The Horn
295. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Wright reported that the The Midnight Sun had become the subject of press interest due to an Evans and Novak column in The Washington Post that attributed the seizure to steadily rising Soviet influence in Somalia and East Africa.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential.
296. Telegram 1856 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State
The Embassy reported that the Somali Government had decided to release the “Midnight Sun” as a gesture of goodwill even though it had “blatantly violated internal and territorial waters.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–6 Somali-US. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and COMIDEASTFOR.
297. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff
Kennedy stressed the need for a study of problems in the Horn of Africa. He noted that Kissinger had shied away in the past, but since the area consumed the lionʼs share of African military and economic aid and was home to the single most important U.S. facility in Africa, Kagnew Station, it was important to prepare a general policy.
Source: National Security Council Files, National Security Study Memorandum Files, NSSM 115. Secret. Attached is an undated draft memorandum from Kissinger to the President, as well as an undated draft National Security Study Memorandum. Neither of the attached documents was signed and forwarded.
298. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Secretary of the Army (Resor)
Packard turned down an Army request to retain the status quo at Kagnew Station and directed consolidation on the basis of the Navy plan.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Ethiopia 1970. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.
299. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger reported the release of the The Midnight Sun and its crew. A personal message from General Siad to President Nixon could not be delivered as Russian-provided coding machines did not function properly.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamp on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.”
300. Telegram 138074 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, the Consulate in Asmara, and Kagnew Station
This joint Department of State-Department of Defense message reported that Kagnew would reduce personnel levels by 200 in the next 9 months in addition to numbers from planned consolidation. This was in accord with the Ethiopian Governmentʼs desire that the U.S. presence near Asmara be diminished.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 ETH–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Hall (AF/E); cleared in draft in NSA, ASA, PM, INR/DDC; cleared by DOD/ISA, AF/E, AF/P, OSD/A, Joint Staff/J–5; and approved by Moore. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE.
301. Telegram 3448 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State
The Chargi reported that the Ethiopian Foreign Minister welcomed the proposed personnel reductions at Kagnew Station.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 ETH–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara, CINCSTIKE, and Kagnew Station.
302. Memorandum of Conversation
In his meeting with Nixon, Selassie pleaded his case for increased military assistance. The President reassured the Emperor that the U.S. understood who its friends were and promised to study the military situation, giving full weight to Selassieʼs statements.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 278, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, Oct–Dec 1970. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
303. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Secretary of the Navy (Chafee)
Packard agreed to withhold the consolidation of communications plans at Kagnew Station pending the outcome of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-requested study of September 16, 1970.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Ethiopia, 1970. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.
304. Telegram 2653 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State
The ambassador stated that when plans for the Diego Garcia base were announced, the U.S. should expect a strong negative reaction from the Somali Government, condemning the action as a colonialist, imperialist venture designed to subvert the freedom of African states.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 744, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.
305. Telegram 208803 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia
The telegram reported that during a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom, Somali Ambassador Addou asked what aid might be given if Somali flag vessels discontinued trading with North Vietnam and Cuba. Newsom responded that even before the change in government in Somalia the U.S. bilateral aid program was scheduled to end after Fiscal Year (FY) 72 and it was not possible to make any promises.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 Somali-US. Confidential. Drafted by D.H. Shinn (AF/E); cleared in AF/E, and AID/AFR/ESA; and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Rome, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi.
306. Airgram A–11 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State
The Embassy stated that the four U.S. policy objectives in Somalia were economic development, ditente in the Horn, true non-alignment, and the strengthening of ties to the West.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 Somali-US. Confidential. Only the summary is published.
307. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger told the President that Selassie was correct in stating that his countryʼs security situation had deteriorated over the past several years, but neither Somalia nor the Sudan was capable of mounting a sustained attack. Kissinger believed the Emperor feared that the United States intended to terminate its military assistance program (MAP), but MAP actually would continue as payment for Kagnew Station and as long as the Emperor was alive. Kissinger also reported that the ambassador in Addis Ababa had been instructed to deliver an oral message from the President to the Emperor informing him that the President understood his misgivings about Ethiopiaʼs long-range security and fully intended the United States to continue its significant military assistance program over the coming years. The President wished the Emperor to know that he was personally interested in Ethiopiaʼs security and had instructed the Executive Branch that Ethiopia would continue to have a priority claim on the resources available for military assistance to Africa.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Africa, Ethiopia, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped: “The President Has Seen.” Another copy of the memorandum at Tab A, also undated and marked “Action” rather than “Information,” is at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 292, Memoranda to the President, October 1970.
308. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Wright gave Kissinger an update on the Ethiopian Security Situation.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Africa, Ethiopia, Vol. I. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote: “Also a [unclear] assessment of what to do when Haile Selassie dies—make another NSSM.” He crossed most of this out and wrote to the side, “See it is in NSSM.” Below, he also wrote, “Good job—Marshall!” Tab A is Document 309. Tab B is not published.
309. National Security Study Memorandum No. 115
The NSSM directed a review of potential issues affecting U.S. interests in Ethiopia, Somalia, and the French Territory of Afar and Issa (FTAI).
