Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972

313. Memorandum From the Vice Director, Joint Staff (Freeman) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹ ²

Washington, March 18, 1971

JCSM–127–71

Subject:

• Kagnew Station Communications Facilities (U)

1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 16 September 1970, subject: “Kenitra and Kagnew Communications Facilities,” which requested that a study of US communications functions at Kenitra, Morocco, and Kagnew Station, Ethiopia, be developed in the form of contingency relocation plans.

2. (S) The plan for Kagnew Station, Ethiopia, Appendix A hereto, is forwarded as requested in the reference. The plan for Kenitra, Morocco, was submitted to you on 8 January 1971. [text not declassified] and were forwarded to you on 19 February 1971.

3. (S) The Kagnew Station communications facilities are important to the national security interests of the United States. Loss of the station and the relocation of these facilities to other sites would result in a serious reduction of the capabilities now being provided at Kagnew Station. A complete reconstitution of the missions now performed at Kagnew Station is not possible. Circuit cost estimates for the relocation of minimal essential capabilities exceed $18 million, [text not declassified]. Further, the total value of an installed plant which cannot be recovered is estimated to be in excess of $60 million.

4. (S) The possibility of reducing strategic communications facilities at Kagnew Station by utilization of advanced technological developments was investigated. Expansion of the use of military satellite communications capabilities would permit the reduction of high-frequency (HF) circuitry in the Defense Communications System (DCS). However, because a program has not been approved and funded, replacement of the US Navyʼs tactical HF facilities by satellite communications is not feasible at this time. Present plans for development of the military satellite communications system for tactical and strategic purposes in the Indian Ocean area have not yet been funded. Because of the isolation of Kagnew Station from Middle Eastern and European DCS nodal points, the employment of other advanced communications technologies, e.g., microwave and troposcatter, is not feasible.

5. (S) In planning relocation sites for the communications facilities of Kagnew Station, use of the US Navy site at Diego Garcia was considered as a suitable location from the technological standpoint. The site, however, is limited in scope to construction of an austere communications facility by an understanding with Congress. Therefore, expansion beyond the presently approved scope would require your approval and that of Congress. In addition, coordination with the Government of the United Kingdom would be necessary.

6. (S) Construction at Diego Garcia will commence in March 1971 and is estimated to be completed in March 1973, at which time an interim operational capability will be available. Upon completion, an 18-month testing period will be authorized to acquire sufficient data to ascertain the feasibility of phasing down a portion of the US Navyʼs tactical communications facilities at Kagnew Station oriented towards the Indian Ocean area. If the data prove that communications for fleet operation in that geographic area can be provided from Diego Garcia, that portion of tactical communications facilities at Kagnew Station, Ethiopia, might no longer be required. Tactical HF coverage of the western Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf now available from Kagnew Station could not be provided from Diego Garcia, even if it were to be expanded. The most feasible alternative for Kagnew Stationʼs naval tactical HF facilities covering these areas is Bahrain Island.

7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Kagnew Station communications facilities be retained to support the continuing requirement for command and control communications facilities for naval forces, Presidential communications support, the DCS, [text not declassified].

8. (S) In accordance with a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 27 October 1970, implementation of the US Navy plan for the consolidation of DCS facilities at Kagnew Station, Ethiopia, has been held in abeyance, pending the updating of Appendix A. The estimated cost of $6 million involved in implementing the consolidation plan could not be offset by projected savings in less than 5 years.

9. (S) Although there has been general interagency agreement on the necessity to retain Kagnew Station for at least the next 5 years, National Security Study Memorandum 115, dated 25 January 1971, subject: “Horn of Africa,” will focus on Kagnew Station and its value to the United States. In view of National Security Study Memorandum 115 and the resultant uncertainty of US tenure of Kagnew Station, the Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that implementation of the consolidation be reconsidered after the response has been approved by the Senior Review Group.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Mason Freeman

Rear Admiral, USN
Vice Director, Joint Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, Ethiopia 1971, Box 63. Secret. The attachment is not published.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Kagnew Station be retained, consolidation be reconsidered, and an 18-month period be authorized when Diego Garcia was completed in March 1973, to assess the feasibility of moving some Kagnew Station functions to that location.