48. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State1
746. Kuwait please pass Muscat, Doha. Subject: US-Bahraini Relations; Visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary Sidney Sober.
1. Summary: A resounding success, Sober visit to Bahrain made significant progress toward buttoning up Middle East Force problem. Of longer term significance, it evoked emphatic statements from Amir and Prime Minister on importance GOB attaches to special relationship with U.S. in context U.S. role in fostering stability and orderly progress in Gulf and peninsula. End summary.
2. Deputy Assistant Secretary Sober September 16 had brisk limbering up session with Development (Acting Foreign) Minister Shirawi, resulting in most illuminating exposition to date on what GOB wants from us in way of broader relationship, focused on technical assistance presence, to put continued U.S. Navy presence here in what Bahrainis will consider proper context. (septel). Then proceeded to standard 20–30 minute “courtesy call” on Amir and Prime Minister. The Khalifa leaders were lying in wait. Fifty minutes later, Sober emerged from significant exchange in which “Amir-Prime Minister show” had been most intense, emphatic and open in my experience, in telling how they view US-Bahraini relationship and how this relationship bears on future of the region and U.S. role in it. As usual, the Amir, who tends toward one-liners, provided the gracious broad brush touch while the Prime Minister moved in for the heavier and more specific articulation, with Shirawi adding the occasional nuance. Essentially they spoke in harmony, as follows:
3. Middle East peace and U.S. role. Bahrainis expressed deep gratification and relief in response to Mr. Sober’s persuasive reassurances that USG under President Ford continues without deviation to pursue energetically efforts to facilitate stability and enduring peace in Middle East. They voiced admiration for US efforts to date, noting that while little Bahrain could hardly make effective direct contribution to peace effort and could better concentrate on problems at home and in Gulf area, US peace efforts had enthusiastic GOB support. Bahrainis stressed [Page 210] crucial importance maintaining momentum toward peaceful settlement and expressed conviction that Arab world convinced peace must be achieved in Middle East.
4. Secretary Kissinger’s visit. Amir, in emphasizing appreciation for role Secretary has played in Middle East peace effort, noted Bahrain disappointment, but understanding, that Secretary had been unable to pay brief visit to Bahrain last spring. He expressed hope Secretary’s schedule in near future would permit a visit to Bahrain and Mr. Sober promised to convey personally to Secretary the Amir’s standing invitation.
5. Soviet role in area. Mr. Sober discussed briefly his recent visit to YAR noting apparent desire YAR leadership to move away from reliance on Soviet assistance and to strengthen ties with US. Bahrainis expressed great pleasure in this trend (Amir twice noted his admiration for al-Ayni). In response to Bahraini question, Mr. Sober sketched Soviet role in recent Middle East developments noting that while there is no evidence Soviets seek to disrupt peace efforts, we can assume Soviets view their diminishing influence in Egypt particularly and in Middle East diplomatic initiatives generally with some disappointment. Amir said “We want them to be disappointed.” Bahrainis noted need for continued vigilance re Soviet intentions in Gulf area, particularly Soviet efforts working through PDRY and Iraq to undermine regional stability.
6. Gulf stability and U.S. role. Evidencing interest in Mr. Sober’s impressions of visit to Saudi Arabia, Bahrainis came down hard on key role of Saudis in Gulf. Prime Minister described Saudi Arabia as “backbone of stability of Arab side of Gulf” and King Faisal as “father” to smaller Arab states in region. Added that “all” of smaller states recognize importance of Saudi role, “even Kuwait though they don’t like to admit it.” Bahrainis also noted full awareness of importance Iranian role in security and stability in Gulf. They went on to emphasize importance of close relationship between US and Saudi Arabia and of increasing US efforts to support orderly Saudi development, welcoming this trend enthusiastically. Prime Minister expounded at some length on fact that King Faisal had stuck with US at lowest moments of American prestige in Arab world, expressing pleasure that USG appreciative of Saudi’s good faith and friendship. Bahrainis noted they also had constantly maintained faith in US. They stressed importance US contribution to stability of Gulf region, describing US support to Saudi Arabia and Iran as major and welcome element in fostering the security of all the Gulf, but urging that USG also intensify direct relations with smaller Gulf states, notably Bahrain.
