Command. If the Command is needed for this
purpose, could not the destroyers serve as flagship?
V. Military Attachés
for Gulf
Insofar as Bahrain is concerned the low potential for developing our
bilateral defense relationships, the political problems created by
the present Middle East Force presence and the proximity of USMTM Saudi Arabia for ad hoc advice on military matters all argue
against posting a U.S. Military
Attaché.
