As we agreed, my staff has prepared from their own resources the
attached memorandum on the possible sanctions we might impose on
countries which are uncooperative on hijacking. I recognize that the
product is insufficient for your purposes, but I believe we must tap
outside sources if we are going to get a more comprehensive
paper.
Attachment
SANCTIONS AGAINST COUNTRIES WHICH ARE UNCOOPERATIVE
ON HIJACKING
Checklist
Jordan
Receives US economic and military
assistance.
Syria
No leverage except through international forums associated with
air travel.
Lebanon
Receives US military and economic
assistance.
US air carriers land regularly at
Beirut.
UAR
We are engaged in an effort to reschedule the Egyptian debt.
Algeria
No leverage except through international bodies.
North Korea and Cuba
We have already severed all financial and trade relations under
the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Other Sanctions
… Agreement by US and foreign air
carriers to boycott certain airports or take other action
associated with air travel through various international forums
(ICAO, LATA, pilots’
associations, etc.).
… Refuse to grant Eximbank loans.
… Embargo all exports to a country under the Export
Administration Act.
… Economic boycott similar to that against Rhodesia.
… Restriction of passports for travel.
[Page 3]
DISCUSSION
The following are countries which have been uncooperative in
punishing hijackers or in releasing planes or passengers:
Jordan. The most notorious case of
hijacking recently was in Jordan; here the question was not the
intention of the Government, but its ability to control the
guerrillas.
Syria in September 1969 held for
several days all passengers on a hijacked TWA aircraft. They then released
non-Israeli passengers and Israeli women and held the handful of
Israeli men until they were finally included in a broader UAR-Israel prisoner exchange
arranged by the Red Cross. The Syrian government released the
hijackers.
Lebanon. The Lebanese have been
involved in several hijacking cases, either as a transit point
or, in one instance, as the final destination. In almost every
case there have been indications of official-inspired laxity in
accepting the hijacked aircraft and/or attempting to capture and
prosecute the hijackers. Pan American Airways, after the recent
hijackings threatened to stop landing in Beirut, and the
Lebanese Government has instituted new security procedures.
The UAR
should not be placed fully in this category. The UAR Government immediately released
all passengers from the Pan Am 747 blown up in Cairo in
September. They apprehended the hijackers and still have them in
prison. They may falter when it actually comes to sentencing the
hijackers, but it is too soon the make that judgment. Cairo for
a time closed its airport to hijacked aircraft.
Algeria. Algeria has been less active
recently in the hijacking business; but sometime ago it held
Moshe Tschombe until
his death and also some Israeli victims of hijacking.
North Korea. North Korea has not been
involved in many cases, but it did hold the hijacker of a
Japanese plane while allowing the plane and passengers to return
to Japan. (Somewhat the same is the treatment given hijackers
from Communist countries in Germany and Austria; though both
states often prosecute the hijackers, they give very light
[Page 4]
sentences.)
Cuba. Cuba has now become one the
best-behaved of the hijacking states, since it immediately
allows the planes and passengers to return and often jails the
hijackers. It recently returned its first hijacker, and offered
to return all hijackers provided we would do the same (a
commitment we cannot make because of the political asylum
aspect).
Appropriate Sanctions
In deciding which economic weapons to use in hijacking cases, we
need to decide first whether we are acting only in cases
involving U.S. citizens and aircraft, or whether we are speaking
of more general action.
The cases of both Lebanon and Jordan raise the question of
whether pressure on governments is an answer. Here the
governments are ineffective because of civil strife, and foreign
pressure is easily likely to make it harder for these
governments to cooperate.
In the case of Lebanon, the Pan American Airways threat to stop
landing at Beirut had some effect, and there is no reason why
similar sanctions should not be applied provided there is broad
international support so that US
carriers will not be exploited by those of other flags.
As far as other sanctions are concerned against Lebanon, the U.S.
faces a dilemma. On the one hand, everything that can be done to
prevent hijacking should be done. On the other, the U.S. has a
major interest in buttressing the responsible government of
Lebanon against Syrian-backed radical guerrilla groups that
operate in Lebanon—as much to undercut the government as to
operate against Israel. In the broad political context, the U.S.
is providing military and economic assistance to Lebanon in
order to help the government contain the radical Palestinians.
It is these Palestinians who perpetrate the hijackings. So
cutting off aid or trade would run directly counter to the U.S.
assistance to the government in controlling these radical
groups.
The way to deal with the problem in Lebanon is to apply pressure
through the international groups and the carriers in ways
directly related to air travel and then to work with the
government in providing the capacity to restrict guerrilla
activity.
In Syria, the 1969 TWA hijacking
experience showed that the U.S.—without even, diplomatic
relations — has no leverage-to use against Syria except for
those pressures that can be generated through the international
forums associated with air travel (ICAO, IATA,
pilots). Boycotting Damascus airport was seriously considered in
the 1969 hijacking case, but the idea was dropped because U.S.
carriers would have been hurt when other governments and
non-US carriers refused to go
along.
[Page 5]
The choice of sanctions also depends upon whether they are
unilateral sanctions or whether there is wide international
cooperation. Multilateral sanctions are the only effective
economic means of pressure, since the United States is not
sufficiently important as an external trading or financial
partner of the above countries to give us decisive influence
through multi-lateral economic measures.
We have proposed in the ICAO a
resolution which calls upon member states to take joint action
suspending all air connections with states detaining passengers,
crew or aircraft for international blackmail purposes, or which
fail to extradite or prosecute hijackers. We are also calling
for rapid completion of a treaty to accomplish the same ends.
These proposals amount to a joint boycott using civil air
weapons.
However, even these proposals have been resisted by a number of
states, and it is by no means certain that our proposals will
prevail. There is much less chance of a multilateral agreement
using boycott weapons beyond the civil air field. (Several
nations have told us that they would support our proposals at
some other time, but that they are unwilling to join an effort
which, in view of recent happenings, would be interpreted as
anti-Arab.)
There are a number of unilateral actions we could take. However,
our importance to these countries is so small that U.S. action
alone could not be decisive, though it could be highly annoying
to the countries involved. By using instruments outside the
civil air field, we would be declaring ineffectual economic war;
costing ourselves business to no end other than the marginal
gains of a moral stance on the issue; and thus subordinating our
entire foreign policy to the hijacking incident.
Of the countries listed above, Jordan and Lebanon are recipients
of U.S. aid or arms sales, and we are engaged in an effort to
reschedule Egyptian debt.
Another possibility of action would be to cut off loans from the
Export-Import Bank, but these are not large for the countries
concerned, and the damage in lost export sales would be heavier
to us than to the purchasing country.
The main instrument of economic boycott available to the U.S.
Government is the Trading with the Enemy Act. This Act has
allowed us to sever all financial and trade relations with
China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba and Rhodesia. Somewhat
similar authority under the Export Administration Act allows us
to embargo all exports to those destinations. (Restriction of
passports for travel accomplishes the same thing in a more
limited field.)
[Page 6]
Use of either of these instruments is the equivalent of economic
war. No major industrial power uses any instrument of this
intensity with the exception of those countries adhering to the
Rhodesian boycott. However, though there would be a great
symbolic significance in use of these two Acts, the practical
effect on the countries concerned would be relatively small and
we would be leaving as hostage whatever American investment
exists in these countries.
Where American investment in these countries is larger than their
holding of assets in the United States, as it is in most, we
would lose more than we would take, in a reciprocal confiscation
of assets maneuver.
The chances of effective action are better if we continue to
pursue the multilateral civil air boycott possibilities, at
least until we have thoroughly exhausted them.
