122. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant For National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon
1
2
Washington, February 7, 1969.
Subject:
Secretary Rogers has submitted the
attached memorandum describing the steps the State Department is taking
to deal with the problem of aircraft hijacking.
We seem to be making progress in obtaining Cuban Government cooperation
in two areas:
- 1.
- They have indicated their willingness to accept limited
numbers of Cubans who wish to return to Cuba from the US.
- 2.
- They are willing to permit passengers to return to the US on the hijacked plane if the
crew, airlines, and US
authorities will accept full responsibility. (The passengers of
a hijacked Colombian plane were permitted to return on the same
plane yesterday, after the Colombian authorities assumed
responsibility for their safety).
However, it is probably going to be difficult to reach agreement with the
Cubans on the one step that might have some deterrent effect, i.e.,
returning hijackers of commercial aircraft to the country of aircraft
registry to face criminal prosecution. The Cubans have said they do not
consider it possible to undertake a bilateral agreement “under present
circumstances”, and Castro recently has implied that Cuban measures to
return hijackers may depend on our actions to prevent Cubans from
departing Cuba illegally via the Guantanamo Naval Base.
I think you should be aware of one historical aspect of this problem
which may prove embarrassing to us. In 1961, when there were several
cases of ships and planes seized by Cubans escaping to the United
States, we did not respond to a Cuban note proposing a mutual agreement
to return the persons responsible for those actions to the country of
registry of the ship or plane. In effect, we refused to consider
essentially the same proposal we have now made to the Cubans.
[Page 2]
Attachment
Washington, February 6, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Hijacking of Aircraft
Hijacking of aircraft to Cuba is an increasingly serious problem.
Most of the hijacked aircraft have been U.S. planes, but aircraft
from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru have also been involved.
So far this year, nine U.S. aircraft and three from other countries,
all commercial airliners, have been taken to Cuba. This compares
with seventeen U.S. and nine non-U.S. aircraft hijacked in 1968. A
few of these were non-scheduled and private planes, but most were
commercial airliners. There were seven successful hijackings of U.S.
aircraft and three of other countries in the period 1961-67. Most of
the recent hijackers have been U.S. citizens, rather than
Cubans.
None of these incidents has as yet involved us in a serious
international problem. Aside from the inconvenience and cost
involved in each incident, however, there are two kinds of problems
that could arise:
- a)
- an accident with loss of life; and
- b)
- an incident in which we are unable to obtain the return of
the aircraft or the passengers and crew. (So far, the Cubans
have been meticulous about returning relatively promptly
hijacked aircraft, passengers and crew. However, they could
change their attitude, or, if the habit spreads, we could
have a hijacking of a U.S. aircraft to some less cooperative
place, such as North Korea.)
Given the growing seriousness of the problem and the increasing
public and congressional concern about it, I [Page 3] thought it desirable that you be
advised of the steps the Department has taken with respect to the
international aspects of this problem, both bilaterally and
multilaterally:
- 1.
-
Bilateral
We have made two bilateral approaches to the Cubans
through the Swiss:
- a.
-
We suggested last July that
we use the return leg of the refugee air lift
plane to return to Cuba those Cubans that want to
go back to Havana, and that the Cuban
Government agree to permit them re-entry into
Cuba. In November we provided the Cuban Government
with a list of names of Cubans in the U.S. who had
indicated to us their desire for repatriation.
Most of the hijackers are not Cubans, but some
are, and a repatriation arrangement might be
helpful, at least psychologically.
- b.
-
We presented a note to the
Cubans through the Swiss in December proposing an
arrangement for the return of hijackers of
commercial aircraft and expressing our
willingness to make this reciprocal. One of the
most effective means of deterring further
hijackings would clearly be the prosecution of
hijackers, and a gap in our efforts to combat the
problem has been the fact that Cuba, at present,
does not return hijackers to the country of
aircraft registry. Nor, to our knowledge, are they
tried for hijacking in Cuba.
We have just received through the Swiss a Cuban reply
dated February 1 to both approaches. The Cuban note is
measured and responsible in tone, indicates that the
Cubans are concerned themselves about the problem, and
provides some hope for some small practical steps that
could ease the problem:
- --The Cuban Government stated that it could
not approve unrestricted entry for all Cubans who
might wish to return from the U.S. because this
could result in relatively large [Page 4] numbers of
returnees and present serious problems re housing
and employment. Nor did they wish to permit return
of individuals who violated Cuban law in departing
the country illegally. They are prepared however,
to receive limited numbers and to give
consideration to any list of names given
them.
