89. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Monday Morning Operations Staff Meeting (6/15/70)
[Omitted here is discussion of the NSC system.]
He [Kissinger] asked Mr. Sonnenfeldt to report on his European trip.2
[Page 249]European Trip—Mr. Sonnenfeldt said he had found the Germans deeply divided ideologically, primarily over their Eastern policy. A preponderance of the population was looking for some vague reconciliation with the East but with great uneasiness. He thought the SPD would interpret the election results3 as support of their Eastern policy which he saw as the only thing that was holding the coalition together.
Dr. Kissinger asked why the SPD would so interpret the elections.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt replied that they will see the victory in North Rhine-Westphalia as the key. They will argue that, while the last minute slander campaign may have swayed a few votes, the majority held.
Dr. Kissinger agreed that they now have the Parliamentary base to carry out their policy but asked how they could argue that the election returns were an endorsement.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt remarked that politicians find endorsement in narrow margins and that those with narrow margins may sometimes have to do revolutionary things. Of course they would prefer to conduct their Eastern policy with a broader base.
He added that the Germans will make the US their handmaiden in this policy since they are tying everything to Berlin. Since we will have to negotiate the guarantees on Berlin, this will be interpreted as an endorsement of the German Eastern policy.
Dr. Kissinger asked if the reverse is true: if the Germans do not get what they want in Berlin, will they stop in their Eastern policy? He asked what the Federal Republic wants in Berlin.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt replied they want the right to represent West Berlin in national affairs; want each West Berliner to carry a Federal Republic passport. They are willing to reduce the activities of the constitutional organs to achieve this. They believe the Soviets want to make a deal, probably before the slim SPD margin disappears.
Dr. Kissinger asked what the Soviets would get.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt replied “peace on the Western front.” He noted that the Soviets were probably giving the Germans some expectations in Eastern Europe which would be troublesome for the US. The Germans believe the proposed deal over Berlin is weighted pro-West, but consider Bahr’s deal for a renunciation of force as favoring the Soviets. Therefore the Germans see it as an even exchange and believe the Soviets will accept. He noted Bahr was an inventive negotiator, was totally confident of the outcome, resented the FDP for slowing things up and was prepared to ignore the CDU. He noted that the CDU is convinced there is no way to stop the trend unless the US inserts itself.
[Page 250]Dr. Kissinger said we should not do so.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt said the German Government was concerned about the possible withdrawal of US forces and was becoming willing to consider some form of budgetary support. He noted Schmidt had taken some lead in this regard in the DPG meeting. He referred to the next round of offset negotiations in the near future and noted their relation to consideration of NSSM 84. (U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO)4
Mr. Bergsten remarked that the bureaucracy was waiting for a White House trigger on the offset negotiations. He recalled that they had asked for an okay to talk to Brandt when he was here but had been turned down. They were now waiting for a go-ahead.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt noted, with regard to Vienna,5 that it was the sense of the delegation that there was a broad potential area of agreement with the Soviets and they wish more flexibility to explore this area. He agreed there was such a broad area, with caveats, and that decisions would have to be made in Washington to see whether it is worth pursuing. He also thought we should begin to think about preparations for the Berlin negotiations.
Dr. Kissinger said we must get ahead of this topic and must have some meetings on it. He asked Col. Kennedy to pursue this.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt mentioned the necessity to devote some attention to the interrelationships among issues—Berlin, SALT, Southeast Asia— in dealing with the Soviets. He thought the situation in critical areas had not really improved and questioned the effect on the SALT talks. He noted that Kosygin would probably be here in the fall for the UN General Assembly and there was the likelihood of a high-level meeting. In this connection, he stressed that we should be very careful of what we commit the President to do in connection with high-ranking visitors to the UN and suggested that a Working Group be set up immediately on the question of the UN anniversary.
Dr. Kissinger instructed that this be done.
[Omitted here is discussion of Romania, Korean troop withdrawals, and the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons.]
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council, 1969–77, Meetings, Staff, 1969–71. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Davis on June 16.↩
- During his visit to Bonn in early June, Sonnenfeldt met with a number of German political leaders, including Guttenberg, Schröder, and Bahr. In a meeting on June 8, Guttenberg gave Sonnenfeldt a memorandum in which the CDU argued that the “renunciation-of-force agreement negotiated by Bahr and Gromyko would prejudice four-power responsibility for Berlin and thereby the rights of the three Western powers in Berlin and would endanger the stability of West Berlin.” (Telegram 6565 from Bonn, June 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR) Schroeder also emphasized to Sonnenfeldt that “US should tell FRG to hold up and not go further with Moscow signature until the Berlin issue is clearly pinned down, and only then go ahead.” (Telegram 6564 from Bonn, June 10; ibid.) In telegram 6691 from Bonn, June 11, the Embassy reported that, in his talk with Sonnenfeldt, Bahr had “minimized CDU opposition and felt the SPD enjoyed broadly based popular support for its present course.” “At only one point,” the Embassy commented, “did Bahr not reflect ‘full steam ahead’ confidence and optimism. He said the FDP-caused delays in the Ostpolitik played into the hands of Ulbricht and Gomulka, both of whom are trying desperately everyday to slow down and sabotage the Soviet-FRG negotiations.” (Ibid., POL 1 EUR E–EUR W)↩
- See Document 90.↩
- See Document 36 and footnote 9 thereto.↩
- Reference is presumably to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which were held alternately in Helsinki and Vienna.↩