Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

88. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Germany’s Eastern Policy and the Berlin Talks: A Status Report

There has been great activity recently in each of the component parts of Chancellor Brandt’s Eastern Policy: talks with Gromyko in Moscow, negotiations with the Poles in Warsaw, and two historic meetings between East German Premier Stoph and Brandt. In addition, three sessions of US, UK and French discussion with the Soviets on Berlin have been completed.

FRG-Soviet Talks

After some 35 hours of discussion ranging over several months, Brandt’s State Secretary, Egon Bahr, agreed with Gromyko on May 22 a set of “principles” to govern future negotiations on a treaty renouncing the use of force. In essence, the principles center on Bonn’s willingness to accept the territorial and political status quo in Central Europe, including the border between the two Germanys. It was also agreed that Bonn would conclude similar renunciation of force agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Bonn feels it will have safeguarded the basic right of the German people to peaceful reunification by means of a letter to that effect, which the Soviets have indicated they will not rebut.

The Bonn Government has now officially announced that formal negotiations for the FRG-Soviet renunciation of force treaty will begin probably in late June. Foreign Minister Scheel will probably personally conduct the negotiations in Moscow.

FRG–GDR Talks

The second Brandt–Stoph meeting at Kassel, West Germany, was almost a complete failure, particularly since the Germans had hoped that progress in the Moscow talks would be a helpful influence on the East Germans. Brandt offered a series of proposals reflecting his position that two sovereign states existed within the German nation, but that they were not “foreign” to each other. Stoph took a very hard line, insisting on full international recognition of the GDR. The only hopeful sign was that agreement emerged to maintain existing technical discussions, and the continued existence of the possibility of another meeting in the future.

German-Polish Negotiations

The fourth round of negotiations will open on June 8 in Bonn with both sides privately predicting some agreement by the fall. Although the series of negotiations have treated trade matters and consular relations, the main issue is the degree to which Bonn will acknowledge formally the Oder-Neisse line. The issue is bound up in Four Power rights and responsibilities reflected in the Potsdam Agreement, and thus is one in which we will play a distinct role. Meanwhile, the Poles and French have been considering a formula for the Four Powers to issue at the time of an FRG-Polish agreement, which would amount to a pledge to agree to that border line in any future peace settlement for Germany.

Four Power Talks in Berlin

The US, UK, French and USSR Ambassadors will meet in Berlin on June 9 for their fourth session. The Soviets have taken an increasingly harder line, insisting that West Berlin be respected as an independent state and that the FRG eliminate its presence there. The Western powers have been probing for signs of Soviet willingness to agree to improvements in access, intr-acity movement and acceptance of Berlin’s ties to West Germany. Unfortunately, the three Western powers and the FRG have not yet reached agreement among themselves on several issues including the German role in access matters, the degree to which FRG presence in Berlin can be bargained away, and the synchronization of the Berlin talks with the other FRG negotiations with the East.

Brandt’s Problems and Prospects

Domestic German political considerations are now key to Bonn’s next moves. In the face of the regional elections on June 14 Brandt wanted to move quickly to an agreement with Moscow, but the conservative leaders of the FDP (and even Foreign Minister Scheel) are surfacing doubts about the wisdom of the Eastern policy. At the same time the CDU is increasing its attack on Brandt’s moves with the East. The elections could give the SPD/FDP coalition a strong hand in continuing its Eastern policy, but a poor showing by the junior partner (FDP) could slow the pace and even bring down the Government.

In the background is the question of a European security conference. In an accommodation to Allied feelings, we agreed at the NATO meeting in Rome officially to hold out the prospect of multilateral talks if progress is made with the East on the German-Berlin issues. Thus, those European Allies strongly interested in moving toward a conference will be eager to see success in Bonn’s Eastern policy and in the Berlin talks. If the series of Bonn negotiations do not meet with immediate results, increased pressure can be expected both from the Germans and the other Europeans for some demonstrable success in the Four Power talks on Berlin.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Confidential; Nodis. Sent for information. A stamped note on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Kissinger had requested a “brief summary” of recent developments in Ostpolitik on June 2 (see footnote 1, Document 83). The same day, Sonnenfeldt forwarded a “brief memo” to the President as well as a “longer analysis” for Kissinger. In the latter document, Sonnenfeldt commented on the lack of progress in the quadripartite negotiations. “The Soviet position is becoming harder, while the Allied position is confused and carries increasing potential for serious intra-Allied friction. Our own position and goals are less than clear. State has not provided the White House with any assessment or comment since the President approved the basic US position in early March. Perhaps State is waiting for the end of the fourth session—after which each of the four Ambassadors will have been in the chair— to take stock and offer an assessment.” (Ibid.) According to another copy, Downey drafted the June 2 memorandum to the President. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 290, Memoranda to the President, 1969–74, May–June 1970)