Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

277. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rogers¹ ²

Washington, March 17, 1972.

Post-Apollo Cooperation in Jeopardy

This memorandum is in the nature of an “alert” to a problem that is rapidly emerging with respect to post-Apollo cooperation with Europe.

I met earlier today with an inter-agency group to develop the last round of proposals for the negotiation of an agreement on this program with the Europeans. Kissinger, Flanigan and David each had representatives on this group, and they were unanimous in reflecting the prevailing spirit in their home offices as one of deep skepticism as to the desirability of European participation in the development of the hardware for the space shuttle or other elements of the post-Apollo space transportation system.

The underlying reasons for this attitude center on protecting the technological position of the U.S., maximizing balance of payments and employment benefits for the U.S., and avoiding managerial difficulties that may be encountered in international cooperation in technological activities. It was their belief that the only argument which would. be. persuasive in the decision to go ahead with European cooperation is that we may have gone so long and so far in our discussions with the Europeans as to be “stuck” with their participation. In that event we may contemplate an effort to ensure that the nature and extent of the cooperation is tailored by the U.S. to meet the concerns enumerated above.

As you know, the cooperation in the space shuttle that we and the Europeans are now contemplating is modest (about $150 million European investment over a 7 year period) compared to the “substantial” participation ($1 billion) which we suggested in our initial discussions with the Europeans about two years ago.

Pursuant to our conversation earlier this week, I informed the inter-agency group of the Department’s view that for the U.S. now to pull back from the discussions on post-Apollo hardware cooperation would give rise to a serious international problem, and that you were interested in this problem and expected to participate personally in any decision. Our target for the development of a position for the consideration of our respective superiors is April 15.

I am hopeful that it will be possible to persuade my inter-agency group that the foreign policy considerations in this instance cannot be entirely discounted and, indeed, that the issues of concern to the White House staffs were much more relevant to earlier proposals for substantial European participation than to the more modest proposals that are still on the table.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SP 10 US. Confidential. Drafted by Pollack. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Samuels, and Hillenbrand. In a separate March 17 memorandum to Flanigan, March 17, the Executive Secretary of NASA, outlined in detail the NASA position on European participation. Printed in Logsdon (ed.), Exploring the Universe, Vol. II, External Relations, as Document I-25.
2. Pollack alerted Rogers that cooperation with the Europeans in the post-Apollo program was endangered because the White House staff was skeptical that European participation in the development of hardware for the space shuttle and other elements was desirable.