- --Recognizing concern expressed over the Cuban
practice of requiring the hijacked plane to return
without the passengers and the latter to be flown
back separately, the Cuban Government stated its
willingness to permit passengers to return to the
U.S. on the hijacked plane provided the crew, the
airlines and U.S. authorities consider this
feasible and safe, and take the
responsibility.
- --The Cuban note stated that the Cuban
Government does not consider it possible “under
present circumstances” to undertake bilateral
commitments to return hijackers. However, if
hijackings are repeated at their present rate, the
Government of Cuba would “consider the adoption,
on its own account, of such measures as it might
deem appropriate to settle the matter adequately
and fairly.” We take this to mean the possibility
of publicized prosecution of hijackers in Cuba or
unilaterally returning or expelling them.
We plan an immediate response to the Cuban reply to pin
down arrangements on the first two points—which will
settle some practical problems—and to express our hope
that the Cubans will give continued consideration to
either the return or prosecution of hijackers as a means
of deterring further incidents.
At the time the Swiss Ambassador received the Cuban note
he also talked to Castro himself. In that conversation, as
reported by the Ambassador, Castro expressed his concern over the
hijackings, “especially since most of the hijackers are
not completely normal people.” He also expressed his
concern that many of the Cubans who [Page 5] hijacked planes were
persons who fled the country illegally, especially
through Guantanamo.
We had given some thought to a direct approach to
Castro
through some unofficial intermediary such as James
Donovan. However, in view of the Cuban reply just
received, indicating reluctance to proceed at the moment
with negotiated bilateral understandings we have decided
to defer further consideration of this tactic for the
time being. We will weigh its desirability again in the
future if the problem’s intensity is sustained or if
more propitious signs for it are received.
- 2.
-
Third Party.
- a.
-
We asked the Director General
of IATA, the
International Organization of Airlines, to talk to
the Cubans about the general problem. He did
so in Havana in January. He was given no
encouragement, and nothing significant developed
from the conversation. But the Cuban authorities did
state they considered this a “first talk” and would
be prepared to discuss the problem further.
- b.
-
We have also asked the
President of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), a U.N. specialized agency, to
talk to the Cubans. He has not yet received a
response to his request to discuss this
matter.
- c.
-
We have asked both the
Canadians and Mexicans to discuss the general
problem with the Cubans--not on our behalf
but in terms of it being an international problem.
The Canadian Ambassador has a request pending with
the Cuban Foreign Minister for this purpose. The
Mexicans do not believe the moment propitious for
them to make a general approach, but they have
requested extradition of hijackers of Mexican
planes—unsuccessfully so far.
- 3.
-
Multilateral.
We have two major multilateral efforts in progress:
- a.
-
The first involves the “Tokyo
Convention,” which deals principally with
crimes aboard aircraft and only secondarily with
hijacking. It would require the country where a
hijacked plane lands to return the airplane to the
country of its registry and to permit the
passengers and crew to continue their journey.
That convention is not in effect since it requires
12 ratifications before it becomes effective, and
only 8 have so far ratified. President
Johnson sent this convention
to the Senate for its advice and consent in
September 1968. I would hope that the U.S. would
ratify it soon, and that thereafter it would
quickly become effective. While I doubt that Cuba
will ratify soon, this is an important convention
in that it establishes an international code of
conduct that would be helpful if we ever have an
incident in which either the airplane, the
passengers, or the crew is detained.
- b.
-
The U.S. has proposed a
protocol to the Tokyo Convention that would
require that a country return the hijacker to the
country where the hijacked aircraft is registered
for trial. There will be a meeting on this
protocol in Montreal on February 10, under the
auspices of ICAO.
There are two important aspects to this protocol:
- (1)
- It is limited to incidents involving the
hijacking of a commercial aircraft carrying
passengers for hire. We would not want to get
involved with individuals who steal a raft or a
small aircraft to escape political persecution or
the like.
- (2)
- Our proposal provides that the traditional
right of asylum would not apply to hijackers
covered by the protocol. Our feeling was that the
risks to safety are so great that [Page 7] they
outweigh this traditional consideration.
We are aware that conceivably we might have to return a hijacker who
does plead that he is escaping political persecution. Nevertheless,
we felt that without this exception to the asylum rule, the protocol
would not be effective.
I am advised that there appear to be very limited possibilities of
preventing hijacking at the source, e.g. by screening devices or
procedures before the aircraft is boarded or by over-powering
hijackers in flight. The Federal Aviation Agency and the Department
of Transportation, with whom we maintain constant communication and
coordination regarding the overall problem of hijacking, are, I
understand, informing you further with respect to these areas.
As you can see, dealing with this matter on the domestic and
international fronts has proved to be both difficult and
frustrating. We will continue, however, to deal with the problem as
a matter of urgency.
