Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

34. Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders and William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 25, 1973.

SUBJECT

• Decision on F–4s for Kuwait

Now that our agreement in principle to sell F–4s has been conveyed to Saudi Arabia, the question of F–4s for Kuwait needs to be addressed. You will recall that we suggested separating this from the Saudi decision so you would have more time to think about it. The State Department is now seeking clearance of the attached cable informing Kuwait of our agreement in principle to sell them F–4s.

This decision is more difficult than the decision on Saudi Arabia. The pros and cons are spelled out in greater detail below, but, in brief, the argument hinges on these two points:

—On the one hand, our interests in Kuwait are less important than in Saudi Arabia; Kuwait has less of a regional role to play and less obvious military need for F–4s; Kuwaiti foreign policy has, until recently, been somewhat erratic; and Kuwait has not had the special relationship with the US that justifies selling Phantoms to Israel, Iran, Turkey and now Saudi Arabia.

—On the other hand, the recent Iraqi attack on Kuwaiti border posts and Iraqi territorial demands appear to have led Kuwaiti leaders to a fundamental reappraisal of their head-in-the-sand foreign policy. They turned immediately to us for military equipment, which we are selling, and this opens an opportunity for us to tie them more firmly into a system of states friendly to us.

In greater detail, the following are the advantages of agreement in principle:

—Kuwait appears to be at an important stage in the evolution of its foreign policy. Strong US political support, as demonstrated by agreement to sell F–4s, could be an important factor in bringing Kuwait within the orbit of states more closely related to us than to the USSR. This could be an important step in building up the US presence in the Gulf at a time when the Soviets are concentrating on building their own presence in the Gulf.

—The Kuwaitis are presently trying to strengthen their air defense capabilities and are on the verge of signing letters of offer for nearly $500 million of US military equipment and services, including 32 F–8 Crusader aircraft. The Kuwaiti decision on F–8s, however, may depend upon assurances that eventually they will be able to graduate to the F–4.

—Actual delivery will be several years off. One squadron more or less of F–4s in the Persian Gulf area will not have a decisive military impact, especially when one assumes it will not be used very effectively in the foreseeable future.

—There is a real possibility that Kuwait will buy Mirage IIIs and subsequently Mirage F–1s if we do not agree in principle now to sell F–4s. This has two aspects: (1) they will get sophisticated aircraft anyway; (2) the French would very much like to break the strong American position in Persian Gulf oil. Admittedly, Mirages in Kuwait would not be as bad as MIGs and the Soviet presence they would bring; but if we are talking about strengthening the US presence in the Gulf, this is a significant opportunity and vehicle.

—By agreeing to sell F–4s to Kuwait, we will be able to establish a relationship with the Kuwaiti military that will to some extent enhance our influence in Kuwaiti military decisions and over the end use of the equipment through the control of spare parts. US influence, however limited, should serve the interests of Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran better than French influence.

The following are the disadvantages of agreeing to provide F–4s to Kuwait:

—The factor that has to be taken most seriously is that the Israelis will object sharply to any move that puts Phantoms into Arab hands. While the numbers are small and any deliveries are at least 3–4 years off, the Israelis will read this as somehow a diminution of their favored status. Their alternative, however, is French influence and behavior, to be considered against the background of Libya’s recent transfer of Mirages to Egypt.

—One cannot at all exclude that these planes would be transferred to the front lines in an Arab-Israeli confrontation, although again that is at least 3–4 years away at the earliest. Kuwait is extremely vulnerable to pressure from the radical Arab states. The US could cut off spare parts, but the planes might operate for a limited period.

—Coming in the wake of our decision to strengthen the defenses of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and even Lebanon, agreement to sell F–4s to Kuwait will be seen as part of an overall upgrading of Arab military capabilities. While this decision in itself will not affect the Arab-Israeli military balance soon, its symbolic importance in the eyes of Arabs and Israelis may be significant. If nothing else, it may contribute to the illusion of growing Arab power, which could lead to poor judgments on the part of Arab military men. It also suggests that the US is so concerned by the energy crisis that it is embarking on a crash program to arm its friends.

—The Soviets would see this as a further sudden deepening of US involvement in the Gulf and might in turn seek to strengthen their own activities in the area, via Iraq in particular. The Soviets, however, appear to be going ahead with a substantial buildup in Iraqi military capabilities without reference to our military programs in the Arabian Peninsula.

—Even with F–4s, Kuwait will not be strong enough by itself to resist Iraqi pressures.

—The F–4 does not make much sense in Kuwait. It is a sophisticated aircraft which the Kuwaitis may find difficult to operate effectively.

—Selling to Kuwait may make it difficult to refuse to provide F–4s for Jordan and Lebanon.

State and Defense recommend strongly that Kuwait be informed now that we are prepared in principle to offer the F–4 as a follow-on to the F–8. Training and manpower requirements will be discussed, and it will be made clear to Kuwait that deliveries of F–4s could not begin for several years. The offer of F–4s would assume that Kuwait will not undertake a Mirage program as well.

It should be recognized that a decision on F–4s for Kuwait is at this stage largely a political gesture. It is tempting to call it a “marginal” political gesture since Kuwait will still have a political incentive to keep its lines out to France and other European countries in order to avoid being too closely associated with us and our Arab-Israeli policy. However, the present situation provides an opportunity to consolidate a significant change in Kuwait’s orientation. In the context of our broader interest in upgrading our position in the Gulf, this cannot be lightly dismissed. Providing an American weapons system as the core of Kuwait’s air defense—along with our position in Iran and Saudi Arabia—would quickly give us the dominant role in supplying the military forces of three of the four principal Gulf nations.

In a completely rational world we would not be selling this kind of equipment to a country like Kuwait, but Kuwait is going to get the equipment and the French are not going to hesitate to supply it. The US has a substantial stake in the Gulf, and the French have an interest in undercutting our oil position there, so there is an argument for competing. The Israelis will object, but their alternatives have to be considered. This decision will have no effect whatsoever on the military balance for the next four years or so and then it will be minimal. In any case, our interest is to attend to our position in the Gulf and to keep it as separate as possible from the Arab-Israeli impasse. Besides, a US military influence in Kuwait serves Israel’s interests far better than a French influence.

Although it is hard to be enthusiastic, on balance it seems desirable to go ahead with this decision in principle to provide F–4s.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize clearance of the attached cable informing the Kuwaitis of our agreement in principle to sell them F–4s. There is a time factor in that a prompt answer is most likely to assure a decision on American aircraft.

1. Summary: After the approval in principle to sell F–4 Phantom fighters to Saudi Arabia, the NSC analyzed the desirability of approving a similar proposal for Kuwait, linking the possible sale of the F–4 to the recent Iraqi border incursion and potential Israeli and Congressional opposition to arms sales to the Middle East.

   Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 180, Geopolitical File, Middle East Chronological File, July 2, 1973–September 4, 1973. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Kissinger did not select an option for the recommendation. Instead, he wrote: “Let me think—Raise again next week,” at the top of the memorandum. Attached but not published are May 18 and June 7 memoranda from Eliot recommending White House approval of a draft telegram to the Embassy approving the sale of the F–4 to Kuwait. Also attached is the draft telegram. This memorandum and its attachments were attached to a later July 30 memorandum on the same subject, published as Document 35. For the record of the approval of the sale of the F–4 to Saudi Arabia, see Document 87.