96. Memorandum From Samuel M. Hoskinson and Fernando Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
SUBJECT:
- International Terrorism at the UN
This would not appear to be an ideal time to get the Security Council to take effective action against international terrorism. At a maximum, we would be seeking to (1) focus world public pressure on those governments which tacitly or directly support groups which engage in acts of international terrorism, (2) bleed Israeli reaction away from acts of military retaliation into more constructive channels, and (3) project our determination to stamp out international terrorism.
In order to achieve the purposes cited above, a Security Council resolution would be needed which:
- --condemns all acts of international terrorism;
- --calls for immediate action by all member states to take all necessary steps to prevent future acts of terrorism;
- --demands that member states withhold support from organizations which engage in international terrorism.
Realistically, we would have to expect any resolution containing the foregoing provisions to fail. Only the US, UK, Belgium, Japan, Italy and Argentina could be counted on voting for a strong resolution. If France were persuaded to go along, we would still only have seven affirmative votes—nine are required. Panama and India would be the swing votes, with six negative votes (including possible vetoes) expected from the USSR, PRC, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Sudan and Guinea. (In the General Assembly, things would be worse for us because of Afro-Asian support for liberation movements in general).
The basic issue boils down to whether we wish to back a losing but strong resolution in the Security Council or settle for something less. If we lose: [Page 2]
- --the terrorists may take heart by the Security Council’s failure to act against them and by an unhelpful airing of Arab grievances against Israel;
- --the Israelis, who might well oppose any move to the UN in the first place, would only be further embittered by an abortive effort and even more inclined to handle things their own way;
- --the UN would be further exposed as an ineffectual institution.
In short, an appeal to the UN Security Council to seek a strong resolution might exacerbate rather than ease the already tense situation created by the terrorist attack on the Israeli Olympic Team. For these reasons we recommend against seeking meaningful action now on terrorism from the UN Security Council.
Agree ________ Disagree ___________
If, in response to public pressure, we still want to take the matter to the UN, we might instruct our UN Mission to seek a resolution specifically condemning the Munich attack acceptable to the Security Council as a whole. This would stand a better chance of getting through.
Agree _________ Disagree _____________
Another option would be to ask George Bush to explore urgently with UN officials and other delegations how UN action in any form might be taken against international terrorism.
Agree __________ Disagree __________
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “OBE.” There is no indication that Kissinger agreed or disagreed with any of the recommendations.↩
- Hoskinson and Rondon recommended that action against international terrorism should not be pursued in the United Nations at this time.↩