7. U.S. Navy presence. In response to Mr. Sober’s expression of U.S. Government appreciation for Bahraini leadership’s favorable attitude toward our desire to retain Middle East Force in Bahrain, Bahrainis [Page 211] stressed their pleasure that Navy would remain. They noted this reflects long-standing goodwill toward U.S., and as evidence Bahraini leadership takes pride in its friendship with U.S. Government and desires even closer relationship. Prime Minister said there are certain “details” to be worked out in arranging continued Middle East Force presence but that these should pose no problem in context overall good relations. Bahrainis added, however, that continued presence U.S. Navy inevitably subjects Bahraini leadership to questions by Bahraini public and friendly Arab states and attacks by less friendly ones since fact that Middle East Force stationed in Bahrain implies GOB has a relationship with USG which no other Arab country has.
8. “Special” US-Bahraini relationship. Prime Minister added that GOB has “guts” enough to stand up to criticism of Middle East Force presence in Bahrain but needs evidence of US support to combat such criticism. GOB must be able to show its own people and friendly neighbors that in having special relationship with US, manifest in part by Middle East Force presence, it has some additional significant manifestation of US cooperation. This cooperation should focus on development of civilian economy. Long-standing cooperation between US private business and Bahrain is most welcome and GOB would be grateful for USG efforts to encourage, as a matter of policy, increased presence of American private business in Bahrain. Of particular and urgent importance, however, is need for some tangible evidence of official US economic cooperation and support. GOB has come to conclusion that USG technical assistance, through providing a number of expert American advisers on concessional terms, would be most effective way USG could assist Bahrain in handling political problems of continued U.S. Navy presence, while serving at same time mutual US-Bahraini interest in strengthening social-economic fabric in Bahrain, and hence in Gulf generally. Mr. Sober explained in some detail strong USG interest in providing technology and expert advice to Bahrain and other states in region, noting present statutory and budgetary restraints on providing such help on other than strictly reimbursable basis. He assured Amir and Prime Minister USG continuing to look at this problem urgently and would lose no opportunity to be of help where possible. Bahrainis indicated awareness and appreciation of USG good faith in this regard but stressed urgency of their need for significant token of USG support for Bahrain development, reiterating their conviction that Bahrain already and inevitably has a “special” relationship with US, and wishes to see it grow.
9. Comment. I consider Mr. Sober’s visit especially beneficial in indicating to Bahraini leadership U.S. interest in Bahrain and Gulf region generally and in providing reassurances re U.S. policy in Middle East and Gulf. Both Mr. Sober and I were struck by intensity and [Page 212] openness with which the Amir and Prime Minister expressed their desire for stability throughout Gulf area with U.S. effectively supporting Saudi and Iranian roles while intensifying direct relationships with smaller Gulf states. Bahraini perception of Gulf and our role in it is consistent with our own policy objectives. Amir and Prime Minister are obviously sincere in their desire to see U.S. Navy presence continue in Gulf, accommodated in Bahrain. At same time they are understandably sensitive to being exposed, both at home and in rest of Arab world, to criticism for maintaining only U.S. military establishment on Arab soil. Hence they feel strong and urgent need for evidence of “special” relationship with U.S. in which visibility of Middle East Force presence will be offset by some U.S. support for orderly development of Bahrain’s economy. Various indications of growing US-Bahraini cooperation are welcome, including continued USG encouragement to American business community to consider opportunities in Bahrain. Essentially, however, GOB has concluded that presence of small number U.S. civilian expert advisers in Bahrain, provided by USG under concessional arrangements, would best evidence evolving US-Bahraini relationship in which continued Navy presence might be more easily justified to public opinion. GOB leadership also sees U.S. technical advisory help as desirable for its own sake, serving mutual U.S.-Bahraini interest in orderly progress in Bahrain and Gulf region generally. One cannot escape conclusion that Bahraini request is urgent and based on sound reading not only of Bahraini interest but of our own interest, both political and commercial.
10. Department please pass DOD for ISA, SecNav, CNO, CINCUSNAVEUR.
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Summary: The Embassy reported on Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Sober’s visit to Bahrain to negotiate an agreement for the retention of MIDEASTFOR.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, POL 15, Bahrain Government. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Jidda, Tehran, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait City, Sana’a, COMIDEASTFOR, and London.
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