90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1

SUJBJECT

  • German Election Trends

The Christian Democrats made a strong showing in all three state elections compared with their performance in the last state elections three and four years ago. The most impressive gains were in North Rhine-Westphalia where it picked up 3.5% and regained its position as the plurality party. It made similar gains in popular votes and seats in the Saar and Lower Saxony. Compared with the last Federal elections of September 1969, however, the increases in popular votes are not nearly as impressive: 2.7% in North Rhine-Westphalia, .5% in Lower Saxony, and 2% in the Saar.

It may be that the strong showing in North Rhine-Westphalia represents the strength of its new local leadership under Heinrich Koeppler and the impact of local economic issues, rather than a vote for the party’s national opposition to Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

The CDU retains a slim majority in the Bundesrat where it could block constitutional action on any treaties Brandt may negotiate with the East.

The Social Democratic Party, though suffering an important setback in North Rhine-Westphalia, does not appear to have been repudiated if all three results are taken together. In both the Saar and Lower Saxony it increased its popular vote. In Lower Saxony it holds a one vote majority in the local parliament’s lower house. Moreover, its decline in popular percentage in North Rhine-Westphalia, compared with the Federal elections last fall, was only about .7 percent.

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On the other hand, to the extent that these elections were regarded as a sort of referendum on Ostpolitik, Brandt will find it difficult to make a credible claim of an endorsement for his policies.2

For the Free Democrats the results were a near disaster. They now disappear from representation in both the Saar and Lower Saxony. But in North Rhine-Westphalia, which for the party was the most important test, they barely managed to qualify (5.5%) and show a tiny gain over the popular vote in last fall’s national election. Compared with their performance in the local state elections of 1966 they declined almost 2%.3

The future of the party and its role in the national coalition in Bonn is in doubt. The party holds a Convention Congress next week (June 22–24), and Foreign Minister Scheel’s leadership of the party will come under greater pressure from the party’s right wing.

There are two possibilities: The FDP leadership will shift to the more conservative faction (Interior Minister Genscher) and might withdraw from the coalition with Brandt. If the FDP party splits, Brandt could arrange to lose a vote of confidence in order to force new national elections. The SPD may feel that the threat of such a move, which might spell the end of the FDP nationally, will retain enough FDP Bundestag votes to continue the coalition government with the Social Democrats.

The second possibility is that the FDP will remain in the coalition on the condition that the Ostpolitik is slowed down and in some respects stiffened. While Brandt might make some gestures in this direction, chances are that he is too heavily committed in both the negotiations with the Soviets and the Poles to retreat.

In either case, the net result seems to be a polarization around the issues of Eastern policy. The CDU will be heartened to sharpen its attacks in the other laender elections, notably in Hesse later this year. On the other hand, Brandt may feel the only real choice for him is to accelerate the pace of his negotiations in order to demonstrate more specific results. Alternatively, he could try to broaden the parliamentary support for his policies through a better relationship with the CDU.

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As a consequence of such polarization our role becomes increasingly sensitive and perhaps even critical. Brandt will be looking for any sign of endorsement from the Allies and will be pressing us to make the Berlin negotiations successful. The CDU will point its appeals more directly to us to stop Brandt or give some sign of our reservations over his policies. The danger will be that whatever we do, we cannot avoid the appearance of taking one side or the other. At the minimum we will now be under pressure to offer more in the early phase of the Berlin talks than might be prudent, and, if we go too far, the French will balk.

Domestically, the prospect is for lack of movement on critical economic and social issues.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Confidential. Sent for information. In a June 15 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt explained that he had done a report on the state elections “in the form of a memorandum for the President, should you care to forward it.” (Ibid.) A stamped note on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. According to another copy, Hyland drafted the memorandum on June 15. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 290, Memoranda to the President, 1969–74, May–June 1970)
  2. In a June 16 memorandum for the President, Rogers reported that, although the state elections produced “substantial gains” for the CDU, Brandt had announced that he would “pursue his Eastern policy without change.” Rogers concluded, however, that the German Government “is likely to be somewhat more cautious in dealing with the East and there will be a degree of instability when important decisions within the Cabinet are required.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 GER W)
  3. Attached but not printed is a chart analyzing the results of the 1966 and 1970 Landtag elections, as well as the 1969 Bundestag elections, in North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and the Saarland.