69. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
SUBJECT:
- Potential Problem in Nigerian Relief
You should be aware that we could face in the next couple of weeks a nasty little run-in with the Feds over relief flights.
The problem stems from the growing frustration on the Federal side as the war drags on. Lagos has been predictably testy during the last few weeks as their offensive stalled and the Biafrans made major gains on the southern front. But feelings have come to the flash point with the dramatic appearance a few days ago of a Biafran “airforce.” Piloted by Swedish mercenaries and armed with French rockets, 5 or 6 tiny piper cubs have hit hard at the Nigerian Air Force in surprise raids on Federal bases around the perimeter—more damage in a week than Federal MIGs and Ilyushins managed in two years. (These little planes symbolize all too vividly the tragic-comic plight of the Feds. The Swedish pilots serve Biafra with an ardor Lagos canʼt even muster among its own people (let alone the seemingly myopic Egyptians whoʼve been flying Federal MIGs). Then too, the one-seaters are a brilliant improvisation perfectly suited to the rustic technology of this war. While sophisticated Soviet jets dart around hitting hospitals and villages, the cubs lumber along at tree-top with simple but telling accuracy. Biafran air raids are thus an embarrassing mockery of Federal leadership as well as a military threat.)
The Feds could save face by (1) shopping for small prop planes of their own or (2) diverting attention with an offensive somewhere along the perimeter. There is evidence that they may be planning both. But the planes will take time, and the offensive is also time-consuming and all but foredoomed. Gowon needs a dramatic gesture now.
That leaves what has always been the most obvious and vulnerable scapegoat of Federal frustration—the relief airlift. You will remember that the food flights go into Biafra only at night under the auspices of the International Red Cross and religious voluntary agencies. The Feds have suspected all along that the voluntary agencies were running guns. In any case, the relief flights do constitute, willy nilly, a cover for the French arms flights which also come in at night.
[Page 2]So far, Gowon has sullenly tolerated the relief airlift—ostensibly for moral reasons, though the decision was made easier by the knowledge that his own mercenary pilots would have considerable difficulty with moving targets. Now, however, he is pressed by wounded pride as well as xenophobia. And even without a conscious decision to bar relief flights, some jittery Federal pilot could take on a Red Cross or church transport.
Whether by declaration or action, a Federal outlawing of relief flights would surely bring us some tough decisions. The Biafra lobby here would find new life and press for Presidential intervention. Our choice might boil down to acquiescence in a relief blockade or some kind of open confrontation with the Feds.
There is still the chance that cooler heads, few as they are, will prevail in Lagos. But I wanted to alert you to the more unpleasant possibilities. I have State hard at work on planning for a crisis of this sort
—Including some fast acceleration of Clyde Fergusonʼs relief negotiations which might yet yield a surface corridor to substitute for the night airlift.
Iʼm afraid, though, that this episode is only symptomatic. As long as this war continues, not even our low profile will shield us from some sizable brickbats both there and here.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Kissinger underlined “all but foredoomed” in paragraph 3 on page one and wrote “Why?” and “Roger, What is it that keeps Feds from winning?” In response to the penultimate paragraph on page two, Kissinger wrote: “When are we going to see paper?” In an attached memorandum dated June 11, Bob Houdek asked Morris to answer the questions Kissinger had posed, referring to the “paper” as “the State contingency paper on relief efforts should the Feds decide to outlaw or stop relief flights.” Written at the top of page one of Morrisʼ memorandum is, “Action completed orally per RMorris, 7/22.”↩
- Morris advised Kissinger that Federal feelings had reached a flash point over the recent appearance of a Biafran “air force” piloted by Swedish mercenaries and armed with French rockets. In response, it was possible that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, would bar all relief flights. This would cause tough decisions for the United States.↩