25. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
2
Washington, September 21, 1969.
SUBJECT:
Attached is a cable from American Embassy Tel Aviv which provides an
excellent assessment of continuing Israeli concern about the TWA hijacking. In summary, the
following points are made:
- -There is little discernible forward motion towards
obtaining release of the two Israeli passengers still held
by Syria.
- -A violent Israeli public reaction with dangerous
repercussions for TWA and
the US could occur if the
TWA pilot departed from
Damascus.
- -It will become increasingly difficult to convince Israel
that relying on the US is the
best way to gain release of the two prisoners.
- -Israel may attack a prominent target like the Damascus
airport if it concludes that the two Israelis will never be
released.
The Ambassador warns, and I concur, that we must intensify efforts to
gain the release of the two prisoners, preferably prior to the visit
of Prime Minister Meir next
Thursday. He recommends specifically that we:
- -prevent the election of Syria to the Security
Council.
- -warn other governments (especially the Soviets) and
international organizations that we are losing patience and
are seriously considering strong diplomatic sanctions
against Syria.
[Page 2]
Attachment
Message from American Embassy Tel Aviv (no. 3588)
dated September 18, 1969
[September 18,
1969]
SUBJECT:
-
TWA Hijacking: Three Weeks
Later
- 1.
- After the initial success in obtaining the release of the
first of the non-Israelis, and then of Israeli women, the
problem of the two Israeli men detained in Damascus has
remained, with little if any forward motion discernible.
After a strong protest from the United States Government,
the Israeli public and governmental outcry was moderated,
but deep concern for the two Israelis still remains
immediately below the surface and could break out at any
time into violent public problem again. Departure of the
TWA Captain without the
release of the passengers would, we believe, cause another
outbreak of outrage against the “abandonment” of the
passengers by the airline which had, in return for the fare,
undertaken responsibilities towards them. TWA should not be under any
misapprehension that the situation has quieted down to the
point where the Captain could leave Damascus without adverse
reaction. We continue to hear bitter comments from Israelis
about the departure of the rest of the crew, and the
departure of the Captain would have repercussions on TWA (and also on the US Government) beyond any
disadvantages or inconveniences involved in the Captain’s
remaining in Damascus.
- 2.
- The Secretary’s letter to Eban was delivered on September 14 in time
for Eban to use it in
his Cabinet discussion on the morning of September 15 before
his departure for the United Nations General Assembly. We
believe the letter was useful to Eban in gaining Cabinet agreement to
continue the Government of Israel’s policy of relying on the
US Government to get the
men out. The time is approaching, however, when we will need
something more substantial if we are to persuade the
Israelis that the present course of action is the one best
calculated to obtain the men’s release. Every indication
(although this not necessarily is to be accepted as final,
of course) has been that the Government of Israel will not
entertain the idea of an exchange of the Syrian pilots for
the Israeli passengers. In the Algerian case, an exchange
was made because the Government of Israel saw no other way
out. Many have feared this set precedent, and are determined
the precedent will not be reinforced. If and when the time
comes that Israel concludes the US Government has given up on the passengers or
[Page 3]
that the
US Government efforts
will not work, we must not rule out the possibility of
Israel resorting to violent action. It is true that some
Israelis have come, with hindsight, to view the Beirut
airport raid as a possible mistake or at least excessive.
These feelings are not based, however, on a lack of
appreciation for the operation itself, but more on the
relatively mild attitude of Lebanon in the Arab-Israel
controversy and the relatively tenuous connection between
Beirut and Athens airport murder. These factors will not
operate in the case of Syria. Once they have concluded that
the Israelis will not be released anyway, the Government of
Israel may opt for a military attack on the new Damascus
airport or some other prominent objective. If and when such
a time comes, it will be because the Israelis have despaired
of any other means and nothing the US Government says at that time would be likely
to dissuade them.
- 3.
- We therefore urge immediate attention to a new
hard-hitting campaign aimed at getting the Israelis out of
Damascus by some specific date, such as September 24 arrival
of Prime Minister Meir
in the United States. To accomplish this would make for a
less troubled and distracting atmosphere during Mrs.
Meir’s visit.
Otherwise, this problem, still hanging over our heads at
that time, may put us in a defensive position on a matter of
great public interest in Israel and cloud what we hope will
be a great positive contribution to US-Israeli relations.
- 4.
- Other than doing something to prevent a Syrian election to
the Security Council, we do not have any specific steps to
recommend. It would appear desirable, however, to go again
to the Soviets and other governments as well as
international organizations which may have influence in
Syria and make it clear that the US is at the end of its patience and will be
bound to take strong action against Syria in every way
possible, regardless of consequences to things like
overflight rights and air service to Syria, in order to
protect the principle that the US Government will not stand for kidnapping and
illegal detention of passengers on US flag aircraft.
