Attached at Tab A is a summary record of the June 9 Heroin Task Force
meeting which was chaired, in your absence, by Dr. Moynihan. A copy is being furnished to
Dr. Moynihan, at his request and
with General Haig’s
concurrence.
The meeting surfaced an apparent strong feeling on the part of Dr.
Moynihan, Deputy Attorney
General Kleindienst and Assistant
Secretary Rossides that more
direct bilateral pressure should be applied to the Turks. Mr. Richardson forcefully reviewed the
extreme importance of maintaining Turkey as an ally, and made the point
repeatedly that further US pressure on
the Turks could topple the Demirel Government. Mr. Richardson also defended the
performance of Ambassador Handley. Following the meeting, General Haig and I discussed the situation of
the Task Force and its Working Party (chaired by Harry Schwartz), particularly in the
light of Mr. Richardson’s new
appointment.
Tab A
WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON HEROIN
Meeting of June
9, 1970, at 3 pm
The White House Task Force on Heroin met for 75 minutes in the
Roosevelt Room. The meeting was chaired, in Dr. Kissinger’s absence, by Dr.
Moynihan; a list of
participants is attached.
* * * * *
Summary Conclusions
- 1.
- The State Department will cable Embassy Ankara and request an
assessment of how the Turks are complying with their commitment
to buy up the entire current poppy harvest. In addition,
Ambassador Handley will
be instructed to consult with Prime Minister Demirel to reach agreement on
the scope and nature of the expected Turkish announcement at the
CCMS meeting.
- 2.
-
NATO countries should be
advised of our strong interest in assuring that the CCMS meeting on June 18 is
productive, and that all contribute. No mention will be made of
the US-Turkish arrangements to
those countries not already informed.
- 3.
- As Chairman of the Task Forces Working Party, Mr. Schwartz will prepare a list of
areas in which we might apply pressure on the Turks; this should
include things we could do to the Turks, for the Turks, and
things we could withdraw from them.
* * * * *
Summary Record
At the Chairman’s request, Mr. Richardson
reviewed and brought up to date the points in his memo of May
19. He concluded that the decision was made to open a multilateral
channel because that would enable the Turks to move faster toward
elimination of opium production than in response to direct bilateral
US pressure. The CCMS meeting is a vehicle to create a
forum for the Turks to announce further measures as well as to move
toward a wider international conference on the entire drug problem.
Mr. Kleindienst
asked if this was considered the best approach solely because
of the political problems within Turkey. In response, Mr. Richardson
said this was the result of the very limited bilateral US pressure which could be used as
leverage with the Turks; to press harder would be counterproductive.
Also, the move to the multilateral would enable other countries to
bring
[Page 3]
pressure on the
Turks, and would enable the Turks to be in the company of others in
taking its own steps.
After a brief discussion of the arrangements for the CCMS meeting, the
Chairman raised the question of the proposed world ban on
opium, as outlined in Mr. Richardson’s memorandum. Mr.
Finch
commented that at this time there is really no effective
substitute for opium, and that there would be a host of domestic
problems relating to such a position (including the various state
laws on the subject). Dr. Egeberg expanded
on these comments, noting that his preliminary soundings in the
medical community revealed very stiff opposition to any such
suggestion. Opium is used in twenty different medical preparations
by 2-4 million people per year, and there is no effective substitute
for its pain-killing and euphoric qualities. The Chairman suggested that, while it would be useful to
raise the question generally in the CCMS meeting, it probably would not be productive to
take further soundings within the US
at this time. In discussion later in the meeting, Mr. Finch and Dr. Egeberg agreed, and
Mr. Finch said that HEW would provide medical advice to Dr.
Moynihan for the CCMS meeting.
Mr. Kleindienst
emphasized that forceful action was needed with respect to the
Turks and other countries; that at the moment these countries
considered it in their interest not to eliminate production. Mr. Rossides
picked up this theme, noting the corruption in opium traffic
in Turkey. He referred to Secretary Kennedy’s view that next year the AID program for Turkey should be held
up if there was not satisfactory improvement in the situation.
Following the Chairman’s expression of
concern that the Turks might not in fact be collecting the entire
poppy harvest, Mr. Rossides
suggested that the Defense Department consider working closer
with the Turkish military on the opium problem. Mr. Richardson
thought this suggestion was worth pursuing.
The Chairman referred to a recent
conversation he had with the President on the status of the heroin
elimination efforts, and also noted that he was unhappy with the
apparent lack of vigor with which Ambassador Handley was pursuing this matter.
Mr. Kleindienst
said we needed a very active Ambassador in Ankara. Mr. Richardson
said he was satisfied with the Ambassador’s performance, and
that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both emphasized to him
that the Ambassador had been persistent on the opium question.
Further, the Demirel Government would fall if it appeared that he
responded to direct US pressure on
this. Mr. Kleindienst
asked if that assessment assumed that, if Demirel falls, the
next government would not be as friendly toward the US. Mr. Richardson
said that was correct, unless the generals take over.
[Page 4]
The Chairman asked Mr. Richardson to describe the
commitment the Turks have made to us. Mr.
Richardson
said it was not very clear: at a minimum they will reduce the
number of provinces for 1972 to one; at a maximum, elimination in
1971; and the middle ground would be reduction in 1971 to one
province. They have been evasive, but they promised some action at
the CCMS meeting. (There was a
brief discussion of the degree of interest held by the other NATO countries, and of the possibility
of suggesting a survey of the narcotic problem in the NATO armed forces.)
Mr. Kleindienst
opined that the CCMS would
not accomplish anything, that the meeting would merely deplore the
problem and agree to meet again. Mr. Richardson
reviewed the strategic importance to the US of a strong Turkish ally, and the
delicate political balance within Turkey. Rhetorically, he asked
whether Mr. Kleindienst had
any alternative suggestions as to how better to accomplish the task
of eliminating the opium problem.
The Chairman concluded the meeting by summarizing the conclusions
noted above.
[Page 5]
PARTICIPANTS AT THE HEROIN TASK FORCE MEETING, JUNE 9
| White House |
Dr. Moynihan
|
|
Mr. Blaney |
|
Mr. Ehrlichman
|
|
Mr. Krogh
|
|
General Haig
|
|
Mr. Downey
|
| State |
Mr. Richardson
|
|
Mr. Schwartz
|
| Justice |
Mr. Kleindienst
|
|
HEW
|
Mr. Finch
|
|
Dr. Egeberg |
| Treasury |
Mr. Rossides
|
|
Mr. Liddy |
| Defense |
Admiral Mack |
|
Mr. Bartimo |
|
CIA
|
[name not declassified] |
