Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

36. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Visit by Willy Brandt’s Emissary, Egon Bahr

I had a two-hour session with Bahr on Monday, October 13.² The trip was his suggestion and I agreed, after discussion with Secretary Rogers on the understanding that there would be no negotiation of specific matters.³

Bahr said he wanted to assure us, in Brandt’s name, of the basic continuity in German foreign policy and of Brandt’s desire to have close relations. He indicated there was no difficulty with Brandt over your election night phone call to Kiesinger. I assured him of your desire to maintain close and confidential relations with Brandt. We agreed on a confidential channel of communications which, together with the direct line from you to the Chancellor, can be used for strictly private exchanges or contact in moments of crisis. I stressed the need for absolute secrecy when such communications are made and Bahr agreed.⁴ (He has unfortunately not had a reputation for discretion and we will have to test the privacy of this channel in practice, now that Bahr is to become Brandt’s foreign and security policy advisor in the Chancellor’s office.)

In a discussion of the policy intentions of the new coalition in which Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand participated,⁵ Bahr made the following points:

1. After Brandt’s election by the Bundestag, the Germans intend to approach the allies with a proposal to enhance the voting rights of the 22 Berlin deputies in the Bundestag. The matter is controversial in Germany on constitutional grounds and also because it is clearly intended to boost the SPD’s slender majority in the Bundestag. We made no commitments to Bahr but will pursue our internal examination of our options which will also have to take into account problems that might arise with the French (who oppose any change in the existing limitation on Berlin voting rights) and with the Soviets. The Secretary of State is to submit a study for your review.⁶

2. Bahr outlined a fast-paced timetable for German signature of the NPT. It includes a démarche to us concerning interpretations of certain clauses in the NPT. Such a démarche was already in train under the outgoing German government and should not pose problems for us. Once the Germans sign, we can expect early Soviet willingness to jointly complete ratification with us, as we have proposed.⁷

3. Bahr outlined a series of German moves toward the USSR, Poland and East Germany. In themselves they pose no major problems for us (e.g., a German-Soviet understanding on renunciation of force, a new German offer to the Poles amounting to de facto acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line); but they could become troublesome if they engender euphoria, affect Germany’s contribution to NATO and give ammunition to our own détente-minded people here at home. The Germans may also become so engaged in their Eastern policy that their commitment to West European unity may decline. The Soviets—and, with some apparent prodding by Moscow, Ulbricht—seem willing enough to receive Bonn’s overtures. The Germans may wind up combining the disadvantages of each of their major policies: getting sucked into more and more concessions to “save” their new Eastern policy while causing their Western allies to question their reliability. It is questionable whether the internal strength and cohesion of the FRG is strong enough to sustain a series of frustrations and setbacks.⁸

4. Bahr expressed concern about unilateral US troop reductions in Germany, mostly because he felt this would reduce Western bargaining leverage in negotiations with the Russians on mutual troop cuts. I told him that we had no plans or intentions to cut our troops but that, realistically, the trend in Congress and elsewhere toward doing so could not be ignored. I said we would hope to deal with this problem in an orderly way by consulting with our allies on a viable strategic concept and on a force posture which we and the allies would abide by. We are preparing a NSSM on our NATO forces for early issuance.⁹ But it is clear that the Germans expect substantial US cuts in the next two years or so and are themselves examining various schemes for negotiating with the Russians on major reductions on both sides. NATO also has a study underway on such mutual reductions. I believe it is essential that we have an agreed strategic concept before any negotiations with the Soviets occur.

Altogether, the points in Bahr’s substantive presentation contained no surprises. He did say that we should expect less of a guilt complex in Bonn under Brandt and President Heinemann, and hence a more self-reliant and not always compliant attitude toward us. The Socialists may well seek to take on a more nationalist coloration by presenting themselves as defenders of the German national interest.¹⁰ In any case, we can probably expect to see a posture of greater independence toward us in Bonn. I told Bahr that we want to deal with Germany as a partner, not a client.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Sonnenfeldt redrafted the memorandum on October 15 to incorporate Kissinger’s handwritten corrections; two substantive revisions are noted in footnotes below. A note on the memorandum indicates it was returned from the President on October 22.
2. Bahr also prepared a memorandum of the conversation on October 14; see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 1114–1118. For memoir accounts, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 410–412; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, pp. 270–283; and Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp. 286–287.
3. See Document 28.
4. As Kissinger later recalled: “Bahr, after leaving the White House by the front door, reentered it through the basement for a private talk with me, primarily to establish a channel by which we could stay in touch outside formal procedures.” (White House Years, p. 411) According to Bahr, the two men agreed that only Nixon, Sonnenfeldt, Brandt, and Ehmke would also know about this backchannel. (Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 2, p. 1114, fn. 2) After the meeting, Kissinger arranged to set up a line of communication to Brandt that “would be just a transmittal to Brandt and then back to us.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
5. Hillenbrand drafted a memorandum of the conversation in which he commented: “This was a typical Bahr performance. He did most of the talking and did not always distinguish between his own views and those of Brandt. Judging from information from other sources, the line of thinking which he outlined generally reflects the putative new Chancellor’s own approach.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III)
6. See footnote 3, Document 31.
7. On October 30 Ambassador Roth, the German Disarmament Commissioner, met Secretary of State Rogers in Washington to discuss German signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Memorandum from Rogers to the President, October 30; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 12, President’s Daily Briefs, October 29–31, 1969) Rogers subsequently agreed, with the President’s approval, to issue public assurances that the NPT did not affect the security guarantees of NATO. (Memorandum from Watts to Eliot, November 12; ibid., Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, April 1969–Mar 70) The text of Rogers’ statement, delivered on November 28 following German signature of the treaty, is in Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1969, p. 545.
8. The previous two sentences are based on Kissinger’s comment in the margin of the draft: “Germans may wind up combining the disadvantage of every course of action. The cohesion of the FRG is not strong enough to sustain a very great area of maneuver.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III)
9. Kissinger issued NSSM 84, U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO, on November 21. The text is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI.
10. This sentence is based on Kissinger’s marginalia: “It may be that the Socialists want to present themselves as defenders of the German national interest.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III)