Ch. 1. Afghanistan


1. Telegram 612 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, January 26, 1973, 0325Z

Newly appointed Prime Minister Musa Shafiq met with Ambassador Robert Neumann on January 9, explained his future policies, the compatibility of Afghan and U.S. interests, and Afghanistan's strategic situation. The Ambassador replied that the United States would attempt to aid Shafiq's administration discreetly.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 Afghanistan. Confidential. It was drafted by Neumann and repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, USUN, and the U.S. Mission Geneva. King Zahir appointed Shafiq's Government in December 1972.


2. Telegram 1121 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, February 16, 1973, 0740Z

The Embassy reported on Afghanistan's approach to Afghan-Pakistani relations, especially Pakistan's policies in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the related issue of “Pushtunistan.” The Embassy noted the threat these issues posed to Prime Minister Shafiq's “reform” government, which hoped the United States would help “keep the situation in hand.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL AFG-PAK. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. It was drafted by Neumann and repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, New Delhi, Moscow, Lahore, and Karachi. In telegram 1118 from Kabul, February 15, the Embassy summarized the Ambassador's discussion with Shafiq regarding developments in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Shafiq asked that the United States use its influence to contain the Pakistani crisis because the “course of action now being followed by Bhutto might lead to events which would not be confined to the borders of Pakistan.” (Ibid.)


3. Telegram 4948 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, July 6, 1973.

The Embassy encouraged further departmental attention to the problem of poppy cultivation in the area of the USAID-administered Helmand Valley project (HAVA).

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Kabul Embassy Files: Lot 76 F 44, AID-7, U.S. Program operations, Helmand Valley, 1973. Limited Official Use. It was drafted by Arthur Boehme, Jr. and John Wilson (AID); cleared by DP and RDA; and approved by BOEHME. Written in an unknown hand on page 2 is the marginal note: “The farmers don't think like that—they don't try to 'resist' poppy growing because we think it is evil.”


4. Telegram 5222 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, July 17, 1973, 0255Z.

The Embassy reported on the coup perpetrated by former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud against King Zahir and offered its observations of the incoming government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan, Volume I. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted by Neumann and repeated immediate to Anakra, Bonn, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Rome, Tehran, and to CINCPAC. The coup took place on July 16, while King Zahir was in Rome for medical treatment. Prime Minister Shafiq was detained by Daoud's Government and executed in 1979. In telegram 142393 to London, July 20, the Department reported that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had asked the United States to delay recognition of the Daoud Government.


5. Telegram 5325 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, July 20, 1973, 1310Z.

Ambassador Robert Neumann met with Mohammad Naim, President Mohammad Daoud's brother and chief advisor. The discussion centered on the continuation of U.S. development aid and Naim assured Neumann that Afghanistan desired continued cordial relations with the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate;Exdis. It was repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, London, Paris, Tehran, and New Delhi.


6. Telegram 143450 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, July 20, 1973, 2313Z.

The Department encouraged the tentative contacts between representatives of the Daoud regime and the Embassy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted by Arthur Rovine (L/NEA); cleared by NEA/PAB, NEA; and approved by Mark Feldman (L). It was repeated immediate to Ankara, and to Bonn, Islamabad, London, Rome, and Tehran.


7. Telegram 172577 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, August 29, 1973, 2324Z.

Based on a review of post-coup traffic between the Department and regional embassies, the Department summarized current Afghan-Pakistani tensions and presented U.S. policy objectives, including specific instructions to the ambassadors.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. It was drafted by P. D. Constable and A. Schifferdecker; cleared by NEA/PAB and NEA; and approved by Davies. It was repeated to Tehran, Moscow, New Delhi, and London. In telegram 164400, August 17, the Department asked Ambassador Robert Neumann, in his next meeting with Daoud, to tie continued U.S. aid to the stabilization of Afghan-Pakistani relations. (Ibid.) Neumann responded in telegram 6176 from Kabul, August 20, that he linked the two in meetings with Naim, but felt that threatening Daoud would be counterproductive, “however softly stated.” (Ibid.)


