Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

266. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹ ²

Washington, June 4, 1971.

NASA Presentation on Post-Apollo

Attached is a statement prepared at NASA for Dr. Kissinger on technology transfer in the Post-Apollo program (Tab B).

I think all you need to read at this time is the section on Conclusions on page 7 of Tab B.

In essence this report confirms Jim Fletcher’s prediction to you that NASA study would conclude there is no significant transfer of technology inherent in Post-Apollo cooperation with Europe.

NASA was also supposed to provide proposals on alternatives to post-Apollo participation. A second paper in the attachment is so entitled (Tab C). However, it is essentially a contentious paper reciting the dire consequences that would follow from backing out of the post-Apollo proposals. It denies that there are any suitable alternatives.

We shall supply you with some recommendations for the meeting which Dr. Kissinger will hold on the attached paper at 3:00 p.m. on Monday, June 7.

Tab B

Washington, June 1, 1971

V. Conclusions

As a result of this study, the following primary conclusions were reached:

1. European development of the shuttle vertical tail would result in technological benefits to both Europe and the United States and a relatively small transfer of advanced technology to Europe in terms of the economic value of the tail project.

2. European development of the space tug could result in some greater transfer to Europe of discrete technology and considerable systems engineering assistance in terms of the total cost of the tug project. The technology transfer can be limited and controlled through U.S. performance of certain tasks.

In the course of this study, the following ancillary, but important, conclusions were also reached:

1. Knowledgeable Europeans are particularly interested in gaining program management and systems engineering experience from association in the Post Apollo Program, rather than in specific discrete technologies.

2. Knowledge of European technological capability requires additional refinement. A critical validation of European technology capability for specific tasks would be necessary before commitment to specific cooperative efforts. Such a requirement has already been made very clear to European officials and industry.

3. U.S. industry, experienced in this field, does not consider European participation a threat or unmanageable. Rather, they believe participation desirable to stabilize the program.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SP 10 US. Confidential. Tab A, “Introduction to NSA Presentation” and Tab C, “Alternatives to Post-Apollo Participation” were attached but not published. Pollack suggested that Johnson read the “Conclusions” printed on page 7 of Tab B. Page 7 of the attached Tab B is published. According to a handwritten notation on a subsequent June 5 briefing memorandum Pollack sent to Johnson (Document 267), the meeting scheduled for June 7 was postponed until August 9.
2. Pollack’s assessment of NASA memoranda, prepared at Kissinger’s request, on Technology Transfers in the Post-Apollo Program and Alternatives to Post-Apollo European Participation.