Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

203. Telegram 184791 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹ ²

Washington, August 5, 1975, 2207Z.

Subject:

• Texts of Letters From Prime Minister Bhutto

1. Following are the texts of the letters to the President and the Secretary from Prime Minister Bhutto dated June 13, 1975. These were delivered to the Department by the Pakistani Embassy.

2. Quote: Dear Mr. President,

I have been wanting to write to you on a matter of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However, since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until you returned home and had time to address your attention to other matters of importance to world peace. On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United States.

It is an established fact that practically all of India’s armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons. Moreover, in view of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971, an armed attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval and, indeed, direct involvement.

As you are aware, Mr. President, my government is determined to further the process of normalization of relations with India in accordance with the Simla agreement. We will sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India. Nevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation, as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one. For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim to the whole of the state of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan’s control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.

Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely the same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering this question but have given us no answer so far. Their decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China’s freedom to act as a result of this treaty was tragically demonstrated when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.

Dr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United States would not be able to stay out of that situation.

To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the determination of the United States to ward off a danger of vast and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news, I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the clarity with which your administration has perceived the implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it, a turning point would be reached in its history. The global balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace in our critical region could become truly inviolable.

With best wishes and warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

End quote.

3. Quote: My Dear Dr. Kissinger,

As you are aware, we have done, and will continue to do, our utmost to normalize our relations with India in accordance with the Simla agreement. Nevertheless, we are seriously concerned over the probability of India deciding to launch a war against Pakistan in which Afgahnistan will also join and both will have the full backing of the Soviet Union. Such a war could come at any time the Soviet Union should judge the situation to be ripe. It is our assessment that it could be unleashed within two years, before we have had the time adequately to strengthen our defence capability. India could contrive a pretext on the basis of its brazen claim to Jammu and Kashmir being an integral part of India and Pakistan being in control of a part of the state.

Against this background, I was relieved to hear from Mr. Aziz Ahmed what you had told Gromyko and what you planned to tell the Chinese about the action the United States would take if the Soviet Union attacked China for coming to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan.

This latter assurance could have a most vital bearing on the balance of power in Asia and fortify peace and stability in this critical region. I consider it to be the most effective counter yet to the Soviet ambitions to extend hegemony to Pakistan, which is the immediate target of these ambitions. It comes as a refreshing indication of a new determination in the United States administration to safeguard peace and stability in South Asia.

I should also add that this assurance is another manifestation of the far-sighted statesmanship and clarity of vision which I, like many others, have always admired in you, only such a perception of lurking dangers and the un-distracted will to avert them can transform the fears of today into the hopes of tomorrow.

May I suggest that the question of Chinese assistance to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack may be taken up with the Chinese leaders while they are still considering the issue. It could help them materially to decide what China could do in that contingency.

Mr. Aziz Ahmed took up the matter of the Chinese press attacks on the United States with the Chinese Ambassador along the lines indicated by you soon after his return from Ankara.

With warm personal regards,

Yours Sincerely,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

End quote.

Kissinger

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 1 Nov. 1974–75 August 1975. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Constable and approved by Atherton.
2. The Department forwarded the text of two letters sent to President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger from Prime Minister Bhutto. In the letters, Bhutto emphasized his concerns about threats to Pakistan from India and the involvement of China and the Soviet Union in such a conflict.