Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

179. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹ ²

Washington, August 18, 1970.

SUBJECT:

• Heroin Task Force Meeting-Conflicting Interpretations

In order to ensure that all agencies and members of the Task Force are working from the same base, it may be desirable to distribute a summary of the conclusions reached at yesterday’s meeting. Such a summary at Tab A can be distributed to the members by the Secretariat in the same way as WSAG conclusions are distributed.

One serious difference of interpretation has already surfaced. An Inter-agency group is scheduled to meet on August 20 to consider the long-stalled PL-480 wheat program for Turkey, Treasury had held up the program because it wanted it either cut or in some other way, tied to the opium question. On July 30, Secretary Kennedy informed Under Secretary Johnson (Tab B) that, in view of the urgency of the wheat program, he would be prepared to concur in the release of the first 500,000 ton tranche (against their estimated need for 1,700,000) on the understanding that the Turks would be informed now that approval of further shipments would be conditional upon their employing a substantial portion of the lire-generated funds in an accelerated and more broadly based poppy crop substitution program.

Assistant Secretary Rossides raised the question of the PL 480 program near the end of the Task Force meeting. The response to his point was not perfectly clear. But, from the comments of the Attorney General, Under Secretary Johnson and yourself, there seemed to be a consensus that until the Handley/Ingersoll assessment was received, the AID program should not be directly linked with the opium issue. You clearly left open the possibility of employing AID funds in some fashion, if in fact the conclusions of the assessment so warranted. The summary conclusions at Tab B (item 5) reflect this view.

On the other hand, Assistant Secretary Rossides considers that the conclusion of the meeting was that Treasury’s objection (as contained in Secretary Kennedy’s letter) still stood, and that no inconsistent action with respect to the PL 480 program should be taken until further decision based on the assessment. In short, State/AID feel that the meeting resulted in agreement to proceed as usual with the PL 480 program, and Treasury thinks the meeting agreed to its reservation to the PL 480 program. The circle must now be squared, hopefully in time for the inter-agency AID meeting on August 20.

One method of settling this would be to distribute the summary reflecting the meeting’s consensus and at the same time call Rossides to advise him that if Secretary Kennedy feels strongly that the PL 480 program must contain his reservation tying it to opium, he should feel free to send a memo making his case. If Secretary Kennedy does decide to send a memo, compromise could be to permit the 500,000 ton tranche, but at the same time inform the Turks that we are considering conditioning further trenches on their use of the proceeds for opium control if such steps seem warranted.

Recommendations: That you approve the summary of the conclusions at Tab A.

Approve ______ Disapprove ___________

2. That you approve the distribution of the conclusions at Tab A (or as altered) and that you call Assistant Secretary Rossides.

Approve _________ Disapprove __________

Tab A

August 18, 1970

WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON HEROIN
Meeting of August 17, 1970, at 3:15 p. m.

The White House Task Force on Heroin met for 60 minutes in the Roosevelt Room.

Summary Conclusions

1. Elimination of Turkish production of opium as soon as possible remains a goal; it is to be pursued in the context of our efforts to achieve a world-wide ban on the production of natural opium.

2. Our central goal is to achieve air-tight control of the 1971 crop and to ensure that the Government of Turkey has the political will as well as the organization, personnel and equipment to meet this goal.

3. Ambassador Handley should continue to apply pressure to the Turkish Government, making clear the seriousness of our interests.

4. BNDD Director Ingersoll will visit Turkey to take a survey and assess exactly what is needed by Turkey with respect to organization, men and equipment to eliminate diversion to illicit channels.

5. A back-stopping mechanism will be established in Washington to be responsible for recommending to the Task Force a plan to achieve the goal in paragraph 2 on the basis of the results of the assessment of Ambassador Handley and Director Ingersoll.

6. At least, until the plan is received, economic assistance programs (PL 480) shall not be linked with the opium control issue.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 358, Subject Files, Narcotics III. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was unsigned. There is no indication that Kissinger approved or disapproved the recommendations. Tab B was attached but not published.
2. Saunders suggested that a summary of conclusions reached at the Heroin Task Force meeting of August 17 should be distributed to ensure a uniform interpretation of the administration’s goals and policy.