89. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Rush and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
K: Hello.
R: Henry.
K: Yes, Ken.
R: What I called you about was something that to—I’m sorry to bother you at the last moment, but this sale of F–4s to Kuwait is a matter of very great constance to us.
[Page 327]K: Well, I have just had a violent complaint from the Israelis about the Saudi sale.
R: I know it and—
K: And I just can’t go along until I’ve had a chance to get to the President.
R: All right. What underlies this thing really Henry is the Israelis, and I understand this, they are going to take a very strong stand always against our selling F–4s to the Saudis or to Kuwait. But we really need to sell these planes to keep the stability in that area. They can’t resell them.
K: But they can use them.
R: They can use them but not against people that use them against the Israelis.
K: Why not?
R: They have no intention of doing so. The Shah has told me that he is developing good relationship with both Kuwait and with the Saudis. What they are worried to death about is the trouble being drummed up by Yemen and by the Russians in Yemen and in that general area. Now another aspect of it is, and I don’t want to take too much of your time because I know you are busy, but I had in all the heads of the companies doing business in Libya. They are really—their backs are against the wall. What Libya is going to do is knock off one by one and then leap frog over to the Middle East, and the Shah has told me he does not want to raise the price of oil, but that if we , then he’s got to do it at least back to Libya and back and forth. And all the heads of these companies say we’ve got to do something to show—to calm this emotional upsurge in the Middle East.
K: But they are always wrong Ken. Every year they have another pet project to calm it, and they are never right.
R: They don’t know about this, in fact that’s a very minor factor.
K: I agree with you that we should calm emotional upsurge but that’s a much more complex—you see, probably we’ll approve it, almost certainly we will approve it.
R: Right.
K: But I don’t see how when the Israeli Ambassador has requested to see me before the President on the Saudi thing, I don’t see how we can on top of it throw the Kuwait thing in without hearing it.
R: Well—
K: I’ll see him Saturday.
R: I understand. And we will hold off—I didn’t realize that he was going to see you.
[Page 328]K: No, he’s got a letter from Mrs. Meir and they are absolutely steaming. Now, we of course aren’t going to undo the Saudi thing and we’ll almost certainly go ahead with the Kuwaiti thing
R: Right.
K: But we owe them a hearing.
R: I agreed to that. Well, we are in accord.
K: We certainly cannot do it while he’s waiting for an appointment with me.
R: I certainly agree.
K: Okay.
R: We are in accord, Henry.
K: Thank you.
R: Okay.
K: Bye.
R: Bye.
Summary: Rush and Kissinger discussed the Israeli reaction to the F–4 sale to Saudi Arabia and the possible sale of F–4s to Kuwait.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 20, Chronological File, April—May 1973. Israeli opposition to the sale was reported in telegram 101662 to Tel Aviv, May 25, in which Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban said that Israel was “all out” against sales to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 180, Geopolitical File, Middle East Chronological File, July 2, 1973–September 4, 1973)
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