8. Telegram 6755 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, September 17, 1973, 1315Z.

The Embassy downplayed a Soviet role in the coup or Soviet influence over Daoud's Government and concluded he would likely be able to outmaneuver Marxist political forces, and thus would avoid a heavy reliance on the U.S.S.R.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan, Volume I. Secret; Priority;Exdis. It was drafted by LEWIS and repeated to Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran. In intelligence note RNAN-46, INR argued that Daoud might revive the Pushtunistan issue as a rallying point against opposition Marxist factions such as the “Parcham” party. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 Afghanistan)


9. Intelligence Note RNAN-51 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, November 5, 1973.

The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) produced a brief study of the Pushtunistan question, noting that the problem would intensify in coming months.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Islamabad Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 114, Pakistan/Afghanistan, July-December 1973. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. It was drafted by W. Dean Howells and Joel Woldman.


10. Telegram 236146 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, December 1, 1973, 2053Z

The Department discussed Afghan-Pakistani tensions, requested of both embassies information and advice, and encouraged them to facilitate discussions between the two governments.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential;Exdis. It was drafted by Schifferdecker; cleared by NEA/PAB, and NEA; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Tehran, Moscow, New Delhi, and London.


11. Telegram 1717 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, March 20, 1974, 1115Z.

Ambassador Elliot reported on a March 20 conversation with Mohammad Naim, who embarked on a tour d'horizon regarding Afghan-American relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential.


12. Telegram 72260 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, April 10, 1974, 0018Z.

Secretary of State Kissinger concurred with the Kabul Embassy's assessment of relations with Afghanistan, and discussed at length development efforts.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Kabul Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 53, POL 1, AFG Government (General) 1974. Confidential. In telegram 1090 from Kabul, 21 February, the Embassy summarized its yearly policy review, concluding that the change in regime had not altered the United States' role in Afghanistan and emphasizing that the use of aid could encourage Afghanistan to remain outside Soviet orbit. (Ibid).


13. Telegram 2407 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, April 22 1974.

The Embassy commented on human rights observance in Afghanistan and recommended against linking development assistance to strict standards on issues such as the treatment of political prisoners.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Kabul Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 53, POL 1, AFG Government (General) 1974. Confidential. It was drafted by Lee Coldron (POL) and Frank Denton (AID); cleared in draft by W. A. Helseth (ADCM); cleared by DAO and POL; and approved by Eliot. “Summary: Yes, but never mind” was written above section 1 by David McGaffey, the Embassy Economic officer.


14. Telegram HAKTO 76 From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), November 1, 1974, 1300Z.

Secretary of State Kissinger reported on his meeting with President Mohammad Daoud. Their discussion centered on Afghanistan's dispute with Pakistan.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Trip Briefings, Box 2, HAK Messages for the President (2). Secret; Sensitive.


15. Memorandum of Conversation, Kabul, November 1, 1974, 10:10-11:30 a.m.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sayed Waheed ABDULLAH and Mohammad Naim discussed U.S.-Afghan relations with Secretary of State Kissinger, concentrating on development issues and the importance of U.S. good offices concerning Afghanistan's dispute with Pakistan. Kissinger responded that the United States would consider Afghan ideas on the Pushtunistan issue.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, Entry 5463, Records of Henry Kissinger, Box 5, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, November 1974 (2). Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Foreign Ministry. All brackets in the original.


16. Telegram 7137 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, November 12, 1974, 0750Z.

Citing a recent incident in which a Pakistani helicopter landed in Afghanistan and was seized by Afghan authorities, the Embassy noted an intensification of the Pushtunistan dispute. It urged the Department and Islamabad Embassy to advise Pakistan to moderate the tone of its statements on Afghanistan. The Embassy also reported that refugees from Baluchistan had entered Afghan territory.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Islamabad Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 114, Decentralized Subject Files, 1973-74, Pakistan/Afghanistan, July-December. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, and New Delhi. U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Henry Byroade deprecated the Kabul Embassy's suggestions in telegram 10791 of November 14. (Ibid.) The Department agreed with both viewpoints but the next day, in telegram 252746, advised that the two embassies urge restraint without drawing attention to specific propaganda attacks. (Ibid.)


