Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

202. Telegram 5282 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹ ²

Islamabad, June 11, 1975, 0539Z.

Subj:

• Personal Message for the Secretary

1. Bhutto phoned me a couple of days ago inviting me for a discussion prior to a dinner which he later gave in our honor. We had an unusually good, wide-ranging discussion which covered some matters that I would hope to discuss with you on our coming home leave which hopefully will allow me to be in Washington either later this month or in July.

2. This message will cover only one of the points discussed and I am sending it in order to plant a thought in your mind at an early date.

3. Bhutto took me into his confidence on domestic political matters here to an extent which was unusual, while cautioning me not to mention his plans to even his closest confidants. In this connection he told me of his plans to call elections for December 1976 and of his great hope in winning a sizeable mandate. He talked freely about his successes, and some failures, to date and his hopes of what he could accomplish for Pakistan with an extended tour as Prime Minister. Although the image of Pakistan has been greatly enhanced during his present term, he clearly envisages more progress in the future. He foresees a role for Pakistan which could not only be more important per se but more important from the viewpoint of support of overall U.S. interests.

4. The above discussion led to his noting the extreme importance he attaches to PL–480 food grains in the coming year. He asked what I thought the chances were. I replied that it looked like a good year for us and that I had very tentative hopes we might be able to do half a million tons of wheat. He asked if there were any chance that it could be increased to a million. I told him I doubted it very much. I said I felt it only fair to him to tell him that I would anticipate opposition in Washington on any such figure based upon the fear that this amount of concessional assistance might lead to a relaxation of determination here to make the hard decisions necessary to ensure that Pakistan developed to its fullest ability its own potential for food production. I mentioned excessively subsidized prices, what has amounted to semi-forced procurement of wheat from the farmers, lack of sufficient fertilizer distribution centers, more efficient use of water and in general the items we keep plugging away at here in our aid program to insure greater local incentive and productivity. Some of this touched a sensitive nerve because of the inherent political risks some of these measures entail.

5. Bhutto sought to convince me that he had taken political risks in his recent raise of food prices (he says partly in response to my advice) and in other efforts which led to his current conservative and rather tough budget now before the National Assembly. I gave him full marks for this as well as for the goals he has laid down for increase in agricultural production which I do indeed believe will result in considerable progress here this year and more markedly so in next year.

6. Bhutto pulled no punches in making his personal request to me re food assistance, saying it was extremely important to him in the election process and in the achievement of his hopes for the future as he had outlined them to me. He asked if I would talk to you personally and frankly on this subject when I went home and I said that I would. Bhutto’s hopes are very specific although he accepts the fact that we probably could not go as much as a million tons under PL–480. His request, therefore, was for 700 thousand tons PL–480, 250–300 thousand in CC credits. I told him I would see what was possible.

7. Besides the policy question on military supply, which we have already handled, this is only the second request of me that Bhutto has put in such personal terms. As I survey the local political situation the conclusion seems inevitable that U.S. interests would be served by the continuation in power of Bhutto over the next few years. Further, I do not believe that meeting his request in such magnitude would lessen his resolve to take further steps to make Pakistan self-sufficient. He has proved over the last year and a half to be highly susceptible to our suggestions on matters such as food and fertilizer prices so as to give incentive to the farmers even though these have sometimes been politically difficult for him. I realize the time for decision re next year’s PL–480 allocations is some time away but I wanted to give the political aspects of this matter to you personally at an early date so that the eventual decision would not be overly swayed by those who are not aware of the political implications.

Byroade

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 1 Nov. 1974–15 Aug. 1975. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cherokee. On Kissinger’s instruction the Embassy conveyed, in telegram 6183 to Islamabad, July 8, the Secretary’s assurance that he was “deeply sympathetic” to Bhutto’s request but that no guarantees could be made at that time. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
2. Ambassador Byroade informed Secretary of State Kissinger of an urgent personal request from Prime Minister Bhutto for an increase in PL–480 food aid from the United States.