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, National Security Council, National Security Study Memoranda, July 1970–Sept 1971. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
310. Memorandum of Conversation
In a conversation with Newsom, Somali Ambassador Addou reported that Somalia had virtually lost its independence to the Soviet Union. General Siad remained suspicious of the United States, but Addou urged keeping communications open.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 Somali. Secret.
311. Memorandum of Conversation
Somali Ambassador Addou told Assistant Secretary of State Newsom that the United States was doing very little to improve relations with Somalia. Newsom commented that the United States wanted good relations but saw no indication this was shared by the Somali Republic.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, POL Somali-US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.
312. Study Prepared in Response to NSSM 115
The study discussed the political and economic background for relations with Ethiopia and Somalia, the requirements for maintaining Kagnew Station for another five years, and the significant importance of Ethiopia to U.S. interests as compared to Somalia.
Source: National Archives, NSC Institutional Files, NSSM Files, NSSM 115. Secret. Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. Pages 1–11 only are published.
313. Memorandum From the Vice Director, Joint Staff (Freeman) to Secretary of Defense Laird
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Kagnew Station be retained, consolidation be reconsidered, and an 18-month period be authorized when Diego Garcia was completed in March 1973, to assess the feasibility of moving some Kagnew Station functions to that location.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, Ethiopia 1971, Box 63. Secret. The attachment is not published.
314. Policy Planning Paper for Somalia
This paper was transmitted from the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia under cover of Airgram A–13, drafted by Acting Secretary of State Johnson, May 17, 1971. Johnson stated that the paper constituted an official statement of U.S. policy towards Somalia. Objectives included ditente in the Horn, true non-alignment, ties with the West, U.S. access to ports and airports, oil exploration, and restriction of Soviet efforts in the area.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 Somali-US. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Holmes and approved in AF.
315. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Eliot reported that three vessels, a derrick and pipe laying barge, and a cargo barge, all U.S.-owned, had been apprehended by Somali authorities off the Somali coast while en route from Louisiana to Bahrain. Consular access had been denied. This was the fourth incident involving American vessels since February 1970 and had considerable potential for harming U.S.-Somali relations.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential.
316. Item Prepared by Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff for the Presidentʼs Daily Briefing
Wright reported that there still had been no consular access to the Americans on board the vessels seized by Somalia. The shipsʼ owners were “hopping mad” and believed there was a lack of urgency on the part of the United States. The owners had been in contact with George Bush at the United Nations who, in turn, had contacted the Department of State.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential.
317. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Brewster reported that consular access to the seized vessels had been gained on June 23, the crew was well treated, and four craft were in protected anchorage. There was no indication as to when the crew and vessels might be released.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 Somali-US. Confidential.
318. Telegram 121360 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia
The Department instructed Ambassador Hadsel to delay his end-of-assignment departure until the release of the crew and vessels was certain. If the ambassador were to depart prior to the release, it might seem to indicate that the U.S. Government was becoming less interested in resolving the problem.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 Somali-US. Confidential. Drafted by Shinn; cleared in AF/E, AF/EX and PER/CA; and approved by Moore. Repeated to Accra and Nairobi.
319. Telegram 1407 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State
Ambassador Hadsel reported that during his farewell call he had been assured by President Siad that the vessels would be released very soon, perhaps that weekend, despite the deep feeling of resentment on the part of Somalis over U.S. ships violating Somali laws. The ambassador considered this to be a definitive assurance of action.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 Somali-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Jidda, Bonn, London, Nairobi, Panama, Paris, Rome, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, and COMIDEASTFOR
320. Telegram 127073 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia
While the assurances given were encouraging, the Department wanted Ambassador Hadsel to remain at his post until the amount of the fine was known and all problems had been resolved.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 Somali-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by W.B. Coote (AF/E) and approved by Newsom.
321. Telegram 1424 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State
Hadsel transmitted a diplomatic note stating that the vessels would be released on payment of the fine, plus expenses or damages claimed by port authority, and warning that further violations would have grave consequences. All concerned parties were satisfied with result and the ships should depart on July 18.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4, Somali-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Jidda, Bonn, London, Nairobi, Panama, Paris, Rome, USUN, CINCSTRIKE and COMIDEASTFOR.
322. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)
Packard suggested continuing to seek ways to phase-down Kagnew facilities whenever feasible.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, Ethiopia, 1971, Box 63. Secret.
323. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers
Newsom informed Rogers that Secretary of Defense Laird, without consulting interested sections of the Department of Defense, decided in a budgetary move to eliminate the Army Security Agency (ASA) at Kagnew Station by June 30, 1972.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15–10 ETH–US. Secret. The attachment is not published.
324. Telegram 3084 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia
The Department reported contact with the Department of Defense, which agreed to hold action on Army Security Agency (ASA) termination pending an interagency working group review. The Ambassador was instructed not to raise the issue with the Ethiopians. If asked, he should state that he had not been officially informed of any such reduction. However, the costly Kagnew operation was a likely candidate for economy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 ETH–US. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Melone; cleared in AF/E, PM, AF, AF/RA, OASD/ISA, OASD/I–V, INR/DDC, and S/S; and approved by Newsom. Repeated immediate to Asmara.