17. Telegram 1156 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, February 23, 1975, 1239Z.

Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Curran met with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah to discuss Afghani concerns regarding the end of the U.S. arms embargo to Pakistan.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Afghanistan, To Secretary of State Nodis. Confidential; Nodis. It was repeated immediate to Islamabad and New Dehli. After this meeting President Mohammad Daoud reacted unfavorably and publicly to the end of the embargo, linking it to the Pakistani crackdown in the NWFP. (Telegram 1719 from Kabul, March 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)


18. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 6, 1975, 10:30 a.m.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah and discussed matters related to non-alignment, economic development, and Pushtunistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Constable (NEA/PAB) and approved in S on October 2. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers Hotel


19. Telegram 11283 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, January 16, 1976, 0143Z.

Assistant Administrator Robert H. Nooter responded to Ambassador Theodore Eliot's concerns regarding development funding for programs in Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Kabul Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 132, Subject Files, Box 133, Cables 1976. Confidential. In telegram 107 from Kabul January 6, 1975, Eliot wrote Nooter pointing out the perils of curtailing U.S. aid to Afghanistan in fiscal 1976-77 below $5-6 million and transforming grant programs into loans, which would be “read by the Afghans as the imposition of tougher aid terms” and “appear political and discriminatory.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)


20. Telegram 1418 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, February 25, 1976, 0715Z.

With Secretary of State Kissinger meeting with Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in New York in March in mind, the Embassy reported on Afghan efforts to allay Pakistani fears of Soviet encirclement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. It was repeated immediate to USUN and Islamabad.


21. Telegram 3367 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, May 4, 1976.

Ambassador Theodore Eliot reported his May 2 discussion with Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Abdullah on opium poppy cultivation and the importance of eradication in U.S. project areas.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Kabul Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 132, Subject Files, Box 133, SOC 11-5, Cables 1976. Confidential. It was drafted and approved by Eliot; and cleared in draft by POL; cleared by NEA/PAB and Curran (DCM).


22. Telegram 4630 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, June 19, 1976.

The Embassy reported on the “continuing dialogue” following the June 1976 summit meeting between Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and President Mohammad Daoud.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Kabul Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 123, Subject Files, Box 131, POL 7, Bhutto Visit 1976. Confidential. It was drafted by Curran and William Hallman (POL); cleared by POL; and approved by Eliot. It was repeated to Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran.


23. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, June 29, 1976.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft reported on Secretary of State Kissinger's proposal to create a small PL-480 program for Afghanistan. The President approved the program.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Advisor, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asia Affairs, Convenience Files, 1974-77, Box 1, Afghanistan (2), Mirror File. Confidential. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A is Kissinger's June 17 memorandum to the President supporting both PL-480 programs. Also attached is a July 6 memorandum from Staff Secretary James Connor to Director of the Office of Management and Budget James Lynn reporting that the President approved the Afghanistan program and disapproved the Jamaican program. (Ibid.)


24. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 30, 1976, 4-5 p.m.

Secretary of State Kissinger discussed with Special Envoy Mohammad Naim development and security issues and the implications of the recent summit between Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Mohammad Daoud in Kabul.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 90, Afghanistan 1974-76. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Office.


25. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 1, 1976, 1 p.m.

Secretary of State Kissinger lunched with Special Envoy Mohammad Naim and discussed aid to Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Nodis. It was drafted on July 6 by Robert Peck (NEA/PAB); and approved in S on July 20. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Office. All brackets in the original.


26. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 1, 1976, 4:50-5:36 p.m.

Special Envoy Mohammad Naim met with President Gerald Ford to discuss U.S-Afghan relations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973-77, Ford Administration, Box 20. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. All brackets in the original.


27. Memorandum of Conversation, Kabul, August 8, 1976, 12:35-2:34p.m.

Secretary of State Kissinger met President Mohammad Daoud during his 1976 trip to South Asia and the Middle East. Their discussion included the improved relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Daoud's upcoming visit to Pakistan, the sharing of intelligence information, Afghanistan's positions regarding issues of concern related to the Non-Aligned Movement, and economic development projects.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, CL 276, Memoranda of Conversation, May-Aug. 1976. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Peter Rodman (NSC) and approved in S on August 27. The meeting took place at the Presidential Palace. All brackets in the original.


28. Memorandum of Conversation, Kabul, August 8, 1976, 3:30-4:05p.m.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with several members of the Afghan cabinet, including Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah to discuss development questions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Afghan Foreign Ministry. In telegram 223874 to Kabul, September 10, the Department informed the Embassy and Daoud that several of the projects discussed could be funded by existing grants or new loans, including Helmand Valley irrigation, school financing, electricity generation in the Kandahar area, new women's dormitories at Kabul University, and promised sympathetic consideration for the large fertilizer assistance proposal and the use of satellite imagery in natural resource exploration, but not for a large hospital and steel mill. (Ibid., RG 84, Kabul Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 132, Subject Files, Box 133, Cables 1973-76) All brackets in the original.