The Emperorʼs assertions were correct. Items contributing to the
worsening security situation are:
—In 1969 leftist and pro-Russian military groups seized power in both the
Sudan and Somalia, both of which countries have an unresolved
territorial dispute with Ethiopia.
—The Russians are the sole arms
and military assistance suppliers to the Sudan and Somali military
forces.
—The militant Arab states have sharply increased their
assistance to the Eritrean Liberation Front, a Muslim group which aims
at the independence of a substantial part of the Ethiopian Empire. As a
result, ELF activities have increased
dramatically and caused the Ethiopian Government to declare martial law
throughout the province of Eritrea.
—The Chinese Communists are
building the 1, 200 mile Tanzam Railroad through. Tanzania and Zambia
and the Chicoms have now undertaken to equip and train the Tanzanian
armed forces.
—In short, communist influence appears markedly on the
rise among the Emperorʼs immediate and unfriendly neighbors as well as
more widely in East Asia.
On the other hand, there are other factors which substantially reduce the
threat to Ethiopian security. Neither Somalia nor the Sudan is capable
of mounting a sustained attack against Ethiopia. Despite the relative
increase in the strength of her neighbors, Ethiopia continues to have by
far the strongest and most effective military establishment in the
area.
We believe the Emperor fears that the U.S. intends to terminate our
military assistance program for Ethiopia. That fear, we believe, rather
than any immediate concern with his security situation, was the
motivation behind his presentation to you. We have, therefore, taken two
steps to meet his concern. First, we have sent a message from you
expressing your understanding for his concern with his security
situation and assuring him that we intend to continue a significant
military assistance program in the coming years. The message also
informs him that you have instructed our military mission in Addis Ababa
to make itself available for discussions to identify the priorities for
the continuing program. Secondly, we have restored million to the
Ethiopian MAP program for 1972 which had
earlier been
out by OMB.
A more detailed assessment of the Ethiopian security situation and of our
response to the Emperorʼs concern is found attached at Tab A.
Tab A
Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Washington,
undated
SUBJECT:
- Threat to Ethiopian Security
At his October 25 meeting with you Haile
Selassie renewed his 1969 request for more military
assistance and asserted that the Ethiopian security situation has
deteriorated in the last several years. You directed that we give
you an assessment of the validity of his assertion.
The Emperor is correct. The past two years have brought a clear
deterioration in the overall political situation in the East Africa
area, and there has been a sharp increase in the military hardware
available to hostile neighboring states. Factors contributing to
this assessment are:
—In 1968, Sudan and the USSR signed
a $60 million arms agreement. Deliveries thus far have included 24
Mig 21 jet fighters, 55 tanks, and a number of transport
aircraft.
—In May 1969, a leftist military group seized power in
the Sudan. The group is hostile to Ethiopiaʼs friendship with Israel
and provides assistance to Moslem separatists in Ethiopia.
—In
October 1969, the Soviet trained and equipped Somali Army seized
power and Somali policy since that time has been increasingly
pro-Soviet and anti-American. The ruling group is erratic and highly
nationalistic, characteristics of significance in view of the
longstanding Somali claims to a portion of Ethiopia.
—Since
1963, the Somalis have received about $40 million of Soviet military
equipment and there are credible rurnors of an enlarged program of
assistance.
—The Eritrean Liberation Front, a Muslim rebel group
seeking the independence of Ethiopiaʼs northernmost province, has
been reinvigorated in the last year by assistance from radical Arab
states. The
[Page 4]
current
level of ELF terrorism, although
still no threat to overall Ethiopian control, is more intense and
more widespread than at any time in recent years.
—The Chinese
Communists have lent Tanzania and Zambi over $400 million to build a
1200 mile rail link from Zambia to the coast, and, in January 1970,
undertook to arm and train the Tanzanian armed forces.
—In March
1968, the Soviets began to project their naval presence into the
Indian Ocean. Since then, there have been 49 naval visits to 24
ports in 16 countries.
Factors Which Lessen the Threat to Ethiopian
Security
Taken in isolation, the facts cited above portray an excessive
picture of the security threat which Ethiopia now faces. There are
other factors which substantially reduce the short-run threat to
Ethiopia.
—The Sudanese Government is faced with a serious revolutionary
movement in the South which substantially reduces both the
inclination and ability of the Sudanese Government to harm
Ethiopia.
—According to our best intelligence, both the Sudanese
and Somali forces are having severe difficulties in absorbing the
impressive amounts of Soviet military equipment which they have
received. It is not at all likely within the next several years at
least, that either will attain a level of quality comparable to that
of Ethiopian military forces.
