35. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders and William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Aircraft for Kuwait
Since we sent you the memo at Tab B on F–4s for Kuwait, the Kuwaiti request has become somewhat less clear and the sense of urgency within our bureaucracy more intense. Mr. Clements has sent you an appeal [Tab A] to approve a somewhat more general statement on follow-on aircraft to the Government of Kuwait.
Recent Developments
It is now apparent that the Kuwaitis are not explicitly asking for the F–4 as a follow-on aircraft to the F–8, which they are now considering as a stop-gap measure to provide some immediate air defense capability. Increasingly the Kuwaitis seem to be interested in purchasing two distinct types of aircraft—an interceptor, perhaps the F–5E that at one time they rejected; and a ground attack or close support aircraft, such as the A–4, A–7, or eventually the A–10. The Kuwaitis are sending a team to the United States to look at all of these possibilities.
We cannot preclude, of course, that they will ultimately only be interested in the F–4. If that proves to be the case, the arguments we made in our previous memo remain valid. But it seems possible that the Kuwaitis may genuinely prefer two simpler aircraft rather than the more complicated F–4.
[Page 184]What to Tell the Kuwaitis Now
Mr. Clements has proposed avoiding the issue of the F–4 now by telling the Kuwaitis that we are willing to offer for sale a “suitable, mutually agreed, advanced follow-on aircraft” to the F–8 now under consideration. Mr. Rush concurs in this recommendation. The full statement that they recommend is as follows:
“The Government of the United States is willing to offer for sale to the Government of Kuwait suitable, mutually agreed, advanced follow-on aircraft. These aircraft would be made available as the result of Kuwait experience with interim US aircraft and in conjunction with United States recommendations regarding pilot and maintenance training to provide Kuwait with the capability to absorb sophisticated follow-on aircraft.”
The Issue
The broader issues remain as stated in our earlier memo at Tab B. We have a strong interest in assisting in the defense of Kuwait especially now that Kuwait has turned to us for help and in tying it more closely to our other friends in the area. It will be more difficult to involve Saudi Arabia and Jordan in Kuwait’s defense if they see us participating only half-heartedly. On the other hand, at this early stage in the evolution of Kuwait’s defense and foreign policies, it seems premature to get locked into promising the F–4.
If the more general statement above is approved, it will not commit us to any particular future course of action. But it will commit us to doing something, and we should have in mind what we would be willing to provide for Kuwait. Two possibilities exist:
—A follow-on package, consisting of some combination of ground attack aircraft and interceptors (e.g., A–4, A–7, A–10, F–5E).
—A follow-on package which would include F–4s.
At some point we will have to tell the Kuwaitis which of these options they can count on. Our choices are essentially the following:
—Say nothing for now.
—Approve a vague statement as recommended by Clements and Rush.
—Add an FYI sentence to the above statement saying that we can not consider F–4s for Kuwait, but will approve A–4, A–7, A–10 and F–5E as suitable advanced follow-on aircraft.
—Explicitly agree in principle to F–4s for Kuwait, if they express an interest in them.
Israeli and Iranian Reactions
Israel is adamantly opposed to the sale of F–4s to any Arab state. They are less likely to object to the other aircraft under consideration. Iran, after initially welcoming the news of our possible willingness to [Page 185] provide F–4s to Kuwait, has now, through its Foreign Minister, expressed some reservations, although the Shah told you we should sell Kuwait as much as we like.
RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the following statement for our Ambassador in Kuwait to deliver to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister:
“The Government of the United States is willing to offer for sale to the Government of Kuwait suitable, mutually agreed upon, aircraft to provide for its defense. The appropriate aircraft will be selected on the basis of Kuwaiti experience with interim US aircraft and consistent with US recommendations regarding pilot and maintenance training necessary to provide Kuwait with the capability to absorb sophisticated follow-on aircraft. [FYI only: We have in mind the A–4, A–7, A–10 and F–5E as possible follow-on aircraft. We are not now prepared to offer the F–4, but might reconsider at some future date.]”
Summary: The NSC summarized a discussion among the Department of Defense, the White House, and the Embassy in Kuwait regarding the Kuwaiti desire for an air defense fighter, the recent decision to sell the F–4 Phantom fighter to Saudi Arabia, and Israeli concerns about U.S. weapons sales to Arab countries. Saunders and Quandt recommended that Kissinger approve a follow-on aircraft in principle without specifying the F–4.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 180, Geopolitical File, Middle East Chronological File, July 2, 1973–September 4, 1973. Secret. Sent for action. Brackets are in the original. Kissinger initialed his approval with the proviso that the FYI passage was dropped. Attached but not published is Scowcroft’s August 1 memorandum, directing Pickering to draft a telegram to the Embassy including the approved language. Tab A, a July 12 memorandum from Clements to Kissinger urging the approval of an offer in principle to provide a new fighter to Kuwait and proposing the language approved by Kissinger, is attached but not published. Tab B is published as Document 34. See also Document 89.
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