—Even were they to do so, neither
country has the capacity to support sustained combat operations
against Ethiopia.
—Despite the relative deterioration of
Ethiopiaʼs position, Ethiopian forces continue to be superior in
both numbers and quality to that of any credible combination of
forces in the area.
Overall Assessment of Ethiopiaʼs Security
Position
Ethiopia exists in an area of congenital tension and instability.
Long-standing border disputes, irredentist political movements, and
active insurgency movements compound the situation. Recent political
developments in the area are distinctly unfavorable in terms of
Ethiopiaʼs long
[Page 5]
range
security. The threat, however, is more potential than immediate and
Ethiopiaʼs military strength is adequate to deal with any military
attack which can be deemed at all likely. To a certain extent,
Ethiopian attempt to maintain an overwhelming military superiority
as compared to its potential enemies is self-defeating, for
Ethiopian superiority engenders a large appetite on the part of
Ethiopiaʼs neighbors for Soviet military assistance. Yet the
animosity and political trends of Ethiopiaʼs neighbors is such that
Ethiopia can hardly be expected to feel secure with anything less
than clear military superiority.
What Do We Do About the Emperorʼs Request
I think there is a sharp distinction between what the Emperor says he
wants and what, in fact, he really wants. He expresses his needs in
terms ʼof new agreements on force goals for the Ethiopian air force
and navy, modernization, assistance with Ethiopian
counter-insurgency problems and support for the Ethiopian militia.
In all probability, however, his real fear is that we intend soon to
terminate or drastically cut back the size of our military
assistance program to Ethiopia.
From his point of view, this fear is altogether rational. Our
military assistance program for the past 10 years has been keyed to
the 1960 agreement to equip a 40,000 man Ethiopian Army. That
program is all but completed. Although we in fact plan to continue a
military assistance program comparable in size to those of recent
years, the Ethiopians do not know this. Nor, in all probability, do
they realize that on-going support, spare parts, and replacements
for the existing Ethiopian force,ʼ necessarily involves a program of
significant dimensions. Nor, for that matter, have we ever told them
that we intend to continue on-going support for the force we have
now equipped.
It is, therefore, altogether likely that for the past several years
the Emperor and his Defense advisors have feared that we considered
ourselves approaching the end of our commitment to Ethiopia for
military assistance, and they have been anxious to establish a new
basis for continuing the U.S. program.
We know, for instance, that the Emperor has been deeply concerned
about the Nixon Doctrine and
has on several occasions expressed the fear that it will mean a
sharp cut-back in American assistance to its friends abroad (read
Ethiopia). More significantly, we also know that the Emperor was
extremely reassured by his meeting with you on October 25 In view of
the fact that you were totally non-commital about his specific
requests, the only way to account for that reassurance is your
vigorous statement that
[Page 6]
“we know who our friends are” and that our friends can count on our
continuing support.
We have, therefore, sent a personal message to the Emperor keeping
completely away from the specifics of his request for military
equipment, but making it plain that we contemplate the continuation
of a significant military assistance program to Ethiopia, and urging
that Ethiopiaʼs priority needs be worked out between our MAAG in Addis Ababa, and the Ethiopian
Ministry of Defense. This, I believe, will meet the Emperorʼs basic
need, which is a firm reassurance that his country is not about to
be cut adrift.
At the same time, we have instructed our Embassy in Addis Ababa to
renew consultations as soon as possible with Ethiopian authorities
to examine Ethiopian needs, and, to the maximum extent possible
within prevailing fiscal guidelines, to
incorporate those needs in the on-going military assistance program
for Ethiopia.
Finally, we have restored a one million dollar cut made by OMB in the
1972 MAP for Ethiopia. This will
keep our program at a steady level and permit us to respond to some
of the Ethiopian desires for modernization.
We will thus have established with both the Ethiopians and our own
bureaucracy the fact that Ethiopia continues to have a priority
claim to military assistance funds available for Africa and that you
wish, within the fiscal limitations of that program, to be as
responsive as possible to Ethiopian needs for additional military
assistance.
This is not, in fact, a new policy, but rather a confirmation at the
Presidential level of what we are already doing. Military assistance
to Ethiopia is seen clearly, by both the Ethiopians and ourselves,
as payment for our major communications [text not
declassified] station at Kagnew. While the Emperor lives,
while we still have a need for Kagnew (a recent study deemed it
essential for the next 5 years, at least), and while the general
posture of the Ethiopian Government remains acceptable, it is hardly
conceivable that we would terminate the MAP program to Ethiopia.
